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1 1 7 
Chap ter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Farml and leas ing is a common me thod for trans fer of use rights  
to farmland . In the U.S., four out of ten acres of farm land are l eased 
(U .S .  Census of Agricul ture 1982). Farm land l .eas ing agreement s convey 
s pe c i f i c  r i g h t s  t o  a g r i c u l tura l l and in exchange for ca s h  o r  a n  i n ­
kind payment. 
Farm � p e r a t o r s  l e a s e f a rm l and be caus e it i s  a me ans  f o r  
providing f l exib i l ity t o  the size  o f  operat ion without encumbrance of 
l o ng t e rm de b t .  Land owne r s  l e a s e  t he i r  f a rm l and t o  o b t a i n  a r e t u r n  
f r om the i r  l a nd a s s e t s  wi t h o u t  t he ne c e s s i t y o f  fa rming t he l a nd 
themse lves . 
Because i t  is an important means of resource cont ro l , farml and 
renta l  and the marke t where renta l  t ransact ions occur , are of concern 
to land owners , farm opera to r s , l enders and pub l i c  po l icy makers .  
Prob l em S tatement 
Leas ing of farml and has exi s ted in one form or ano ther at  l ea s t  
s ince feuda l t imes .  It  has been extens i ve l y  used in the Uni ted Sta tes 
since the pos t  Ci v i  1 War era.  "Tenant farmers" or " sharecroppers "  were 
once considered a l ower soc io-economic c l ass subject  to exp loitation by 
powe r fu l  l and owne r s .  M o r e  r e c e n t l y ,  f a rm l and r e n t a l ha s be en  c o n­
s i d e r e d  t he f i r s t  rung on t he " t e n u r e  l ad d e r" ,  u s e d  e x t ens i v e l y  by 
l and l e s s  p e r s on s  a t t emp t ing t o  b e c ome f a rm o p e ra t o r s .  Th i s  t e n u r e  
l adde r led ev en tual l y  to fu l l ownership and operat ion of farml and . 
2 
The number of acres of farmland rented in the U. S.  has remained 
r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  o v e r  t he l a s t  5 0  ye a r s .  Howe v e r , r e n t e d  f a rm land 
ac r e s  in S o u t h  Dako ta  ha v e  f l uc t ua t e d  o v e r  t ha t t ime pe r i o d .  The  
percent of l and in. South Dakota farms that was rented approached 60% 
i n  1 9 3 0 ,  r o s e  t o  7 0 % in  1 9 4 0 , t he n  de c rea s e d  .s t e a d i l y  to abou t 3 6% i n  
1 982 ( Ta b l e  1 . 1 ) .  Na t i ona l l y ,  t he p e r c e n t  o f  l and in f a rms t ha t  was 
r e n t e d  wa s a l mo s t  44% i n  1 9 3 0 ,  d e c l i n e d  t o  3 5 %  in  1 9 5 0 ,  and  wa s 
repor ted to be 3 9% in 1 9 82. 
Chang e s  in f a rm l a nd t e n a n c y  p a t t e rn s  ha v e  o c c ur r ed a s  a g r i ­
c u l t ur a l p r oduc t i on  me t ho d s  ha v e  c hang e d .  Chan g e s  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  
t e c hno l ogy ha v e  i n c r e a s e d  the  e f f i c i ent  s c a l e  o f  o pe r a t i o n  i n  agr i -
c u l tu r e .  Inc r e a s e d  u s e  o f  pu r c h a s e d  i n p u t s  ha v e  pushed  c a p i t a l 
r e q u i r eme n t s f o r  comme r c i a l fa rming  o pe r a t i o ns  t o  h i gh e r  l e v e l s  
( Johns on 1 9 7  2). 
Under the se cond i t ions , l eas ing of farmland has become a more  
at t rac tive  option for  farm operators  seeking to expand their  operat ion 
to achieve greate r economi es of s i z e .  Current l y ,  the ma jori ty· of farm 
o p e r a t o r s  a r e  par t owne r s , i . e . , t h o s e  who own f a rm l and and l ea s e  
addi tiona! land. Part owner ope rators a l so farm more acres indi v id-
ua l l y and in t he a g g r ega t e  t han  e i t h e r  f u l l  owner  o r  f u l l t enan t 
o p e r a t o r s  (Janssen 1 98 3 ) .  
Ren t a l o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l l an d  h a s  b e e n  d i s cus s ed i n  ec onom i c  
l i terature since Adam Smi th commented ·on the tenure pat terns in Eng l and 
in The Weal th of Nat ions ( 1 776) . A l f red Marsha l l infused new l i fe to  
Table 1 . 1  Rented Agricultural Land 
,
in South Dakota and. the United States 
--
------------------- South Dakota ------------------- --------------- United States ----------------
Percent Percent 
of Land of Land 
Total Acres Rented b::l Total in Farms Total Acres Rented b::l Total in Farms 
Acres Part- Acres· That is Acres in Part- Acres That is 
Year in Farms Tenant Owner Rented Leased in Farms Tenant Owner Rented Leased 
---------- Thousands of acres ---------- -------- Millions of acres -------
* 
1930 36470 . 1  1 3034 . 9  8337 . 3  2 1 372 . 2  58 . 6  990 . 1 307 . 3  125.2 432 . 5 43.6 
1940* 39473 . 6  1 5277 . 2  12202 . 1  27479 . 3  69 . 6  1 065 . 1 313 . 2  155.9 469 . 1 44 . 0  
* 
1950' 44785 . 5  8053 . 7  1 2 1 88 . 2  2024 1 . 8  45 . 2  li6 1 . 4  2 1 2 . 2  1 96 . 2  408 . 4  35 . 2  
* 
1959 44794 . 0  733 1 . 0  12526 . 5  19880 . 8  4 4 . 4  1 123 . 5  166 . 8  234 . 1 400 . 9  35 . 7  
1969
b 
39584 . 8  4312 . 5  10490 . 8  1 4841 . 8  37.5 1063 . 3  137 . 6  24 1 . 8  379 . 4  35 . 7. 
1982
a 
386 15 . 0  3400 . 5  10585 . 4  14015 . 1  36 . 3  986 . 8  113 . 6  269 . 9  383 . 5  38 . 9  
* Information from Special Report accompanying Ag census that year. 
a ) Excludes abnormal farms, which are primarily land held in trust by tribal governments. 
b ) Excludes abnormal farms and farms with <$2500 of sales. 
Data from U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1959, 1969, and 1982, respectively. 
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pa t t e r n s , and the  numbe r o f  l e a s e s  a f a rm o p e ra t o r  o r  l an d o wn e r  i s  
invo 1 ved in. 
O v e r  the l a s t 4 to 5 ye a r s , t h e  f i nanc i a l s i t ua t i o n  o f  ma n y  
farm operators has deteriorated.  Many farm operators are experi enc ing 
financial  dif ficu l ty due to decreasing l and va�ues , high intere s t  ra te s 
a nd l ow c r o p  p r i c e s .  D i f f i cu l t i e s  i n v o l v i ng i na b i l i t y  t o  o b ta i n  
f i nanc i ng ,  inc ome unc e r t a i n t y ,  a n d  re s tric ted cash f lows are causing 
changes  in rent al arrangement s .  
Dur i ng t h e  1 9 7 0 ' s , whe n  f a rm i nc ome s and l and v a l ue s  we r e  
r i s i ng , p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  s ome  a r e a s  w e r e  swi t c h i ng t o  c a s h  r e n t s and  
cash  rent  p r i c e s  we r e  in c r e a s i ng .  I n  r e c e n t  ye a r s , the r e  ha s b e e n  a 
n e t  sh i f t  f r om c a s h  r en t  t o  s h a r e  r en t a l  ag r e emen t s  and  c a s h  rent  
p r i c e s are  fa l l ing . Op e r a t o r s  a r e  t r y i ng t o  r e d u c e  y i e l d  an� p r i c e  
r i s k  i n  a dd i t i o n  t o  r e l i e v i ng p r e s s ur e  o n  c a s h  f l ow s . I n  s ome 
i n s t a nc e s  banke r s  ha v e  b e e n  l im i t in g  l oans to f a rm o p e ra t o r s  t o  
encourage us� of share renta l agreements  ( Scott 1 985 ) .  
F a rm bankru p t c i e s  a nd f o r e c l o s u re s  are bringing new par tici­
pants into the market and changing the na ture of the l and l ord-tenant 
re lationshi p. Widespread forec l osures and defaul t of co l l a tera l may 
i nc re a s e  t he amount o f  f a rm l and  o wn e d  by n o n f a rme r s  and i n c rea s e  t he 
impo rtance of land rental agreemen t s  and ins titutions . 
S o u t h  Dako t a  i s  h e a v i l y  d e pend e n t  up on  t he ag r i c u l t u r a l 
economy. Yet , prior to the 1 986  SDSU sur v ey , no statewide s tudy of  the 
r en t a l mar ke t  has  b e en c omp l e t e d  s in c e  1 9 5 1 .  T h e r e  h a s  b e e n  n o  
6 
pub l i shed economic research of the farm l and renta l marke t s i tua ti on in 
any region of South Dakota s ince 1959 ( Berry and Bau) . 
Objec t i v e s  of  Research 
The primary.objec t i v e  of this  research effort is to revea l s ome 
o f  the ma j o r cha r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  f a rm l and r e n t a l a g r e emen t s  and t h e  
farml and rental market in South Dako ta.  
Spec ific obj ecti ves  are to : 
1 .  E xami ne the s t ru c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the  f a rm l an d  
r en t a l ma r ke t i n  S ou t h Dak o t a , i n c l ud ing  the  charac t e r i s t i c s  o f  
l and l o rds  and tenants.  
2. Exam i ne th e r e l a t i on s h i p  o f  c h a rac t e r i s t i c s  of  f a rm l a n d  
rental market par ticipants t o  renta l agreement terms . 
3 .  Tes t for signif icant  dif fe rences in lease terms by region 
and by crop ping pat tern in South Dakota .  
4 .  Exami ne the  a b i l i t y o f  the  f a rm l and ren t a l ma rk e t  t o  
respond to sport term changes in uncer tainty and financi a l  cond i t ions 
and the types of adjus tments tha t are oc curr ing. 
5 .  Exami ne t e rms o f  r e n t a l a g r e emen t s: a) f o r  p r e s en c e  o f  
c o nd i t i o n s  f o r  e f f i c i e n t  u s e  o f  r e s o u r c e s ,  and b )  t o  d e t e rm i n e  i f  
renta l agreements dis tribute cos ts  and re turns approximate ly  as output 
is shared. 
Procedures  
The  p r ima r y  s o u r c e  o f  d a t a  for  this  p r o j e c t  was  the 1986 S DS U  
Farml and Renta l Survey. A copy o f  t he sur v ey ins trument i s  avai l ab l e  in 
the  Append ix .  Thi s sur v e y  w a s  ma i l e d t o  a random samp l e  o f  4 , 1 1 0  
l andowners  and farm opera tors  in S outh Dakota. The populat ion for this 
s amp l e  was  the AS C S  p r o d uc e r s  l i s t , w h i c h  c ori t ains  1 00 , 1 4 1  e n t r i e s .  
This  l i s t  contains the names and addresses o f  farm operators and l and­
l o r d s  who ha v e  c r o p l and b a s e  a c r e s  and / o r  ha v e  be en pa r t i c i pa n t s  i n  
fede ra l farm prog rams i n  recent years .  
A rand om samp l e o f  name s f rom e a c h  c oun t y w a s  d r aw n , u s ing a 
f i v e  percent samp ling rate for c ounties eas t of  the Missouri river .  An 
eight  percent samp l ing ra te was used for  count ies wes t of the Mis sour i ,  
b e c a u s e  o f  t he l ow er numbe r  o f  name s o n  t h e  p r o duc e r s  l i s t  f o r  t ho s e  
counties .  A tota l o f  5583 names were se l ec ted.  
The s amp l e  o f  names  f r om each c ou n t y  was  t h en ma i l e d to  t h e  
ASCS of fice in tha t  county. County o f f icers then identified each name 
as ei ther a :  1) nono pera tor l and l o rd ,  2) farm operator who rent s l and 
t o  o r  f r om o t he r s ,  3 )  f arm o p e ra t o r  w h o  i s  no t in v o l v ed i n  r en t a l 
a r ran g ement s ,  o r  4 )  a s  no t a c t i v e i n  any  a s p e c t  o f  f arming o r  r e n t i ng 
a t  the  c ur r e n t  t ime . Of  the  6 6  c o un t y  o f f i c e s  s e n t  l i s t s , o n l y  t h r e e  
d i d  not return them wi th t he names appropriat e l y  c l ass ified.  A tota l 
of 1473  names were e l iminated because they were 1 )  ful l owner operators  
no t inv o l ved in  l and renta l or 2 )  were inac tive .  
The s ur v e y w a s  ma i l e d  t o  t h o s e  i d e n t i f i ed  as  n o n o p e r a t o r  
l and l o rd s  and f a rm o pe r a t o r s  in v o l v e d  i n  r e n t a l a g r e eme n t s .  I n  t he 
counties whe re the loca l  offices did not c l as si fy the names , the survey 
was sent  to the fu l l  5 or 8 percen t  samp le .  Of the 1436  que s tionaires 
re turned , 1 1 5 5  contained usab l e  informat ion for this project .  
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Characteristics of market p a r t i c i pa n t s  and r e n t a l a g r e e me n t s  
a r e  i d e n t i f i e d u s ing  d e s c r i p t i v e  s t a t i s t i c s  and c r o s s  t a bu l a t i o n .  
Ana l y s i s  o f  v a r i ance t e chni q u e s  a n d  c h i  s q u a r e  t e s t s  a r e  u s e d  t o  
achi eve the first  four o b jec t i v e s .  T o  comp l e te objective 5 ,  the abo v e  
ment ioned techniques are used i n  a d d i t i o n  to cro p  e n t e r pr i s e  b u d g e t s  
for specific  areas o f  South Dako ta . 
Organizat ion of Study 
This  thesis  contains s e ven chap ters .  This  chapter contains the 
i n t r oduc t i o n , pr o b l e m s t a t eme n t , o b j e c t i v e s  and p r oc e d u r e s  f o r  t h i s 
r e s e a rch  e f f o r t .  The  se c ond c h a p t e r c on t a i n s  a r e v i ew o f  l i t e r a t u r e  
u s e d  i n  d e v e l o p i ng t h i s r e s e a r c h .  T he o r e t i ca l l i t e ra t u r e  o n  t he 
impacts  of l and renta l on resource us e ,  the na ture of the l and renta l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , and empi r i c a l s t udi e s  d one i n  the  Un i t e d  S t a t e s  a r e  
reviewed . 
The thi rd cha p t e r  c o n t a i n s  a n  ana l y s i s  o f  s p e c i f i c  �h a r a c -
-
teris tics  of  the farml and renta l  marke t ,  terms of rental  agreement s ,  
and cha rac t e r i s t i c s  o f  r e n ta l ma r ke t  p a r t i c i pa n t s  i n  S o u t h  Dako t a .  
C ha p t e r  t h r e e c omp l e t e s  the f i r s t  and  s e c ond o b j e c t i v e . T he f o u r t h  
c ha p t e r  ana l y z e s  t h e  a d a p t a b i l i t y �f  r e n t a l mar ke t s  to  change s i n  
produc t ion due t o  regiona l v ariations i n  land product i v i ty.  Objec t i v e  
3 is  comp leted in the four th chapter .  
Change s in  renta l agreement s are ana l yzed in  the fifth chapte r ,  
t o  de termine the responsi v enes s  o f  renta l marke ts to change s i n  eco-
nom i c  conditions. 
Farm l and r e n t a l a g r e eme n t s  a r e  ana l yz e d  in Cha p t e r  6 f o r  t h e  
presence o f  incentive  cond i t ions theoretica l l y  nece ssary f o r  renters  t o  
p roduce a t  optima l l eve l� .  I n  add i t ion, Chapter 6 contains ana l ysis  t o  
determine whethe r  renta l  agreements i n  pract i ce provi de approxima t i ons 
of  the incen tive cond itions in  the divi s ion of _cos ts  and r� turns . 
The fina l  chapter, seven ,  contains a summary of the resu l t s  and 
c o n c l u s i o n s  o f  the  r e s e a r c h .  Imp l i c a t i o n s  o f  the  r e su l t s  a n d  s u g ­
gest ions f o r  fur ther research are a l s o i n  the final chapter .  
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Chapt er  2 
REVIEW OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRI CAL LITERATURE 
Leasing of agricul tura l  land trans fers specific property  r ight s 
o f  l and own e r s h i p  t o  t he r en t e r, f o r  a s pe c i f i c  t ime p e r i o d, f o r  
agricu l tura l  production. The d i v i s ion o f  . the _proper ty rights  through 
l e a s ing a g r eemen t s  c r ea t e s  c omp l i c a t i ons  in r e s ou r c e  u s e  d e c i s i o n s . 
The l andowner ' s  and renter ' s  ob j e c t ives and interes t s  may not coincide, 
l e ad i ng to  c onf l i c t s  and  u s e  o f  r e s ou r c e s  in o t h e r  than  o p t ima l 
combinat ions . 
This chapt er contains a review of the historical de ve l opment of  
economic theory of farm l and r enta l and r enta l market s  in  Eng l and and 
the Uni ted S tate s .  The firs t part  of the chapter traces the evo l ut ion 
of  the theory of rental market s  from Adam Smi th to  the pres ent .  In the 
s e c ond par t of the c ha p t e r, a r e v i ew of s ome of t he mo r e  imp o r t a n t  
empirical works are presented.  This  l a t ter  section emphas izes  re v iew 
of contempor�ry farmland renta l market condi tions in the U .S .  
Development of Rental Theory - Smi th � Marshall 
Adam Smith, wri t ing in the Wea l th of Nations ( 1 7 7 6 ), discus sed 
the e v o l ut ion of land renta l and the Eng l is h  system of fixed rent s and 
p e r p e tua l t e nanc y .  Smi t h  i d en t i f i ed a po t en t i a l e f f i c i e n c y  pr o b l em 
wi th l and renta l .  Subsequent Bri t ish  and American wri ters bui l t  upon 
this observation. 
Origina l l y ,  tenants  wer e  serfs  who were lega l l y at tached to the 
l and , and a p p l i ed on l y  a s u b s i s t en c e  l e v e l o f  e f f o r t .  Ev e n t u a l l y 
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l and l o r d s  o f f e r e d  t o  pay  a sha r e  o f  t h e  pr oduc t t o  inc r e a s e  ou t p u t .  
The me t a y e r  ( s h a r e  t e n an t )  p r o v i d e d  on l y  l a b o r  and t h e  l and l o rd 
p r o v i d e d  s e e d, c a t t l e  and t o o l s . S in c e  the  l and l o rd s ha r e d  a l l 
produc t ion increases .and had power t o  take back the l and, tenan ts wou l d  
no t a p p l y  t h e i r  own s t o c k ,  pe r pe t u a t i ng a s u b- o p t imum l e v e l o f  
produc tion . 
A s y s t em wa s e v en tua l l y  e s t a b l i s hed i n  Eng l and whe r e  t he 
f arme r ' s  r en t  wa s f i xe d  and t enure  wa s a s  s e c u r e.a s  the  p r op r ie t o r ' s .  
This  occurrence a l l owed Eng l ish farmers t o  prosper , whi l e  the per s i s­
tence of  metayage on the continent impo verished the French farmer.  
Smith be l ieved rent  l ev e l s  were  de termined by the avai l abi l i t y  
o f  f o od a n d  f e r t i l i t y  o f  t h e  l an d .  H i gh e r  1ent i s  p a i d  wh en l and  i s  
mo r e  p r o duc t i v e  o r  when c r o ps re q u i r e  mo re  i n t en s i v e  cu l t i va t i o n .  
Ri skier enterprises earn more rent be cause they mus t  af ford insurance 
as we l l  as profit .  As l and became l es s  abundant , more produc t s  earned 
rent . 
Another  Eng l ish economis t  who contr ibuted significant l y  · t o  the 
d e f i n i t i on of r e n t  wa s Da v i d Ri c a rd o  (181 7). Ac c o r d i ng to Ri c a r d o , 
rent is "tha t  port ion of the produce of the earth which is  paid to the 
l and l o rd for the use of the o rigina l and indes t ruct ible powers of the 
soi l" ( pp. 33 ) .  This payment is a t t r ibutab l e  to the l imited supp l y  and 
varying fer t ility  of land . 
When a country is young , land is cons idered a bound less  gif t o f  
n a t ure  and n o  ren t i s  pa i d .  P o p u l a t i on g r ow t h  r e v ea l s  t h e  l imi t e d  
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s u p p l y  and non-h omo g e n e o u s  na t ur e  o f  l and . T.he be s t  l and e a r n s  r e n t  
when inf erior l and i s  brought into cu l t i va t ion. Production o n  l and of  
a th i r d  degree  o f  f e r t i l i t y, ca u s e s  l and o f  t he s e c ond l e v e l  to  e a r n  
rent and rent o n  land of the firs t l eve l t o  increase . 
Ri c a r d o  t houg h t  i t  w a s impo r t an t t o  mai n t a in t h i s  n a r r ow 
de fini t ion of rent .  Too of ten in pract ice, · rent inc ludes t he interes t 
and profit  of  capi tal . When l and is  improv ed, on ly par t  of  the renta l 
p ayme n t  g o e s  f o r u s e  o f  t he p ow e r s  o f  t h e  s o i l .  The rema inde r  i s  
rea l ly a return t o  capi ta l .  
J ohn S t ua r t  Mi l l  a d d r e s s e d  the  i s s u e  o f  f a rm l and ren t a l a n d  
me tayage i n  The Principles  of Po l i tical  Economy ( 1 85 7 ) .  In genera l he 
agreed wi th Smi th, th.a t  share rent cou l d  act much l ike a tax , reducing 
a tenant ' s  incentive  to  inves t  in improvements .  
It  wa s a mi s t a ke t o  c on d emn t he share  s y s t em ,  howe v e r ,  whe n 
s u c c e s s f u l  s h a r e  s y s t ems e xi s t e d  i n  I ta l y . F i xed  ren t s  a nd s e c u r e  
tenure were not conc l us i ve l y  the cause  o f  bet ter product ion and more 
p r o s p e r ous farme r s .  The c au s e  w a s  mo r e  l i ke l y t h a t  s ha r e  a g r e e me n t  
t e rms w e r e  d e t e rmine d by  c u s t om and t r a d i t i on , no t compe t i t i o n  o r  
economic considera t i on s . 
Wri t ing in Princ ip l es of Economics ( 19 38) , Marshal l used a more 
f o rma l ana l y t i ca l  f ramewo r k  to c o n f i rm Smi t h ' s  b a s i c c o nc l u s i on s . 
Cu l t i v a t o r s  wi l l  not  a p p l y  o p t imum qua n t i t i e s  o f  l ab o r  and .ca p i t a l 
und e r  a s ha r e  s y s t em. If a l an d l o r d ' s  s ha r e  is one ha l f  t he p r od uc t , 
the  fa rme r  maximi z e s  p r o f i t  whe r e  r e t u rn f r om add i t i ona l i n pu t s i s  
equa l t o  twice the cos t  (where margina l cost=margina l return) .  
sou .... . ,  
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M a r s ha l l  a l s o be l i e v e d  tha t s e c u r i t y  o f  tenure  may i n h i b i t  
app l icat ion of inputs  by the cu l t i va tor .  I f  the land l ord can di smis s 
the farmer howe ve r ,  labor and o ther inputs may be prescri bed in quan­
t i ties equa l to those app l ied under  t he Eng l ish system. 
Modern Renta l  Theory= Schicke l e  to-Hur l bur t 
Economis ts in this period used v arious approache s to produc t ion 
ana l ys i s  i n  a p a r t i a l e q u i l i b r i um f ramewo r k ,  and de r i v e d s imi l a r  
conc lus ions.  Subsequent artic l e s  bui ld direct l y upon the cont ribut ions 
of ear l ier wri ters .  
The  a u t h o r s  r e v i e w e d g e n e r a l l y  a g r e e d  wi t h  Mar s ha l l ' s  
as sessment that the margina l cos t  of s hare rental  reduced the farme r ' s  
p ro f i t  max imi z ing o u t pu t  l e v e l  ( F i gu r e  2 . 1 ) .  F i xed  c a s h  a g r e emen t s  
were  no t a s  l i ke l y  t o  cause  d i s t o r t i o n s  a s  sha r e  l e a s e s .  M o s t  a l s o 
be l ieved insecuri ty of tenure caused by sho r t  term lease s cou ld affec t 
app l ication of inputs and effic iency. Each writer proposed changes in 
l easing ins t i tutions tha t  cou ld  a l l e v ia te the efficiency prob l ems . 
Rainer Schicke le  ( 1 93 1 ) app l ied Marsha l l 's marginal ana l ysis  t o  
t h e  modern farm f irm. He ana l yzed the impac t s  on farm efficiency and 
ne t soc ia l  produc t of five  representa t i ve types of tenure.  Net soci a l  
produc t is  affected through reduced aggregate output , produc tion of  the 
wrong crops , and increased socia l cos t s .  
Two cond i t i o n s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  at taining maximum effic iency : 
1 )  the intensi ty of input app l icat ion i s  such that margina l cost equa l s  
margina l re turn , and 2 )  factors  mus t  be combined to yie ld  equi-margina l 
Figure 2.1 Impact of share rental on profit maximizing level of 







Figure 2.la The rental share paid by the tenant reduces the 
value of the marginal product of the variable input 
and lowers the profit max1m1z�ng level of input use 
















Figure 2.lb In terms of output, the rental share reduces the 
price of the product received by the tenant, and 
lowers the profit maximizing output level (MC= 








returns .  The differing goa l s  of  t he two par t ies impedes use of optimum 
combinations of the l and l o rd ' s  (durab l e ) and the tenant 's  (non-durab l e) 
inputs .  
A farm ful ly  owned by the operator meets  conditions for maximum 
efficiency desc ribed by c l as s ica l ana l ysis .  If l and is cash l eased , 
unreso l v ed conf l ic t s  between l and l o rd and tenant may affec t appl icat ion 
o f  input s.  Share agreement s  are fur ther comp l i ca ted because the renta l  
p r i c e  i s  a f unc t i on o f  y i e l d , wh i ch r e d u c e s  t h e  p ro f i t maximi z i n g  
output l e v e l  be low that of a cash r ented farm. Tenant uncertainty about 
future occupancy of  the l and create s emphas is  on short  term produc t io n ,  
and reduced inves tment i n  dura b l e  fact ors .  
S c h i c ke l e  saw t h e  e f f e c t s  of  sha r e  r e n t a l i n  the  U . S .  b e i n g  
partia l l y , but never fu l l y ,  mi t i ga ted b y  l ease  term mod ificat ions such 
as sharing fe rt i l i zer and seed c o s t s .  
Ad justments suggested b y  Schicke l e  to  a l l e v iate the e ffec t s  o f  
l and r en t a l on eff i c i e ncy we r e : 1 )  c om pe n s a t i o n  o f  the  t enan t f o r  
une xha u s t e d  imp r o v eme n t s , 2 )  mo r e  s e c ur i t y  of t e nur e , b u t  no t c om­
p l e te l y  remo v ing competit ion , and 3 )  rep l acing share wi th cash l ea s e s .  
Ear l Heady  ( 1 9 4 7 a n d  1 9 5 2 )  a g r e e d  wi t h  Sc h i c ke l e , conc l ud i n g  
t ha t  r en t a l a g r eeme n t s  s h ou l d  n o t d i s t o r t  i n p u t  a l l o c a t i o n s  t o  
produc tion of soc iety's  preferred bund l e  of goods.  Leases shou l d  a l s o  
pro vide undis torted distribut ion o f  returns t o  fac tor inputs .  
In  t he s ho r t  run , c a s h  r e n t a l s  are a f i xe d  co s t , and d on' t  
affect efficiency. Share renta l  is a varia b l e  cos t , l owe ring inpu t 
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us e and caus ing  ine f f i c i en c y . · L o ng run  ana l y s i s  s u p po r t e d  p re v i o u s  
assert ions t hat  insecurity  of  tenure causes distortions.  However , l ong 
term l eases reduce the incentiv e  for  conscient ious cul tivat ion by the 
tenant . 
Head y ' s  sugge s t i ons  f o r  i ns t i tutional ad j us tments are concep­
t ua l i z ed i n  h i s  '" pe r f e c t  l e a s e'". T he p e r f ec t  lea s e  wo u l d :  1 )  p r o v i d e  
f o r  t h e  d i v i s i on  o f  t h e  p r o du c t s o  e a c h  r e s ou r c e  own e r  r e c e i v e s t h e  
margina l product of  that resource , 2 )  remove  uncertainty o f  obtaining 
re t u r n s  f rom l on g  te rm inv e s tme n t s  by u s i n g  l ong t e rm ag r e emen t s  o r  
p r o v i d i ng c omp e n s a t io n  f o r  unexha u s t e d  imp r o v eme n t s; 3 )  i n  s ha r e  
ag r e eme n t s , t h e  c o s t  o f  v a r i a b l e  f a c t o r s  s ho u l d  b e  s ha r e d  b e twe e n  
l and lord and renter i n  the same pro port ion t hat  out put is  shared , and 
4)  c o n s i d e r  payme n t  f o r  l an d  u s e  s e pa r a t e  f r om p ayment  f o r  c a p i t a l 
improvements and consumer good s .  
D .  G a  1 e J ohn s o n  ( 1 9  5 0 )  d e v e l o p e d  a t h e o r e t i c a  1 mo d e  1 ,  u s i n g  
p ro d uc t i on a nd inc ome f u nc t i on s  t o  ana l yz e  t h e  impac t o f  r e n t a l 
a g r e eme n t s  on r e s our c e  u s e .  The  f i r s t  o r d e r  condi t ions  o f  t h e s e  
f unc t io n s , maximi z i ng w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  l and and l a bor , re v e a l e d t h a t  
tenant s wi l l  rent land unti l the margina l product  of  l and is  zero.  At 
t h i s  p o i n t  l and is f a rmed l e s s  i n t e ns i v e l y ,  and t he r e s u l t  i s  
inefficiency . 
C o n t r a r y  to c o n c e r n s  o f  p r e v i o u s  wr i te r s , J o hns on f e l t  annu a l 
l eases  cou ld  be us ed e f f ec t i v e l y  to encourage renters to  app l y  opt imum 
input l e ve l s .  Ev en wi th long te rm contrac t s  however , Johns on be l i eved 
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that  t radi t ional farm p rac t ices  and imp l ici t agreement on output l e ve l s  
would  prompt the tenant t o  farm a s  intens ive l y  a s  an owner.  
Hur l burt , ( 1 954) put his sugge s t i ons for changes in lease terms 
i n t o  f our  incen t i v e  c ond i t i o n s .  H e  then  u s e d  s u r v e y  r e su l t s f rom 7 
s tates to test  for the ir  pre sence in contemporary renta l agreement s  in 
the Midwe s t .  
The four incentive  cond i t ions are : 
1. The share of v ariab l e  input cos t s  paid must equa l the share 
of  output rec ei ved.  
2.  The share rental for  all  produc t s  must  be the same . 
3.  Ea ch  r e s ou r c e  o wne r mus t  r e c e i v e  the  fu l l  s h a re o f  t he 
produc t earned by each uni t of resource contributed.  
4. E a ch r e s ource  own e r  mus t  ha v e  t h e  o p p o r t un i t y  to r e c e i v e  
t h e  r e t urn  on i n v e s tme n t s  mad e  i n  one  p r o d uc t i o n p e r i o d , b u t  no t 
avai lab l e  unt i l  a subsequent period.  
The  p r e s ence  o f  the s e  c o nd i t i o n s  d o e s  no t guaran t e e  e f f � c i e n t  
r e s o ur c e  u s e ,-but  t he i r  a b s e n c e  p r o v i d e s  i n c e nt i v e  f o r  u s e  o f  o t h e r  
than optimum combinat ions o f  input s .  
C a s h  l e a s e s  aut o ma t i c a l l y  f u l f i l l t h e  f i r s t  two incen t i v e  
c ond i t i on s .  The. r e s o u r c e  owne r mus t r e c e i v e  the  f u l l s ha r e  o f  t he 
produc t earned by fixed resources , to meet  incentive condi tion three. 
Cond i t ion one must  be fu l f i l led  before cond i t ion three can be m e t .  T o  
me e t  c ondi t i on t h r e e , c a s h  r e n t a l r a t e s  mu s t  e q ua l  the  ra t e  l an d  
cont ributes to earnings.  
19 
Mo s t  l ea s e s  r e po r t e d  i n  t he s u r v e y l ac ke d  one o r  more  o f  t h e  
incent ive  conditions.  Sharing o f  variable  input cos ts  was uncommon,  and 
s ha r e d  co s t s we r e  no t l ik e l y  t o  be s h a r e d  in the  same pr o p o r t i o n  a s  
output  was shared . Share renta l proport ions f requent ly dif fe red betw een 
p ro d uc t s , a p p a r e n t ly to compen s a t e  f o r  o t h e r  l e a s e  p r o b l ems . C r o p  
share l ease s comp l y  wi th condi t ion  three i f  ·additional payment i s  made 
for  capita l  impro v ement s .  P ro v is ions o f  this nature were no t present in 
mos t  share agreement s.  
Obtaining re turns from inves tment s can be ensured by mat ching 
t he l eng th of t h e  a g r e emen t  t o  tha t o f  t h e  i n v e s t ment  or p r o v i d ing 
adequa te notice o f  terminat ion. Few l eases  had terms to prov ide this 
as surance . 
In a later publ icat i on , Hur l bur t ( 1 962 ) presented a theoret ica l 
m e t h o d  t o  be u s e d  t o  c o nc l ud e  an  e c o n om i c a l l y e f f i c ie n t  l e a s e . The  
p ro b l em is  t o  de c i de wha t f o rm and amount  p a yment shou l d  be , and how  
l ong s h ou l d  t he l e a s e  e nd u r e .  The s e  t e rm s  o f  paymen t wi l l  t he n  
enco ur a g e  u s e- o f  quan t i t i e s  and c om b i na t i o n s  o f  in p u t s  r e q ui r ed f o r  
ef ficiency . 
A prof it  maximiz ing farm o pe ra t o r ,  equa ting margina l returns t o  
marginal cos t , determines a ppro priate r ent b y  ident i fying the func t ion 
and c o s t  of  each par ty' s  cont ribu t ions .  Payment  of re tu rns is propor-
t io na! t o  t he c o n t r i bu t i on s  o f  t he r e s o u r ce s .  This  p r o ce s s  i s  
comp l icated but shou l d  resu l t i n  more comp l et e  knowl edge o f  input and 
factor p roduc t i vi ty and bet ter  dec is ion making. 
2'0 
Modern General Equil ibrium Approach to. Rental Theory 
Wri t e r s  in t h i s  · p e r i o d  u s e d  g ene r a l e qui l i b r ium mod e l s  t o  
ana lyze the impac t o f  ren ta l on e ff i c iency. Use of genera l equi l ibrium 
a l lowed impac ts other than t he margina l inf luences  of rental terms on 
the firm to be inc l uded. Al though the effec t  of lease terms on use o f  
inputs  is  general ly not d i s puted , o ther inf luences counteract these 
inc e n t i v e s .  E qua l e f f i c i enc y the o r i s t s  g e n e r a lly agree  t ha t sha r e  
l ea s e s  wi l l  b e  c ho s en when t h e y  a r e  t he l ea s t  c o s t  me t h o d  o f  r i s k  
disper sion available . 
Inte re st in  the theory o f  fa rm l and ren ta l  was renewed by Ste v en 
C he ung ( 1 9 68 and 1 9 6 9 ) .  U s ing  a g e ne r a l  equi l i b r i um mod e l ,  C heung ' s  
theory o f  share renta l di sputed the as sertion that share rents caused  
inefficiency. Wea l th maximizat ion by the l and l ord wi l l  lead to  a share 
c o n t ra c t wi t h  a s pe c i f i e d r e n ta l p�r c en ta g e  and ra t i o  o f  n on l and t o  
l and input .  
In thi s mod e l ,  the  l an d l o r d  mus t o f f e r  a re tur n  t o  t he · t e nan t 
equa l to  the wage rate , but no highe r  due to compe t i tion among t enant s .  
Thi s  e q u i l i br i um ren ta l ra t e  pa y s  t h e  l and l o r d  the v a l ue ma r g ina l 
produc t of l and. Renters rece i ve an amount  equa l to  the v a l ue margina l 
produc t of labor.  Input s  are app l ied with equa l intens i ty ,  regard l es s  
o f  whe t her  t he 1 a n d  i s  owne r o p e r a t e d  , c a sh 1 e a s ed , o r  s h a r e  1 e a s e d .  
Cheung supports  hi s hypo thes is with data o n  tenure and renta l prac t ice s 
in China circa 1 930.  
Share lease s dis tr ibute the risk,  making them preferabl e  to  cash 
l ease s ,  but t hey have higher t ransac t i on and enforcement costs.  Of the 
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e qua l l y  e f f i c i e n t  t enure  f o rms , s ha r e  t e nancy is c h o s e n  i f  t he r i s k  
shi f t ing benefits  are worth the add i t iona l cost .  
No t a l l ec onomi s t s ac c e p t e d  t h e  e q ua l e f f i c i e ncy hy p o t he s i s .  
Bardhan and S rini vasan ( 19 7 1 )  determined t ha t  sharecroppers wou ld  s to p  
s ho r t  o f  e q ua l i z ing ' the  v a l ue ma r g i na l  p r o duc t o f  l a bo r t o  t h e  wag e  
r a t e .  Un l i ke Che ung , B a r dhan  a n d  S ri n i v a san in·c o r p o r a ted  t he dema nd 
s i d e  i n  the i r  mo d e l w i t h  ma ximi z a t i o n  beha v io r  b y  t he t e n an t .  Th i s  
p r e v en t s  t h e  l and l o r d  f r om p r o s c r i b i n g  t he amoun t o f  t enant  l a b o r .  
Inco r p o r a t i o n  o f  l and  and l a b o r  augmen t ing t echnica l chang e  shows  
t he s e  i m p r o v emen t s  d e c r e a s e t he amo un t  a nd p e r c en t ag e  o f  l and und e r  
s ha r e  agreements .  
Ana l y s i s  of  c r o s s - s e c t i ona l da t a  f rom Ind i a  s h ows t h a t 
l and l ords ha v e  some marke t power and renta l shares do not resu l t f rom 
market c ompe ti tion. In addition , tenant s  preferred l ower rental  shares  
to  sharing of  input co s t s  by  l and l ords .  
Af te r Bardhan and Srini vasan ' s  artic l e ,  ma jor  contributions t o  
r en t a l  the o ry ha v e  i nc l ud ed r i s k . S u t inen  ( 1 9 7 5 )  e x t ended  Cheun g ' s  
hypothes is using a theory o f  contractua l choi ce wi th risk aversion. In 
the absence o f  transaction costs , share l eases are preferred because 
they are mo re e fficient than othe r  forms of renta l agreemen t s .  
A s  the l e a s t  c o s t  me t hod o f  s ha r i n g  r i s k ,  s h a r e  l e a s e s  l ow e r  
t h e  un i t  c o s t  o f  p r o duc t i on , imp l y in g  h i gh e r  input  u t i l i z a t i o n  a n d  
h ig h e r  o u t p u t  l e v e l s . N o n sha re  l ea s e s  wi l l  on l y  be c h o s en wh e n  
t ra n s a c t i on c o s t s  o f  s ha r e  l ea s e s  e x c e e d  t he c o s t  o f  o t he r r i s k  
dis persing me t h od s .  
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The i d e a  tha t sha r e  l ea s e s. a r e  ac t ua l l y mo r e  e f f i c i e n t  t ha n  
o t h e r  l ea s e  f o rms wa s s u p p o r t e d  b y  R e i d ( 1 9 7 6 ) , who inc l ud e d  t he 
conf l icting interests  o f  l and l o rds  and tenant s into his mode l .  I n  the 
absence of  uncer tainty,  his mode l imp l ies  t ha t  share l easing is  Pareto  
efficien t .  Wi th uncertainty ,  share agreemen t s  wi � l be cho sen when they 
a re t he l e a s t  c o s t l y  me t h o d  of r i sk r educ t i on a v a i l a b l e . Sha r e  
a g r e emen t s  a r e  ac t ua l l y  mo r e  e f f i c i e n t , d u e  t o  t he i r  g re a t e r  f l e x i ­
bi l i ty when ad jus t ing to  unexpec ted e v ents .  
P r e v i o u s  a n a l y s i s  on  b o t h  s i d e s  of  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  
( in)efficiency of  farmland renta l ,  is  incomp l ete according to Ip  and 
S ta h l ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  I ne f f i c i e n c y  a d v o c a t e s  mad e  the  m i s t ake o f  u s i n g  
par t ia l  equi l ibrium ana l ysi s ,  ignoring t he supp l y  s ide of  the rent a l 
mar ke t . Farm sec t o r  in t e ra c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  r e s t o f  t he e c onomy mus t b e  
considered i n  a genera l equi l ibrium · f ramework. 
Equa l e f f i c i ency  a d v o c a t e s  a r e  l im i t e d  by t he i r  neg l e c t  o f  
i n t e r s ec t o r a l  r e s o u r ce a l l oc a t i on , wh i ch c an be i nh i b i t e d  by i n s t i ­
tutions .  Compe t i t i on among farmer s  f o r  ren ta l  land does not reduce the 
i nc en t i v e  to s h i r k. Equa l e f f i c i en c y  o u t c ome s i gn o r e  t he c o s t  o f  
i n v e s t i ng l and l o r d  r e s o ur c e s  t o  e n f o r c e  t he ag r e emen t .  On l y  owne r 
cu l t i vat ion e l iminates t rans a c t i on a n d  s u p e r v i s i o n  c os t s  wh i c h  mak e  
share tenure l e s s  efficient  than owner o pe ra tion. 
Emp i r i ca l s t ud i e s  t h a t  s u pp o r t  t he equa l e f f i c i e n c y  c on c e p t  
a c t ua l l y  rep r e s e n t  t he ne t r e s u l t  o f. two o p p o s in g  t enden c i e s :  1 )  
s ha r e c r o p pe r s '  t endency  t o  a p p l y  s u b - op t imum q uant i t i e s  o f  v a r i a b l e  
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i n p u t s , a n d  2) r e d u c e d  i n p� t  a p p l i c a t i o n  b y  o wn e r  o p e r a t o r s  
attributab le  to risk l eve l s  higher than tho se faced by sha recrop per s .  
The ana l yses abo v e  as sumed l imi ted choices f o r  labo re r/ tenant s  
and l andowners , inc luding four  t enure forms : 1 )  owner cul t i vation ,  2) 
wage l abor , 3 )  sha re ren ta l , and 4) cas h  renta l .  Compe t i t i v e  mark et s ,  
p r i c e s  o f  commo d i t i es  t ha t  r e f l e c t  c o n s umer  p r e f e r ence s ,  and p r o f i t  
maximi z ing beha v i o r  b y  c on t r a c t i ng pa r t i e s  a r e  .a l s o pa r t  o f  t he 
a s s um p t i on s .  I n pu t s a r e  l i mi t e d  t o  l and  and l a b o r  i n  mo s t  c a s e s  t o  
simp l if y  the ana l ysis .  
De s p i t e  t he i nc r ea s e d  s c o pe and c omp l e x i t y  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  
a na l y s i s  o f  t enure f o rms and s ha r e  r e n t a l ,  c o n f l i c t ing v i ewp o i n t s  
p e r s i s t .  A s um o f  t he wo r k  t o  da t e  l ea v e s  no de f i ni t ive  c o n c l u s i on 
abo u t  t he imp a c t  o f  r e n t a l a g r eeme n t s  o n  e f f i c i en c y .  The s e a r ch f o r  
jus tif ication o f  land reform programs i n  l e s s  dev e l oped countries has 
s t imul a ted mos t  of the c ontinuing di scus sion. 
Empirical Studies  and the U . S .  Rental Market  
App l i c a t i o n  o f  the  t he o r y  a bo v e  t o  the U . S .  ag r i cu l t u r a l 
e c o n omy p o s e s  a few p r o b l ems . T e c hn o l o g i c a l p r o gr e s s  and g l o ba l  
mar ke t i ng  ha v e  c hang e d  the  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t he a g r i cu l t u ra l s e c t o r .  
Farm l and tenan ts must  prov ide product i v e  capi ta l in addit ion t o  tech­
nical knowledge . Land lords and tenants hav e  many inves tment and pro­
duct ion o pt ions . Tenure forms hav e  me l de d  into point s on a continuum, 
frequent l y  bl ending renter and l and l ord ro l e s .  Federa l farm programs 
v io l ate the basic  price as sum p t ions .  
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mid-At l antic  states .  Sha re tenants  are more like l y to  grow cot ton in 
t he S o u t h , and c o rn in t he M i d we s t .  Sha r e  t e nan t s  a r e  mo r e  o f t en 
y oung e r  and p o o r e r  t han farm o pe r a t o r s  i n  o t h e r  tenure  c l a s s e s  ( R e i d  
1 9 7 9 ) . 
A r e v i ew o f  f a rm l and r e n t a l p r a c t i c e s in the  U. S .  i n  1 9 7 9  
(We isbe rger) shows the 1/3-2 / 3  l and l ord- tenant share renta l agreements  
to be  the  mos t common. The l and l ord f requent l y  contributes  the l and 
and a s ha r e  of o t her  inpu t s  f o r  o ne t h i r d  of t he c r o p .  The 1 / 2 - 1 / 2  
l ease i s  the second mos t typica l ,  occurring mos t  frequent ly  in the corn 
be l t . Land l ords typica l l y  share more inpu t costs  wi th 1 /2-1/2  l eases .  
Some renta l agreements  hav e  a 1 / 4-3/4 share , wi th the  land l0rd  
providing only  the l and . These agreement s exis t  primari ly in t he high 
r i s k  wh e a t  r e g i on s  of we s t e r n  N o r t h  and S o u t h  Dako t a .  The 2 /5- 3 / 5  
agreement exi s t s  in transi tiona l areas , with cost  sharing between tha t  
of  one third and one ha l f  share agreement s .  
H i g h e r  qua l i t y  l and t yp i c a l l y b r in g s  h i g h e r  r e n t a l ,  a n d  t h e  
l a nd l o r d  i s  l e s s  l ike l y  t o  s h a r e  o t h e r  i n p u t  c o s t s  un l e s s. c r o p  
p ro duc t i on c o s t s  a r e  h i g h .  C r o p s  t h a t d e p l e t e t h e  l and t o  a g r e a t e r  
d e g r ee re q u i r e  a h i ghe r r e n t a l t han  mo r e  benign  c r o p  p ro d u c t i o n  
(We i s b e rg e r  1g7 9 ) .  In l a r g e  p a r t , l and l o r d  s h a r e  r en t s  ha v e  b e e n  
ins t i tut iona l ized a t  three l e ve l s :  one ha l f ,  two fif ths , and one third  
( S c o t t  1 9 8 3 ) .  
Cash renta l s  are m ore  common when the operator has a s teadier  
i n c ome o r  faces  le s s  r i sk f r om d r o u g h t or  o th e r  wea t h e r  ha z a r d s  
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(We i s b e rg e r  1 9 7 9 ) .  A t r end t owa rd i n c r e a s e d  u s e  o f  c a s h  a g r e em e n t s  
d e v e l o p e d i n  s ome s t a t es d u r i ng t h e  1 9 7 0 ' s  ( S c o t t  1 9 8 3 ) .  The d emand 
f o r  l and wa s g r e a t e r  than s u p p l y  at the sha r e  p r i c e  and f a rme r s  we r e  
w i l l i ng t o  p ay a n  amo unt· g r e a t e r  t h a n  t he s h a r e  r en ta l p r i c e .  Du r i ng 
the 1 9 8 0 ' s , l and p r·i c e s  p l umme t e d , c r o p  p roduc t i o n  b e c ame l e s s  
profitabl e ,and many l eases rev er ted t o  share ( Sco tt  1985) .  
Crop  price f luctuations hav e  prompted increased  use  of  f l exib l e  
cash l e as e s ,  especia l ly in part s  o f  the M idwes t and Pacific  Northwe s t .  
These  agreements guarantee the l andl o rd a minimum cash renta l ,  p l us an 
a dd i t i o na l amoun t if the r e t u r n  f rom t he c r o p  is a bo v e  a s pe c i f i e d  
l e ve l (Weisberger 1 9 7 9 ) .  
R e n t  i s  t he e c o nomi c r e t ur n  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  l and .  Ac t u a l 
renta l s  paid inc l ude cos t s  o f  negotiating , enforcing , and managing the 
l e a s e .  I t  may a l s o inc l ud e  a n  a l � o wa n c e  f o r  r i s k ,  and r e t u r n  o n  
capi ta l investments  (Wund e r l i ch 1 98 3 ) .  
T h e  co s t  o f  o b t a i n i n g  u s e  o f  the  l and i s  t h e  r e n t  p a i d  p l u s 
a dd i t i on t o  land v a l ue pa i d  by  the  r e n t e r .  E r o s i on and d e p l e t i o n  o f  
f e r t i l i t y  inc r ea s e  t he l and l o r d s '  c o s t  ( S c o t t  1 9 8 3 ) .  The n e t  r en t  
r e c e i v ed b y  a l e s s o r  d e p e nd s  u p o n  r e n ta l p a i d  and e x p e n s e s  i n c u r r e d .  
Thi s  v a r i e s  wi d e l y  d e pend ing  o n  t h e  e n f o r cemen t o f  t h e  a g r eemen t ,  
o f f s e t t i n g  p r o v i s i o n s , c o mmu n i t y  c o n v e n t i o n s , a n d  n o n - l e a s e  
re l at ionships (Wunder l ich 1 9 8 3 ) .  
Whe t h e r  t h e  r en t a l pa i d  t h e  l and l o rd i s  c a s h  o r  s ha r e , i t  
s ho u l d  ad j us t  t o  r e f l ec t  t he v a l ue o f  the  l and ' s  c ont r i bu t i on t o  t he 
c r o p  en t e r p r i s e .  I n  the c a s e o f  s h a re r en t , howe v e r , t rad i t i o n  p r e -
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v ents  this from happening.  Land rent has hi s torica l ly  be en a l eading 
indicator  of  l and prices on the way up but a lagging indicator o f  l and 
prices on t he way down ( Scot t 1 9 83 ) .  
Nonoperator  land l ords have  been an  increasing component o f  the 
f a rml and r en t a l  ma rket  i n  t he U . S .  s i n c e  1 9 6 9  ( B a r on 1 9 8 3 ) .  I n  1 9 7 8 ,  
nonopera tor land l ords rented o v e r  8 7% of a l l rented land in farms in 
t he U . S .  Ac c ompany i ng t h i s  t r e n d  has b e en an inc r e a s e  i n  the p e r­
centage of  farml and rented by partowners , primari l y  in the Eas tern and 
Cornbe l t  areas of the country. 
Mos t nonoperator land l ords  are inv es tors , wi thout farm back­
g ro und s , gene ra l l y  unwi l l i n g  and unab l e  to p a r t i c i pa t e  in f a rm 
manageme n t  d e c i s i o n s .  Pa r t own e r o p e r a t o r s  a r e  l i ke l y t o  r e n t  f r om 
s e vera l l and l o rd s ,  further decreasing c ontribut ions to managemen t by  
l and l o rd s  (Baron 1983) .  
The lack o f  invo l v ement by  l and l o rds  in  the  management o f  the 
farm o peration makes them l ess  wi l l ing to  participa te in a share l ease .  
F rom 1 9 7 0  t o  1 9 7 9 , u s e  o f  share  ag r e emen t s  ha s de c re a s e d  by  a b ou t 8 % , 
whi le the use of  cash renta l agreement s  has increased by approximate l y  
the same amount ( Baron 1983) .  
The unwi l l ingness of  non-farm orien ted landowners to  make l ong 
t e rm i n v e s tmen t s  to ma i n t a i n  p r od u c t i v i t y  has c a u s e d  s ome c o n c e r n .  
Over the time period specif ied abov e , i t  appears tha t  the proport ion o f  
i n v e s tmen t s  i n  l and made by r en t e r s  ha s in c r e a s ed r e l a t i v e t o  t ho s e  
made by land owne rs .  
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The pa r t owner  t e nu r e  c l a s s  m i x e s  t e nure c l a s s e s  a s  we l l  a s  
o c c u p a t i o ns . T h i s  m i x t u r e  o f  r o l e s c r ea t e s  a f o rm o f  manage r i a l 
p l ur a l i sm ,  and b l u r s  c l a s s  i d en t i t y .  Bo t h  rent e r s  and  own e r s  h a v e  
a l terna ti v es in inve s t ing and us ing the l and (Wunder l ich 1983) .  
The  1 9 7 9  C en s u s  of  Agr i c u l t ur e  F i nance  Sur v e y  r e p o r t s  mo s t  
1 and 1 o r d s , 8 5 % , a r e  i n d i  v i d ua 1 s o r  f ami  1 i e·s ,  n i n e t y  p e r c en t  of  whom 
rent to  onl y  one rent er.  Farm operators  and ret i red farmer s  are 4 1 %  
o f  indi vidua l l and lords .  A l arge majority ,  80% , o f  farmland renters  
are  organized as  indiv idua l o r  fami l y  bus inesses  (Wunder l ich 1983 ) .  
The a v e ra g e  s i z e of  p a r t owne r  f a rms i s  780  a c r e s ,  c om pa r e d  to  
205  acre s for fu l l owner operator farms , and 3 9 6  ac res for tenant farms.  
The moda l age group for t enants  i s  2 5-34 years  of age , part owners 45-
54 , and fu l l  owners 55-64 (Reid 1 98 3 ) .  
Farml and renta l in the Uni ted State s  is wide spread but rental  
market s ,  where  rental agreement s  are conc l uded , t end to be restricted 
in geographic area. To better unders tand the impact of farml and renta l 
on resource contro l and income d i s t ribut ion ,  rental  markets  and renta l 
agreements mus t be ana l yzed in a mo re l oca l i z ed framework. 
Johnson ( 1 9 7 2 )  conduc ted a s tudy of  t he farml and renta l  marke t  
i n  I l l inois and Michigan using cas e studi e s  of  ind iv idual farms . The 
market process in both areas was l ow-key and informa l .  Socia l accept­
abi l i ty dis couraged compe t i t i v e  beha vior  by marke t par ticipant s .  
Three fourths of the res pondent s  owned as we l l  a s  rented s ome 
· l and . On l y  1 0 - 1 5 % of the l and l o r d s we r e  ab s en t e e , t he re s t  r e s i d e d  
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n e a r by and t yp i c a l l y had an i h t e r e s t  i n  f a rmi n g .  M o s t  o f  t he f a rm 
operat ors  re l ied heav i l y . upon l and renta l for expansion. 
Mo s t  l ea s e s , 9 7 % in I l l i n o i s  a nd 5 2 %  in M i c hi gan we r e  s ha r e  
l ease s .  Nine ty percent a f  the leases  were annua l and 67%  were verba l .  
Tenure was fair ly secure , averaging 1 1  years in Michigan , and 1 4  yea r s  
i n  I l l inois .  
Rap i d  change ha s b e e n  a c on s t an t  f e a t u r e  o f · the ag r i cu l t u r a l. 
produc tion economy in the l a s t  5 0  years .  I t  is  impo rtant to under stand 
the scope and inf l uence of fa rmland renta l marke t s , as they ad jus t t o  
these chang e s .  
S ome s ta t e s  ha v e  moni t o r e d  the i r  f a rm l and ren t a l  mar ke t  f o r  
many years . The Uni versi ty of I l l inois has done a periodic ana l ys i s  o f  
f a rm l and ren ta l  i n  tha t s t a t e  f o r  many yea r s .  Da t a  f o r  t h i s  e f f o r t  
c ome from records o f  farm o perat ing ·uni t s ,  c o l l ec ted from t he I l l inoi s  
Farm Business  Farm �tanagement As soc iation ( Sc o t t  1 9 8 1 ) . 
The agricul tural economy has experienced f inancial  upheava l in 
t h e  1 9 80 ' s , c au s i ng ad j us tmen t s  i n  the  f a r m l and r en t a l ma r ke t .  F r om 
1 9 8 2  t o  1986  cash rent on crop l and in s ome areas of I l l inois decreased 
by as much as  40% ( Sco t t  1985 ) .  Al t hough this is a s teep dec l ine , the 
v a l ue of l and d e c r e a s ed i n  t he range o f  5 0  to 6 0 % .  Some r ent e r s  a r e  
swit ching t o  share agreement s , of ten a t  t he ins is tence o f  lenders .  
I t  i s  l ike l y  t ha t  o p e ra t o r s  w h o  e x panded  mo s t  r a p i d l y  in t h e  
1 9 7 0 ' s ,  as  many par t owne r o pe r a t o r s  d i d , wi l l  b e  in t h e  mo s t  s e r i o u s  
financ ial trouble .  A signif icant amount . o f  forec losure o r  liquidat ion 
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wou l d  make much more l and avai l.ab l e  f or rent , a l tering tenure pat te rns . 
T h i s  may p r om o t e  u s e  o f  cus t om f a rm i ng t o  r e p l a c e  l a nd r en t a l  ( S c o t t  
1 9 85 ) . 
The l as t  s t a t ew i d e  s u r v e y o f  t h e  f a rm l and r en t a l ma rke t i n  
S ou t h  Dako t a  was d o ne i n  1 9 5 1  ( S e e  Hur l bu r t , 1 9 5 4 a bo v e ) . Be r r y  and 
B aci ( 1 9 5 9 )  s u r v e y e d  � a rme r s  i n  M o o d y  C o u n t y  t o  de t e r m i ne t he i r  
a t t i tudes toward f lexi b l e  cash rent . Almo s t  a l l cropl and l ea ses , 9 0% ,  
we re share l ease s .  Mos t l and l o rds  used annua l leases to keep tenant s  
a c c o un t a b l e . On l y  1 3 %  o f  s h a r e  t enan t s  wou l d  c o n s i d e r  s h i f t ing  t o  
mu l ti-year f lexib l e  ca sh l ease s , a l though 80% were interes ted i n  l ong 
t e rm 1 eases.  
Since that time , the onl y  publ i shed data on farmland renta l in 
S ou t h  Dako t a  ha s been S o u t h  D a ko t a  Ag r i c u l t ura l Ext ens i o n  S e r v i c e  
News l e t t e r s .  Mad s en and Jans s en ( 1 9 8 5 )  c o ndu c t e d  t he mo s t  r e c e n t  
survey. Most leases reported i n  this  sur v ey were share leases ,  paying 
the land l ord a renta l of 1 / 3  of  the crop.  Cash agreements  are wide l y  
used f o r  pas ture , hay and crop l and. 
Conclus i ons 
F a rm l and r e n t a l  has been and c o n t i nue s t o  be  an impo r ta n t  
c omp o n e n t  o f  ·r e s o u r c e  co n t r o l in a g r icul ture.  Dramatic changes hav e  
occurred i n  agricu l ture over t he l a s t  5 0  years and economic turmo i l  has 
b e e n  the no rm in r e c en t  ye a r s .  T o  u nd e r s t and  r e s o u r c e  f l ow s  wi t h i n  
agricu l ture , i t  i s  necessary to  unders tand the impact o f  l and ren t a l  
p r a c t i c e s  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o n  r e s o u r c e  u s e  a n d  income d i s t r i bu t i o n . 
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T he e x t ent  and r o l e  of  d i f f e r e n t  t enure  f o rm s  and t he amount o f  l and 
inv o l ved prov ide c l ues to the funct ion of  the renta l marke t in mode rn 
agricul ture. Terms of  renta l agreement s  can be examined for impac t s  on 
re source a l l ocation and distribu t i on o f  re turns . 
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Chapter  3 
FARMLAND RENTAL MARKET CHARACTERISTICS AND SELECTED IMPACTS 
OF MARKET CHARACTERISTICS ON LEAS ING AGRE.EMENT TERMS 
Agricul tura l l and has many unique characteris t ics that affec t 
the s truc ture and funct ioning of the farmland renta l marke t.  Land i s  
f ixed in space , and i s  an essential  resource ·neces sary for agricu l tura l 
p ro d u c t i on .  Land a l s o ha s s o c i a l a t t r i b u t e s  tha t ma y i n f l ue n c � 
participants '  goa l s  for l and ownership and r enta l beyond s tric t l y  c o s t  
and re turn ·cons iderat ions . The background and goa l s  of par ticipants 
in the marke t can impact the funct ioning of the market .  
Thi s c ha p t e r  c o n s i s t s  of  two  s e c t i o n s .  T h e  f i r s t  s e c t i o n  
describe s  some o f  the major  s tructura l charac teri s t ics  o f  the farml and 
r e n t a l ma r k e t  in S o u t h  Dako t a .  The  s e c o nd s e c t i o n  c o n t a i ns a n  
examinat ion o f  the impact o f  various re lat ionships be tween contracting 
par t i e s  on terms of renta l agreemen t s .  
Data Sources and Limi tations 
Da ta in thi s chapter  are from a l l 1 15 5  respondent s to the 1 9 8 6  
South Dakota S ta te Uni versity  Farm land Renta l  Surv ey. F o r  the l a t t e r  
p o r t i on o f  t h i s c h a p t e r ,  a s ub s e t  o f  r e s pond e n t s  t h a t  ind i c a t e d  o n l y  
one type of l and l ord-tenant r e l a t ionship in the ir leas ing agreement s  
wa s u s e d  f o r  t h e  ana l y s i s .  Due t o  t he na t u r e  o f  t he que s t i onna i r e , 
t h i s  was  t h e  s o l e  means t o  c o mp a r e  s pe c i f i c  l ea s e  t e rms wi t h  t h e  
re l a t ionshi p be tween tenant and l and l o rd A  
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Farmland Rental Marke t Characteri s t ics  
Some of  the charac teri s t ic s  of the farm l and renta l ma rket t ha t  
wi l l  be  e xamined in t h i s  c ha p t e r i n c l ud e : 1 )  t he t enure  t y p e s  t h a t  
exis t ;  2 )  the  a v e rage  ntfmbe r  o f  ac r e s  p e r  l ea s e  and numbe r  .o f  l ea s e s  
f o r  p a r t i c i pan t s  i n  t·he s e  c a t eg o r ie s ; 3 )  t he g e o g ra p h i c  s co pe o f  t h e  
farm l and renta l market ; 4 )  t h e  age s of  the part icipants i n  the renta l 
marke t ; 5 )  preferred type s  and f o rma l i ty of agreement s ;  6 )  the types of 
bus i ne s s  o r gan i z a t i on s  u s e d  by  r e s p on d e n t s ;  and 7 )  re l a t i on s h i p s  
between part ies t o  renta l agreement s .  
T e n u r e  s t a t u s  o f  f a rm l a n d  r e nt a l  marke t par t i c ipan t s .  F i v e  
tenure catego ries were iden t i fi ed from responses t o  quest ion three of 
the que s t i o nna i re ( s e e  App e nd i x ) .  Nono pe ra t o r  l and l o r d ,  f u l l own e r  
operator l and lord , partowner ope ra tor  l and l o rd ,  par towner operator , and 
t e n a n t  a r e  t he c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  u s e d .  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n wa s ba s e d  on 
r e s p o ns e s  to  que s t i ons a b o u t  the numb e r  of  a c r e s  a r e s po nd e n t  own e d , 
l e a s e d  t o  o t h e r s ,  l e a s e d  f r om o t he r s , and t h e  numb e r  o f  ac r e s  f a rmed  
themse lves .  
Nonoperato r  land l ord s  are res pondents  who own farmland and rent  
a l l  of i t  to someone e l se .  Ful l owner operator l and lords are  farml and 
owne r s  wh o rent  some o f  the  l an d  t h e y  own t o  o t he r s  and f a rm the  r e s t  
thems e l v e s .  Partowner operator  l and l ords own farmland , par t  of which 
the y r e n t to o th e r s  and f a rm t h e  r e s t  o f  t he l and t h e y  own as we l l  a s  
l and t he y  r ent  i n  f r om o t h e r s .  P a r t owne r  o p e r a t o r s  own f a rm l and and 
rent  farml and from othe rs , and farm i t  a l l  thems e l ves .  Tenants  own no 
farml and and rent a l l of the l and they farm from o thers .  
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Nonoperator l and lord wa s the mos t  frequent tenure cl assifica t ion 
of res ponden t (Tab l e  3 . 1 ) . Over ha l f ,  5 6% ,  of the res pondents rent  a l l 
of the land they own to others .  Al t hough nono perat o r  landlords are the 
l arges t group,  ind i v idual l y  they rent  re lati v e ly sma l l parce l s  of l and . 
The av erage number of · acres l eased for  thi s category is 462 ac re s and 
the mean number of leas�s per l and l ord is 2 . 1 .  
F u 1 1 own e r  ope r a t o r  1 a n d  1 o r  d s a c c oun t e d  f o r  on  1 y 4 .  7 %  o f  t h e  
respondents .  This was the lowes t number o f  partic ipants i n  any t enur e  
c lass .  Ful l owner operator l and l ords l eased an average o f  438 acres and 
averaged 2 l eases pe r participant .  
The  d omina n c e  o f  the l e s s e e  s i d e  o f  the ma r ke t  by par t owne r  
operators can be seen in Tab l e  3 . 1 .  Thi s  c l as s i f icat ion represented 2 6 %  
o f  t h e  re s ponden t s ,  a n d  an o the r  5 %  o f  t he r e s pond e n t s  a r e  par t owne r 
o pe ra t o r s  who a l s o r en t  l and t o  o t he r s .  To g e t h e r  t h e s e  t wo. g r ou p s  
account for 8 0 . 3% o f  farml and rente r  respondent s to the surv ey. 
Par t own e r  o pe r a t o r s  a l s o r e n t  mo re  l and i nd i v idua l l y  t h a n  
respondents o f  any other tenure c l as s . Partowner opera tors lease an 
a v e ra g e  of 1 0 4 6  a c r e s  c ompa r e d  to an a v e r a g e  7 6 4 a c r e s  f o r  f u l l 
tenants .  Part owne r operator land l ords lease an average of 1656  acres  o f  
land , including land rented i n  and rented out . 
Re spondent s c lassif ied as par towner operato rs  a l so report be ing 
i n v o l v ed i n  mo r e  l e a s e s  p e r  p a r t i c i p an t  t han  o t h e r  t e nure  c l a s s e s .  
Par towners who onl y  rent land f rom o t hers  ave rage 3 .2  leases per par­
· t i c i pant  and pa r t owne r s  who r e n t  l a nd to o t h e r s  as we l l ,  a v e ra g e  3 . 7  
agreements pe r par t icipant.  
Table 3 . 1  Tenure C lasses o f  Res pondent s ,  Averag e Number o f  Acres 
Leased , and Leases per Respondent 
Average Average 
Number Number o f  
Tenure Numbe r  o f  o f  Acres Leases per 
Category Respondents Leased Respondent 
No . Percent 
Tenant 8 9  7 . 7 1 7 6 4  2 . 7  
Par t - owner Operator 3 0 1  2 6 . 0 6 1 046 · 3 . 2  
Par t - owner Operator 6 2  5 . 3 7 1 6 5 6  3 . 7  
Landlord 
Ful l owner Operator 5 4  4 . 6 8 4 3 9 2 . 0  
Landlord 
Non - Operator Landlord 649 5 6 . 1 9 4 6 2  2 . 1 
A l l  Respondents 1 1 5 5  1 00 . 0  7 0 1 2 . 5  
3 8 • 
3 9 · 
It i s  c l ear from these  figures  that partowner opera to rs are the 
dominant tenure form in the market .  On l y  nonoperator land l ords contr o l  
simi lar quantities  o f  farm land a s  a gr oup.  The sma l ler  size  of indi­
v i dua l t ra c t s  and the l a r g e  numb e r  of  pa r t i c i pan t s  in this  c l a s s  
di ffuses the ir power as indiv idua l s  in the marke t .  
Geogr aph i c  e x t e n t  £f t he ma r ke t .  T h e  l o c a t i on o f  f a rm l and 
r e n ta l ma rke t  par t i c i p an t s  r e l a t i v e t o  the  l and c o v e r e d  i n  t h e  
agreement indica tes the geogra phic s cope of  the market .  An examinat ion 
of data in Tabl e  3.2 revea l s  that of  a l l re spondent s ,  6 5% l i ved in the 
county where the rented l and is l oca ted.  
A l a rge  ma j o r i t y o f  f a rm o p e r a t o r s , a l mo s t  9 0 % , l i v e  i n  t h e  
c oun t y  whe r e  t he l and i s  l o ca t e d .  B y  c on t r a s t ,  s l i g h t l y  l e s s  than  
ha l f ,  4 5 . 6% ,  o f  the  nono p e r a t o r  l and l o r d s  l i v e d  in the  s ame c o un t y .  
A l mo s t  one t h i rd o f  nono p e ra t o r  l and l o r d s , 3 2 . 5 % , r e s i de i n  ano t h e r 
s t a t e .  On l y  4 %  o f  the f arm o p e r a t o r s  r e s pond ing l i v e d  o u t  o f  s t a t e ; 
many of these res ide in counties  that border South Dakota.  
The loca l na ture of the marke t is  further i l lus trated by data 
i n  Tab l e  3.3. The r e nted  l and o f  a l mo s t  8 5 % of  the r e s ponden� s i s  
l ocated wi thin one county. Of those respondent s who reported rent ing 
l and in more  t han one c o un t y ,  mo s t  l i v e  in the s ame c oun t y  as one  o f  
t h e  r e n t e d  t rac t s  o r  in an ad j a c e n t  c o un t y .  I t  c a n  be  s e e n  in t he s e  
resu l ts that except for the out of state  l and lord s ,  the renta l marke t 
func tions in a very limi ted geographic area.  
Age s  � marke t pa r t i c ipan t s . Ana l ys i s  o f  the a g e s  o f  t he 
l and l o r d s  and re n t e r s  in  the ma rke t ,  r e v ea l s  s ome s u pp o r t  f o r  t h e  
Table 3 . 2  Res i dence o f  Rental Market Par t i c ipants in Relat i on t o  
the Rented Land 
Locat i on 
S ame C ounty 
Adj a c ent County in S . D . 
Other County in S . D .  




- - - - - - - - Per c ent o f  Respondents 
8 9 . 9  4 5 . 6  
4 . 9  9 . 6  
1 . 2  1 2 . 3  
4 . 0  3 2 . 5  
1 00 . 0  1 0 0 . 0  
N=5 0 6  N=64 9  
Tot a l  
6 5 . 0  
9 . 1  
5 . 9  
2 0 . 0  
1 0 0 . 0  
N= 1 1 5 5  
Corre lat i on between locat i on o f  respondent and tenure s tatus : 
x
2
= 2 5 2 . 6 8 5  
P< . 0 0 0 1 
DF=3 
4 0 . 
Tabl e  3 . 3  Inc idence o f  Land Ren t a l  in One or More Count ies by 
Res idence o f  Renta l  Market Part i c ipant in Re lat i on t o  
Rented Land 
Rent Land Rent Land in Two 
Locat i on of Res i denc e  N In One County Or More Count ies 
Percent in Res idence C lass 
S ame C ounty 7 5 1  8 4· . 8  1 5 . 2  
Adj acent C ounty in S . D .  1 0 5 7 5 . 2  24 . 8  
Other County in S . D .  6 8  8 6 . 8  1 3 . 2  
Out o f  State 2 3 1 8 7 . 9  1 2 . 1 
Totals 1 1 5 5  8 4 . 7  1 5 . 3  
Corre lat i on between res idence o f  part i c ipant and rent a l  of land in 
one o r  more c ount ies : 
X
2
=9 . 2 7 4  P < . 0 2 6  DF=3 
4 1 . 
4 2 ' 
tenure l adder concept .  Ful l tenants , who rent a l l the l and t hey f arm 
from o thers , were the on l y  tenure group with a signif icant number , 1 6 % ,  
o f  p a r t i c i p a n t s  l e s s  t han 2 5  y e a r s  o f  a g e  ( T a b l e  3 . 4 ) . S l i gh t l y  mo re  
than 40% of tenant respondents  are  be twe en the age s of 25  and 34.  
The da ta in Tab le  3 .4  revea l  a pat tern of increased frequency of 
old er part ic ipants as they report  owning and renting out land . Par t ­
owne r o pe r a t o r s  a r e  a l mo s t  en t i r e l y  b e tween  the  ag e s  o f  2 5  a n d  6 5 .  
S l ight ly  more than 74%  of par towner operator  l and l o rds  are between the 
ages of  35 and 6 5 ,  and jus t o ve r  20% are over  65  years of  age. 
Ana l ysis of  the age dis tr ibut ions of  participants  in the tenant 
a nd p a r t owne r  o p e ra t o r c a t e g o r i e s  i nd i c a t e s  t hey  l e a s e  f a rm l and f o r  
d i f f e r en t  r ea s on s . The young e r  t e n an t s  a r e  l ike l y  t o  b e  pe o p l e  
at temp ting to  ge t s tarted in farming. Partowners wou ld appear to hav e  
expans ion o f  the ir opera tion as  the i r  mot i vation for renting farm l and . 
Of respondents c l as s i f i ed as ful l owner operator l and lords , two 
thirds are over the age of 55 .  Nonoperator l and lords report the ol des t 
dis tribution of age s ,  wi th a lmos t  5 5% o f  respondents  in this category 
over 6 5  year s of age ,  and three fourths a re over  the age of 55 .  The s e  
d i s t ri butions suggest mo s t  fu l l owner  o p e r a t or l and l o r d s  a r e  r e du c i ng 
the s i z e  o f  t he i r  o p e r a t i o n  a s  t h e y  l o ok f o rward to  r e t i r emen t . T h e  
ages o f  nonoperator l and lords  ind i ca te that many are reti red , and may 
be re tired farmers .  
Ma l e  r e s p o nd e n t s  as  a g r o u p , we r e  l i ke l y  t o  be yo ung e r  t h a n  
f ema l e re s pond e nt s .  A l mo s t  t h r e e  f ou r t h s  o f  re s p ond ents  we r e  ma l e ,  
Tab l e  3 . 4  Age of Respondent s  by Tenu re C l as s  and Sex 
Repo r t ed Age G roup 
Les s  than 6 5  years 
Tenur e  C l a s s  N 25 :;tears 2 5 - 3 4  3 5 - 4 4  4 5 - 54 55 - 6 4  a n d  over Tot a l 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Per c en t  o f Those Re s pond i ng - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Tenan t 
Par t owne r  Ope rator 
Partowner Ope r a t o r  Land l ord 
Ful l owne r  Ope r a t o r  Land l o r d  
Non - Ope rator Land l o rd 
To t a l s  




6 1 9  
1 1 1 2 
1 6 . 3  4 1 . 9  
2 . 4  1 6 . 0  
0 5 . 1 
0 3 . 7  
0 2 . 3  
1 . 9  9 . 2  
1 9 . 8  9 . 3  1 0 . 5 2 .  3. 
2 7 . 6  2 4 . 2  2 3 . 1 6 . 8  
' 1 0 .  2 2 7 . 1  3 7 . 3  2 0 . 3  
1 8 . 5  1 1 . 1 3 3 . 3  3 3 . 3  
8 . 1 1 2 . 9  2 2 . 3  5 4 . 4  
1 4 . 8  1 6 . 3 2 2 . 9  3 5 . 0  
Sex - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Age o f Respondent by Sex - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ma l e  8 1 7  2 . 6  1 1 . 5  1 7 . 1 1 7 . 4  2 3 . 3 2 8 . 2  
Fema l e  292 0 2 . 7  8 . 2  1 3 . 4  2 1 . 9 .  5 3 . 8  
To t a l s  1 1 09 1 . 9 9 . 2  1 4 . 8  1 6 . 3  2 2 . 9  34 . 9  
Corre l at i on between t enure c l ass and age o f  respondent : x2=S 1 3 . 4 1 8  P< . 000 1 DF=20 
Corre l a t i on be tween age and sex of responden t : x2= 7 9 . 8 P< . OOO l DF=S 
. 7 . 7  
26 . 4  
5 . 3  
4 . 9  
5 5 . 7  
1 00 . 0  
7 3 . 7 
2 6 . J  




o v e r  one  four th o f  wh om we r e  6 5  y e a r s  o f  a g e  o r  . o l d e r .  Ano t h e r  f o u r t h  
were  be tween t he a g e s  o f  5 5  and  6 4  y e a r s  o f  a g e .  A mu ch l ar g e r  p r o­
p o r t i on o f  fema l e  r e s p onde n t s , 5 4 % , we re  age  6 5  o r  o l d e r .  Jus t unde r  
90% o f  fema l e  respondents were over  4 5  years  o f  age. 
Type s and f o rma l i ty � agr e eme n t s .  Share  a g r ee men t s  a r e  t h e  
mo s t  f r eq u en t l y  u s e d  t ype o f  r e n t a l c o n t r a� t  f o r  c r o p l and . Da t a  i n  
Tab l e  3 . 5  shows that 7 3 4  respondent s  are inv o l ved i n  a tota l o f  1 19 5  
s ha r e  l e a s i ng a g r e emen t s .  The r e  w e r e  a l mo s t  a s  many c r o p l and c a s h 
ag r e eme n t s , 1 0 3 0 , r e p o r te d  as s ha r e  a g r e ement s ,  bu t o n l y  5 7 2  r e s p on­
dent s reported inv o l vement in l eases  of  this t ype .  
V e r ba l ag r e eme n t s  are  used wi t h  c o n s i d e ra b l y  mor e  f r e q ue n c y  
than wri t ten agreement s .  Three f i f ths of t he 2492 agreements for which 
this informat ion was provided we re verba l ,  and 4 0% , or 9 7 5  agreement s 
were  wr i t t en.  An e v en g r e a t e r  p r o p o r t i on o f  the  l e a s e s , 6 4 % ,  we r e  
annua l agreement s ,  wi th the rema inder c l as s if ied a s  mul t i-year.  It  is 
a pp a r en t  f rom t he s e  numbe r s  t ha t  t he r e n t a l marke t r ema ins  a f a i r l y  
informa l market .  Lega l l y ,  v er ba l  agreements  are no t bind ing for more 
than one year. The extent to which this is known may affect the l
-
ength 
of lease se l ec ted.  
The type s o f  bu s ine s s e s  i n  t h e  r e n t a l marke t .  A r e v i ew o f  
Tab l e  3 .6  indica tes that  86. 3% o f  l eases  repor ted by tenant s ,  covering 
7 5 . 7 %  of a c r e s  r e n t e d  i n , we r e  wi t h  l and l o r d s  who are ind i v i d u a l s  
opera t ing on their own beha l f .  State and federa l government , financia l 
ins t itut ions , and triba l  gove rnment s were l is ted as l and l ords in on l y  
Tab le 3 . 5  Character i s t i c s  o f  F arml and Rental Agreements 
Average 
Number o f  
Lease Respondents Number Leases Per 
Character i s t i c  Us ing o f  Leases Res:2ondent 
* 
No . Percent 
Share 7 34 6 4  1 1 95 1 . 6 
Cash 5 7 2  5 0  1 0 3 0  1 . 8  
Pas ture 4 1 4  3 6  7 6 2  1 . 8  
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Verba l 8 0 6  7 0  1 5 1 7  1 . 9  
Wr itten 4 7 4  4 1  9 7 5  2 . 1 
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Annual 8 1 2  7 0  1 545 1 . 9  
Mult i - year 3 9 5  3 4  8 6 0  2 . 2  
N= 1 1 5 5  
*Total percent i s  greater than 1 0 0  because s ome respondents have 
more than one type of lease . 
4 5  . 
* 
Tab le 3 . 6  Inc i dence o f  Tenant Leas i ng From Type of Landlord 
Type of Land lord 
Parent s or I n- Laws 
O ther Relat ives 
Unre lated Ind iv i duals 
F inanc i a l  Ins t i tut i on s  
S tate Government 




Total Leases = 1 0 8 7  
Total Acres = 4 0 8 , 400 
Number o f  Acres 
Leas es Rented From 
- - - - Percent of Total 
1 6 . 3  1 7 . 1  
1 6 . 9  1 1 . 9  
5 4 . 1  46 . 7  
1 . 0 . 8  
1 . 8  3 . 0  
4 . 1 1 2 . 4  
1 . 1  4 . 8  
4 . 7 3 . 3  
1 00 . 0  1 00 . 0  
Numbe r  o f  Renters = 4 2 1  
*From SDSU Economics Department S ta f f  Paper 8 6 - 8 , Bruce Johnson , 
Larry Janssen , and M i chae l Lundeen , " Farmland Renta l  Markets : 
Current I s sues , Prac t i ces , and Cond i t i on s " ,  November , 1 98 6 . 
4 6 . 
4 7 . 
8% of l eases.  However , these ent i t ie s  c ontro l l ed a much l arger pro­
por t ion,  20% , of the acres t enants  r en te d  in. 
In simi l ar fashion ,  mos t farmer s  ope rate their  farm enterprise  
as sing l e  proprie tors.  Despite the f ac t  that many farml and renters hav e  
quit e  l arge farm operat ions , 9 4 . 7 %  o f  the leases repor ted b y  l and lords  
we r e  wi t h  s i ng l e  pro p r i e t o r s h i p  f a rm o p e r a t i ons . Leas e s  t o  s i ng l e  
p ro p r i e t o r s  c o v er 9 6 . 4 %  o f  t h e  l and r e p o r t e d  t o  be  r e n t e d  o u t  b y  
landlo rds  ( T a b l e  3 . 7 ) .  
A s l ight l y  sma l l er proport i on ,  over  three fourths , o f  tenant 
respondent s indicated tha t  they ope ra ted their farm as a sing l e  propri­
etorship.  Almo s t  16% were o rganized in partne rships and 6% were non­
fami l y  corporat ions.  The 1 9 82 Census of Agricul ture reports  87 .8% o f  
the farm opera tors i n  South Dako ta are o rganized a s  sing l e  proprietors , 
9 . 8 %  a s  p a r t ne r s h i p s  and 2 . 4 %  a s  c o r po r a t i o ns . I t  a p p e a r s  f r om 
l and l o rd res ponses to the survey ,  t ha t  indi v idua l proprietors are  more  
l ike l y  to rent  farml and than partnerships or  corporations.  
Re l a t i un s h ip be twe en c on t r a c t i ng pa r t i e s .  A s i gni f i c a n t  
ma j o r i t y  o f  r e s ponden t s  a r e  in v o l v ed i n  l ea s i n g  a g re eme n t s wi t h  
unr e l a t e d  ind i v i d ua l s  ( Ta b l e  3 . 8 ) .  O f  respondents  who rent farml and 
f rom o t he r s ,  34%  ha v e  a g r e eme n t s  w i t h  unre l a t ed i nd i v id ua l s  on l y. 
Ano ther 3 1 %  reported hav ing at  leas t one l ease wi th an unre l a ted par t y  
i n  addi t ion to  at l east  one lease  wi th  a re lati ve.  Renters hav ing al l 
t he i r  l ea s e s  on l y  wi t h  re l a  t i  v e s  wa s the  on l y  o t he r  l e a s i ng pa t t e r n  
· that occurred wi th any signif icant frequency a t  2 1 % .  
Tabl e  3 . 7  Inc idence of Landlord 
Type of Tenant 
Chi ldren or In - Laws 
Other Relat ives 
Unre lated Ind ividua l s  
Non - fam i ly Partnership 
Non - fami ly Corporat ion 
Other 
Total 
Number of Landlords = 650 
Total Number o f  Leases = 1 0 1 6  
Total Number o f  Acres = 2 9 9 , 4 0 0  
* 
* 
Leas ing to Type of Tenant 
Number Acr es 
o f  Leases Rented 
- - - - - Percent of Total - - - -
9 . 6  1 3 . 8  
1 5 . 1  1 5 . 3  
7 0 . 7  6 7 . 3  
1 . 6  2 . 0  
. 3  . 2  
2 . 7  1 . 4 
1 0 0 . 0  1 00 . 0  
From SDSU Economics Departmen t  S ta f f  Paper 8 6 - 8 , by Bruce 
To 
Johnson , Larry Jans s en , and M i chae l Lundeen , "Farmland Rental 
Mark et s : Current I s sue s , Prac t ices , and Condi t ions " ,  November ,  
1 9 8 6 . 
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Tabl e  3 . 8  Tenant Leas i ng Pat terns, Acres Leased, and Number o f  Leases Repor ted Each Pa t te rn 
Ren t e r  Leases From 
Responden t s  
Leas ing 
Pat t e rns 
Number Pe rcent 
Re lat i ves On l y  
Unre l ated I nd i v i dua l s  On l y  
Bus i ness o r  Governme n t s  On l y  
Re l at i ves a n d  Unrelated 
I nd i v i dua l s  
Re lat i ves and Bus i nesses 
or Government 
Unre l ated I nd i v i dual s  and 
Bus inesses or Government 
Relat ives , Unre l a ted I nd i v i dua l s  
& Bus i nesses a n d  Government 
TOTALS 
Tab l e  3 . 8  con t i nued 
Ren t e r  Leases F rom 
Re lat i ves On l y  
Unrel ated Ind i v i dua l s  On l y  
Bus inesses or Governme n t s  On l y  
Relat i ves and Unre l a ted 
I nd iv i dua l s  
Re l a t ives and Bus i nesses 
o r  Government 
Unre l ated I nd i v i dua l s  and 
Bus inesses or Governmen t  
Re l at ives , Unre lated I nd i v i dua l s  
& Bus i nesses or Government 
TOTALS 
8 3  20 . 6  
1 3 7 34 . 0  
1 8  4 . 5  
1 2 5 3 1 . 0  
8 2 . 0  
1 8  4 . 5  
1 4  3 . 5  
403 1 00 . 0  
Number o f  Leases Ave rage 
Reported Th i s  Numbe r o f  
Pat tern Leases Per 
Number Pe rcent Respondent 
1 26 1 2 .  1 1 . 5 
2 8 3  2 7 . 2  2 . 1 
29 2 . 8  1 . 6 
449 4 3 . 2  3 . 6  
2 3  2 . 2  2 . 9  
6 3  6 . 1 3 . 5  
6 7  6 . 4  4 . 8  
1 040 1 00 . 0  2 . 6  
Acres Leased Average 
in These Acres 
Pat te rn s  Leased 
Number Pe r 
( 1 00� Percent Respondent 
49 . 5  1 2 . 6  596 . 3  
1 1 5 . 8  2 9 . 4  8 4 5 . 6  
40 . 3  1 0 . 3 2 2 4 1 . 3 
1 05 . 0  2 6 . 7  840 . 1 . 
2 5 . 7  6 . 6  32 2 1 . 3  
3 6 . 4  9 . 2  2 0 1 9 . 6  
20 . 8  5 . 3  1 49 8 . 0  
39 3 . 7  1 00 . 0  9 7 6 . 8  
C o r re lat ion be tween t yp� of l and l ord leased f rom and l eas i n g  pat tern : X
2
= 1 4 3 . 4  
* Leas i ng pat terns could be i dent i f i e d  f o r  on l y  1 0 3 5  of the 1 1 5 5 respondent s .  
P< . OOO 
S i gn i f i c ant 
D i f f e rence 
i n  Average 
No . Leas e s * *  
D 
C , D  
D 
B 
C , B  
B 
A 
S i gn i f i c ant. 
D i f f e rence 








B , C  
DF=6 
**T t e s t s  used to compa re means to detect s i gn i f icant d i f ferences . D i f fe r e n t  l e t t e r s  i nd i c a te s i gn i f i -
cant d i f fe rences , P=O . O S .  � 
\0 
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An e ven g reater propor t ion o f  the land l ord re spondent s reported 
l ea sing agreements  with unr e l a ted ind i v idua l s  (Tab l e  3 . 9 ) .  Almost  two 
t h i r d s , 6 2 %  o f  l a nd l o r d s  re p o r t e d  l e a s ing  on l y  t o  unre l a t e d  p e r s o n s  
whi le 28% repor ted l eas ihg t o  r e l a t i v e s  on l y. Ano ther 7 . 3% o f  l and­
l o rds reported renta l · agreement( s )  with an unre l ated individual , and 
one rental agreement wi th a re l at i ve.  
By  contra s t , on l y  1 5% of the renters  indica ted hav ing leas ing
. 
a g r eeme n t s  wi t h  f i nanc i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s , s t a t e , f ed e r a l ,  o r  t r i ba l  
gov ernments ; ind i v idua l l y or wi th l eases  f rom other t ypes of land l ords.  
On l y  3 %  o f  l and l o r d s  r e po r t e d  l e a s ing a g r e emen t s  wi th  pa r t ne r s h i p s  
and/or  non-fami ly  corpora tions .  I t  appears  that  the incidence of other 
types of bus iness  organi zations on bo th sides of the rent a l  market is  
low . 
The domi nance  of ind i v i dua l s  i n  t h e  ren t a l ma rke t i s  fu r t h e r  
i l l u s t ra t ed by  t h e  numbe r  o f  a c r e s l e a s e d  a nd the numbe r  o f  l e a s e s  
repor t ed be�ween unr e l a ted parties .  Of  the tot a l  ac res repor ted l eased 
out by l and l ords , 6 1 . 1 %  are l eas ed to  unre lated individua l s .  Leas ing 
agreemen ts for these acres are 6 5% of a l l l eases reported by land i o rds .  
Almo s t  one fourth of the acres repor ted , under 20%  of agreement s ,  are 
l e a s e d  to re l a t i v e s .  Land l o rd s  r e p o r t ing l eases wi th re lat ives  and 
unre lated indi vidua l s  rent out 1 0% of the l eased acres re ported. Thi s 
l and i s  covered by 7 . 3%  of the agreement s .  
The proportion o f  acres l eased by farm o perators who l ease on l y  
from unrelated indi v idua l s  i s  sma l l er than that reported by l and l ords .  
However , it  is  s t i l l  the l argest propo r t i on of total acres rented in by 
* 
T�ble 3 . 9  Land lord Leas i nR Patterns. Acres Leased _(!n_<l _ _N�be r  o f  Leases Reported Each Pat tern 
Landlord 
Leases to 
Re lat i ves On ly 
Unrelated Ind iv idua l s  
Partnersh i p  or Corporat i on 
Re l a t i ves and Unr e l ated 
I nd i v i dua l s  
Re lat i ves and Partnersh ips 
or Corporat ions 
Unrelated Ind i v i dua l s  and 
Partnersh i p s / Corporat i ons 
Related , Unre lated Ind i v i ­
dua l s  & Partnersh i p / Corp . 
TOTALS 
Table 3 . 9  con t inued 
Land lord 
Leases to 
Re lat i ves On l y  
Unre lated Ind iv idua l s  
Partnersh i p  o r  Corporat ion 
Relat i ves and Unre l ated 
Ind ividua l s  
Re lat ives and Partnersh ips 
or Corporat ions 
Unre lated Ind iv i dua l s  and 
Partnersh i ps / Corporat i ons 
Re lated , Unrelated I nd iv idua l s  
.& Partnersh i p s / Corporat ions 
TOTALS 
Respondents 
Leas ing · 
Pat t erns 
Number Percent 
1 7 6 
393 
1 3  
4 6  
0 
3 
6 3 2  
2 7 . 9  
62 . 2  
2 . 1 
7 . 3  
0 
. 5  
. 2  
1 00 . 0  
Number o f  Leases 
Reported Th i s  
Pat tern 
Number Percent 
1 99 1 9 . 9  
6 5 1  6 5 . 2  
1 6  1 . 6  
1 2 1  1 2 . 1 
0 0 
6 . 6  
5 . 5  
998 1 00 . 0  
Acres Lea sed 
i n  These 
Patterns 
Number 
( 1 000 ' s) Percent 
7 6 . 1  24 . 9  
1 86 . 8  6 1 . 1  
6 . 1 2 . 0  
29 . 5  9 . 6  
0 0 
6 . 6  2 . 2  
. 8  . 3 
305 . 9  1 00 . 0  
2 
Corre lat i on between t ype of tenant ( s )  lease . to and leas ing pattern : X = 1 42 . 1 
Average 
Number o f  
Leases Per 
Respondent 
1 . 1  
1 . 7  
1 . 2 
2 . 6  
0 
2 . 0  
5 . 0  




4 32 . 4  
4 7 5 . 3  
4 70 . 7  
640 . 3  
0 
2 1 92 . 7  
800 . 0  
4 8 3 . 9  
S i gn i f i cant 




A , B  
A , B  
A , B  
A , B  
.A 
S ign i f i cant 
D i f fe rence 
i n  Average 






A , B  
P< . OOO DF=S 
* Leas ing pat terns cou ld be ident i f ied for on ly 1 03 5  of the 1 1 55 respondents . 
**T tests used to compare means to detect s i gn i f i cant d i f ferences . D i f ferent l e t te r s  i nd ica t e  s ign i f i -
cant d i f ferences , P= . OS .  \J1 
t-' 
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re spondent s .  Of a l l acre s respondent s rented iri,  29 .4% are l eased f rom 
unre l a t e d p er s on s .  The s e  a c r e s  a r e  c o v e r e d  by 2 7 %  of the  l ea s e s  r e­
ported .  Ren ters l easing f rom unre l a t ed per sons and re latives reported 
that  s l ight l y  ove r 26 .5%  of the acres  were rented in this  pat tern , but 
i n v o l v ed 4 3 . 2 %  o f  t h e  l ea s e s  r e po r t e d .  Re s ponden t s  l e a s i n g  f r om 
r e l a t i v e s  o n l y  l e a s ed 1 2 . 6 %  o f  t he a c re s u s ing 1 2 %  o f  t he l e a s e s  
repo rted . 
Almo s t  two thirds of tenant res ponden t s  reported inv o l v ement in 
mo r e  t han one l e a s e  ( Ta b l e  3 . 1 0 ) .  Le s s ee r e s p onden t s  r en t i ng f r om 
re l a t i ve s  are mos t  l ike l y  to have  a l ease with an unrelated  per s on as 
we l l .  A l mo s t  one t h i rd o f  t e na n t r e s p o nd en t s r e p o r t e d  t h i s l e a s in g  
pa ttern. Another  third o f  t he tenant re spondent s l eased from unre l a t ed 
persons onl y. Almost  ha l f  of t hese ,_ 4 7 . 5 % ,  have mu l t iple  l eases • . Two 
th i r d s  o f  r e s ponden t s  who l e a s e  f r om a f inanc i a l  ins t i tu t i o n  o r  
g o v e r nment  ha v e  o n l y  one  l ea s e .  O v e r  6 0 %  o f  t e nan t s r e n t ing f r om 
re l at iv e s  have  only one leas e .  
Mo s t  l and l o r d  r e s p o n d en t s ,  7 0% ,  r e p o r t e d  ha v ing  on l y  one 
l easing agreement.  Few l and l ord responden t s , 12 .5% , who rented onl y  to 
re l at i v e s  reported hav ing more than one l ea sing agreement . Land l o rd s  
r en t i n g  t o  p a r t n e r s h i p s  o r  c o r p o r a t i on s  a n d  unr e l a ted  i nd i v idua l s  
re ported s l ight l y  more ins tance s  of  mu l t i p l e  leasing , 23% and 29 . 5%  
res pec t i v e l y. Land l ords with  mu l t i p l e  leases  and renting to  re lat i v es 
repo rted leas ing to an unre lated ind i v idua l as we l l  7 . 3% of the time . 
Tab le 3 . 1 0 Inc i dence o f  Mul t i p le Leas ing Patterns by Type o f  Party 
Leas ing W ith 
5 3 . 
Percent o f  
Tenant Leases F rom 
Relat ive On ly 
Unre lated Ind i v i duals On ly 
Bank or Government Only 
Re lat ive and Unre lated 
Relat ive and Bank / Government 
Unrelated and Bank / Government 
Relat ive , Unrelated , and 
Bank / Government 
TOTALS 
Land lord Leas es To 
Re lat ive Only 
Unre lated Ind iv i duals Only 
Partnership 9r Corporat i on On ly 
Relat ive and Unre lated 
Relat ive and Partnership / Corp . 
Unre lated and Partnership / Corp . 
Relat ive , Unre l ated , and 
Partner ship / Corporat i on 
TOTALS 
N 
8 3  
1 3 7 
1 8  
1 2 5  
8 
1 8  
1 4  
4 0 3  
N 
1 7 6 
3 9 3  
1 3  




6 3 2  
Number of Leases Tenant 
S ingle* Mu lt iple Respondent s 
- - - Percent - - ­
Each Pattern 
6 1 . 5  
5 2 . 5  
6 6 . 7  
3 3 . 5  
3 8 . 5  
4 7 . 5  
3 3 . 3  
1 0 0 . 0  
1 0 0 . 0  
1 0 0 . 0  
1 0 0 . 0  
66 . 5  
Number o f  Leases 
S ingle* Mult iple 
- - - Percent - - ­
Each Pattern 
8 7 . 5  
7 0 . 5  
7 6 . 9  
69 . 8  
1 2 . 5  
29 . 5  
2 3 . 1  
1 0 0 . 0  
0 
1 0 0 . 0  
1 0 0 . 0  
3 0 . 2  
2 0 . 6  
3 4 . 0  
4 . 5  
3 1 . 0  
2 . 0  
4 . 5  
3 . 5  
1 0 0 . 0  
Percent o f  
Landlord 
Responden t s  
2 7 . 9  
. 6 2 . 2  
2 . 1 
7 . 3  
0 
. 5  
. 2  
1 0 0 . 0  
*Th i s  inc i dence i s  greater than that reported e lsewhere due to the 
s t ructure o f  the ques t ionna i r e . The f igures in th i s  table usua l ly 
cons ider leases between one l and l o r d  and one tenant as one lease , 
even though it may be for a tract that inc ludes both crop l and and 
pas ture or hay l and . In other rep o r t s  t h i s  was usua l l� c ons idered 
more than one l ease . 
Impact £f re l at i o n s h i p  b e t we en t enant  
and l and l o r d  on  r e n t a l agreement terms. 
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Par t ie s  to  a leasing agreement may have differing object i ve s  
-
when l ea s i ng f a rm l and . The  t e rms o f  t h e  a g r e emen t  wi 1 1  v a r y , wi t h  a 
party 's  obj ec t i ves .  A l and l o rd objec t i v e  of l and t rans fer t o  a son o r  
daug h t e r  may pro duce  l e a s e  t e rm s  mo r e  f a v o ra b l e  t o  the  t enant  t ha n  a 
goa l of maximi zing the returns t o  the l and inves tment . 
In this s ec tion , the re la tionship be tween contrac ting par t ies  
and l ea s e t ype s and t e rms w i l l  b e  e xami ne d .  Thr e e  ca t eg o r i e s  of  
re l at ions hi p wi l l  be  used for  this anal ys i s. The categories are l eases  
b e twe en i mme d i a t e fami l y  membe r s  ( fami l y) ,  l e a s e s  be tween e x t e nd e d  
fami l y  members (re l ative s) , and unre l ated individua l s . The incidence o f  
p e r s ons  l e a s ing o n l y  t o  o r  f r om o t h e r  ca t e g o r i e s  o f  pa r t i c i p an t s  
(corporat ions , banks , and go v ernment )  was too  l ow t o  be inc l uded in the 
analys is . 
The i s s ue s  examined  i n c l ud e  t h e  imp a c t  o f  t h e  t y p e  o f  r e l a -
tionship on existence o f  mor e  favorabl e  l ease terms for the tenant  and 
on the forma l i ty of the agreemen t .  
Re l a t i o n s h ip be twe e n  l and l o rd and  t enant and � .£!.  l ea s e .  
Share l eases are the mos t  f requen t l y  used form of leasing agreement for  
c r o p l and i n  a· l l  three  re l a t i o n s h i p c a t e g o r i e s  ( Ta b l e  3 . 1 1 ) . L e a s e s  
be tween fami l y  members were mos t  l ike l y  t o  be share leases . Jus t o v e r  
ha l f ,  5 3 %  of t h e  r e s p ond e n t s  i n  t h i s c a t eg o r y  r e p o r t ed ha v i ng o n l y  
s ha r e  l ea s e s  wi th  fami l y  membe r s , a nd a l mos t ano t h e r  1 0% had b o t h  
share and cash agreement s .  
Table 3 . 1 1  Type of Lease U s ed by Relat ionship Between Land lord 
and Tenant 
Type o f  
Relat i onship 
F ami ly 




9 9  
1 2 1  
4 9 5  
7 1 5 
Cash 
Type o f  Leas e 
Share Both Tota l 
- - - Percent of Thos e  Respond ing - - -
3 2 . 7  5 2 . 9  9 . 6  1 3 . 9  
3 5 . 4  4 9 . 6  1 0 . 2  1 6 . 9  
3 1 . 6  4 9 . 4  1 4 . 9  6 9 . 2  
3 3 . 8  5 2 . 2  1 4 . 0  1 0 0 . 0  
Corre lat ion between type of l e a s e  and r e lat ionship : X
2
=3 . 6 3 8  
P< . 4 5 7  
DF=4 
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5 6 . 
Re s p ond e n t s  ha v ing l e a s e s  w i t h  re l a t i v e s  and unre l a t e d  
indiv idua l s  reported a lmost  identica l  proportions , 4 9%-50% , us ing share 
l ease s  onl y. A higher proportion of  those hav ing leases wi th unr e l a ted 
parties  repo rted using both cash and share l eases.  On l y  1 0% of  respon­
d en t s  ha v i n g  1 ea s e s  wi t h  r e 1 a t  i v e s u s e d  b o t h  c a s h  and s h a r e  1 e a s e s .  
F i f t e en per c ent o f  r e s pond e n t s  ha v i ng l ea s e s  wi- t h  unr e l a t e d  pe r s on s  
used bo th types of  leases .  
Wr i t t e n  and  o r a l  agr e e me n t s .  Da t a  i n  Tab l e  3 . 1 2  r e f l e c t s  
s p e c i f i c te rms o f  s ha r e  and c a s h  a g r e eme n t s .  I t  can b e  s e en f rom t he 
d a t a  t ha t sha re  l e a s e s  a r e  mo r e  i n f o rma l t han  f i xed c a s h  r e n t  l ea s e s  
among a l l  t yp e s o f  pa r t i c i pan t s .  B o t h  c a s h  and sha r e  l ea s e s  b e t we e n  
unre lated indiv idua l s  are more f requen t l y  wri tten than lease s  be tween 
re l at i ves  or fami l y  members .  
Leas es  be tween relatives are t he mos t  informa l ,  wi th 72 . 7%  of  
cash  l eases and 8 7 . 3% of share l eases  being v erba l  agreement s ( Tab l e  
3 . 1 2 ) .  Cash leases be tween unre l ated indiv idua l s  are the onl y  group 
wi th  m o r e  t han- ha l f ,  5 2 . 3 % , of l e a s e s  b e ing  w r i t t e n .  By c ompa r i s o n ,  
the  h i g he s t  f r e quenc y o f  wr i t t en s h a r e  l e a s e s  i s  3 0 . 8 % , r e po r te d  by 
those l eas ing wi th unre l ated indi v idua l s .  
It  was expec ted that mul t i-year leases wou l d  be more l ike l y  t o  
f o l l ow t he s ame p a t t e rn as  w r i t t en l e a s e s .  On l y  i n  the  c a se o f  c a sh 
l ease s  be tween re latives  was this pa t tern e v ident .  The propo rtion o f  
wr it ten l eases between re l a t i v e s , 2 7 . 3% , i s  the same a s  those report ing 
· mu l ti-year leases .  Of sha re agreement s  be tween fami l y  membe rs , 74% are 
5 7 . 
Table 3 . 1 2 Forma l i ty o f  Leas ing Agreements by Relat i onsh ip 
Between Landlord and Tenant 
Type o f  
Relat ionship 





3 8  
5 5  
2 3 7  
3 3 0 
Cash Lea s e s  
· Verbal W r i t t en 
- Percent o f  -
Res pondents 
7 6 . 3  2 3 . 7  
7 2 . 7  2 7 . 3  
4 7 . 7  5 2 . 3  
5 5 . 2  4 4 . 8  
Corre lat ion between forma l i ty o f  
c ash leases and relat i onsh i p : 
X
2
= 1 9 . 1  
P< . O O O l 
DF=2 
Share Leases 
N Verba l Wr i tten 
- Percent of -
Respondents 
5 3  8 1 . 1  1 8 . 9  
7 1  8 7 . 3  1 2 . 7  
3 0 2  6 9 . 2  3 0 . 8  
4 2 6  7 3 . 7  2 6 . 3  
Corre lat ion between 
forma l ity of share 
leases and relat ionship : 
X2= 1 1 . 46 
P < . 0 0 3  
DF=2 
5 8 . 
annua l .  Cash leases be tween fami l y  members were reported t o  be annua l 
agreements in 72%  of the cases (Ta b l e  3 . 1 2 ) . 
The h i gh e s t  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  s ha r e  a g r e emen t s  r e p o r t e d t o  be  
mu l ti -year , 35 .3% , were between re l a t iv es .  About the same proportion , 
3 4 . 7 % , o f  c a s h  ag r e emen t s  b e twe e n  un r e l a t e d  pa r t i e s were  mu l t i - y e a r .  
Ana lysis  o f  the data i n  Tab l es 3 . 1 2  and 3 . 1 3 , indica te that  o ra l  mu l ti­
y ea r  a g r e eme n t s  a r e  no t unc ommo n .  I t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  s ome c a s h  a nd s ha r e  
l ease s be tween fami l y  member s  and share leases between re latives  are o f  
this t y p e .  
I t  i s  c l ea r  tha t v e r ba l , annua l l e a s e s  a r e  the  dom i nant  f o rm 
f o r  a l l  c a t eg o r i e s  o f  p a r t i c i pan t s .  ( Ana l ys i s o f  t he f ew ( 1 2 )  
agreements that cou l d  be iden t i fied a s  being managed by professiona l 
farm managers , 1 1  we re annua l and a l l were wri t ten.) Al though a lmo st  
t h r e e  f o u r t h s  o f  the l ea s e s  are  annua l ,  t h e  a v e r age l eng t h  o f  t e n u r e  
r e p o r t e d  f o r  r en t e r s  was a p p r ox i ma t e l y  1 0  y e a r s .  I t  wou l d  a p pe a r  
f a rm l and r e n t e r s  a r e  no t f r e qu en t l y  i n  d a ng e r  o f  l o s ing t h e  r i g h t  t o  
farm the land �ach year , despi te  the high proportion o f  annua l leases .  
Re l ationship be tween par t ies  and the  schedul e  of  payments·. The 
payment schedule of cash rental affec t s  the true ( pre sent v a l ue) cos t 
o f  r e n t i n g  l and . I f  p a r t i a l paym e n t  mu s t  be  ma de be f o r e  t h e  g r owing  
season begins , the cos t of renta l is  higher because of the t ime v a l ue 
o f  mone y .  
Da t a  i n  Tab l e  3 . 1 4  shows  tha t c a s h  l e a s e s  be tween unre l a t e d  
ind i v idua l s  are mo re l ike l y  t o  requi re · a semi-annua l payment schedu l e .  
O v e r 6 0 %  of t h e  l e a s e s  be twe en un r e l a t e d  i nd i v i dua l s  r e q u i r e d  s e m i -
Tab l e  3 . 1 3 Leng th o f  Leas ing Agreement 
Landlord and Tenant 
Type of Cash Lea s e s  
Relat i onship N Annual Mul t i -Year 
- Percen t  of -
Responden t s  
F am i ly 36 7 2 . 2  2 7 . 8  
Relat ive 5 5  7 2 . 7  2 7 . 3  
Unre lated 2 3 6  6 5 . 3  3 4 . 7  
Total 3 2 7  6 7 . 3  3 2 . 7  
Corre lat ion between length o f  
cash leases and relat ionsh i p : 
X
2
= 1 . 5 8 1  
P < . 4 5 4  
DF=2 
5 .9  
b y  Re lat i onsh ip Between 
Share Leas es · 
N Annual Mult i -Year 
- Percent o f  -
Responden t s  
so 7 4 . 0  26 . 0  
6 8  6 4 . 7  35 . 3  
2 9 5  7 3 . 9  2 6 . 1  
4 1 3  7 2 . 4  2 7 . 6  
Corre lat ion between for ­
ma l i ty of share leases 
and re lat i onsh i p : 
X
2
=2 . 4 1 0  
P< . 3 0 0  
DF=2 
Table 3 . 1 4 Cash Renta l  Payment S chedule by Relat i onsh ip Between 
Tenant and Landlord 
Type of 
Relat i onship 
F am i ly 
Re lat ive 
Unr elated 
Ind iv i dua ls 
Total 
N 
3 4  
5 2  
2 3 5  
3 2 1 
Payment S chedule 
Annual Semi -Annual 
- Percen t  o f  Respondents -
7 3 . 5  26 . 5  
5 5 . 8  44 . 2  
3 8 . 3  6 1 . 7  
4 4 . 9  55 . 1  
Correlat i on between payment s chedule and relat i onship : 
Total 
1 0 . 6 
1 6 . 2  
7 3 . 2  
1 00 . 0  
2 
X = 1 7 . 89 1  
P< . O O O  
DF=4 
60 . 
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annua l payment s.  I n  leases be tween fami l y  member s ,  onl y  23 . 7%  of the 
l e a s e s  ha d t h i s  r e q u i r emen t .  I n  l e a s e s  be twe en re l a t i v e s  i t  wa s 
r e q u i r e d  i n  4 1 . 5 %  of  the l e a s e  a g r e eme n t s .  Annua l  and s emi-annua l 
paymen t s c he du l e s  a r e  us e d  a l mo s t  exc l u s i v e l y  by  a l l  c a t e go r i e s  o f  
participants . 
Re l a tionship between l and l ord  and tenant and use E.!_ f l exib l e 
c a s h  r e n t a l payment s .  U s e  o f  f l ex i b l e  c a sh a g r e ement s  ha s b e e n  
advocated b y  some a s  a means of  prov iding some risk sharing benefit s  o f  
share l eases without the prob l ems tha t  can occur with share l eases. Us e 
of f l exib l e  cash l ease s may be prefer red i f  inter-genera tional t rans fe r 
is  the goal of the land l ord. 
C a s h  r e n t a g r e emen t s  tha t v a r y  t he r en t a l payme n t bas e d  o n  
variations i n  yie l d  and/or  price s  a re not widely  us ed. Onl y  10. 1%  o f  
a l l c a s h  ag r eeme n t s  r e p o r t e d  h a d  c a s h  r e n t a l p r i c e s  tha t v a r y  wi t h  
v a r ia t i ons  i n  y i e l d  o r  p r i c e .  Examin a t i on o f  d a t a  in Tab l e  3 . 1 5  
rev ea l s  tha t  agreement s betwe en fami l y  membe rs may be more  l ike l y  t o  
contain this feature but the difference was not significant . 
Re l a t i ons hip  b e t w e e n  pa r t i e s  and s ha r e  and c a s h  r e n t a l s .  
Ana l ysis  of the impac t of  re lat ionship between parties  and the renta l ,  
ca sh or share � paid for use of the l and revealed no significant pr ice 
differences .  It  is  apparent t ha t  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  be s i d e s  r e l a t i o n sh i p  
have a great er inf luence on leve l o f  renta l paid.  
Other  share l ease terms and r e l a t ionships between par ticipants .  
S ha r e  ren ta l ag r e ement s ha v e  o t h e r t e rms tha t can v a r y  in wa ys  o t he r  
6 3. 
than varying the share of ou tput or number and share of inputs .  Af ter 
crops have been har ves ted , there is va lue in grazing the crop residue 
in the field .  Almost  two thirds of l eases be tween fami l y  members and 
re l a t i v e s  p ro v i d e f o r a g e  ben e f i t s  to t h e  ren t e r .  Lea s e s  be twe e n  
unre l ated indiv iduals· ha ve this prov i si on only 55 .5% of the t ime. Thi s 
beriefit  is prov ided withou t add i t iona l paymen t in almo s t  al i cases .  
Re l a t i on s h i p  b e twe e n  pa r t i e s  and  c a s h  paymen t  pro v i s i o n s  i n  
s h a r e  l ea s e s .  Share  l e a s e s  ma y inc l ud e  bui l d ings  o r  t r a c t s  o f  l an d  
t ha t  can  on l y  be  u s e d  f o r  hay  o r  p a s t ur e , i n  a d d i t i on t o  c r o p  l an d .  
Paymen t f o r  u s e  o f  the s e  a d d i t i ona l f e a t u r e s  some t ime s c ome s i n  t h e  
form of a cash payment i n  addi t ion t o  the rental share.  If compe t i t ion 
for l and exis ts , renters  may offer  to make a supplementary cash payment 
to secure the lease�  
V e r y  few , abou t 1 5 % o f  the l e a s e s , ha v e  p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  ca s h  
p ayme n t s  a s  part  o f  t he ren t a l p r i c e .  Re l a t i on s h i p  be tween  l ea s i n g  
p a r t i e s  had  n o  s i g n i f i ca n t  e f f e c t on  the  u s e  o f  add i t i o na l c a s h  
pa yment s .  Th i s  may i nd i c a t e t h a t  f ew s ha r e  a g r e emen t s  inc l ud e  
bui l d ings o r  hay l and or that payment f o r  these features i s  inc l uded in 
the rental share. Payment cou l d  be in t he form of o ther considera t ions 
not specifica l l y inc luded in the l ease.  
S ome c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  £f pa r t i c ipan ts � re lationship be tween 
c o n t r a c t i ng par t i e s .  L e a s e s  be tween  f am i l y  membe r s , and p e r h a p s  t o  
some extent re l at i ve s ,  may ref l ec t  the goa l of t rans fer of t he land to  
future generations . Examinat ion of da ta in  Tab l es 3. 1 6  and 3 . 1 7  revea l s  
that l and l o rds  le as ing t o  fami l y  members are like l y  t o  be o l der than 
64 
Table 3 . 1 6 Age o f  Landlord by Relat i onship w i th Tenant 
Typ e  o f  
Re lat i onship N 2 5 - 3 4  3 5 - 4 4  4 5 - 54 55 - 6 4  Over 65 Tot a l  
- - - - - - - Percent o f  thos e  Respond ing - - - - - - -
Fam i ly 6 6  0 0 9 . 1 2 8 . 8  62 . 1  1 2 . 3 
Relat ive 9 7  4 . 1 1 6 . 5  2 0 . 6  24 . 7  34 . 0  1 8 . 1  
Unre lated 3 7 3  2 . 1 1 0 . 5  1 3 . 9  2 6 . 3  4 7 . 2  6 9 . 6  
Tota l 5 3 6  2 . 2  1 0 . 3  1 4 . 6  2 6 . 3  46 . 6  1 0 0 . 0  
Correlat i on between age o f  landlord and relat i onship : X
2
=24 . 3 6 
P< . 0 0 2  
DF= 1 2 
Table 3 . 1 7 Percent o f  Land lord ' s Income From Rented Land by 
Re lat ionship W i th Tenant 
Percent of Hous eho ld Income 
Les s Than Over Type o f  
Relat ionship N 3 0  % 3 0 - 5 0% 50 - 80% 8 0% . To tal 
Percent of Thos e  Res pond ing - - - - - -
Fam i ly 5 9  4 0 . 7  1 8 . 6 • 25 . 4  1 5 . 3  1 1 . 8  
Re lat ive 86 7 4 . 4  1 6 . 3  5 . 8  3 . 5  1 7 . 3  
Unre lated 3 5 3  7 0 . 8 1 7 . 6  6 . 2  5 . 4  7 0 . 9  
Tota l  4 9 8  6 7 . 9  1 7 . 5  8 . 4  6 . 2  1 00 . 0  
Corre lat i on between percent o f  land lord ' s income and re lat i on ship : 
X
2
=39 . 6 29 
P< . 0 0 0 1  
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o ther l and l ords.  Fami l y  l and l ords are a l so more l ike l y  to re l y  upon 
income f rom the rented land for  a greater proportion of their househo l d  
income . 
Of land l o rd s  who rent to fami l y  member s ,  28.8% are be tween the 
a g e s  of 5 5  and 6 4  whi l e  6 2 . 1 %  a r e  6 5  or o l d e r .  S l i gh t l y  more t han o n e  
f ou r th o f  l and l o r d s  who r e n t  t o  f ami l y  membe r s  g e t  5 0- 8 0%  o f  t he i r  
income from their rented farml and.  Another  1 5% re l y  on thi s  s ource o f  
inc ome f o r  o v e r  8 0 %  o f  t he i r  i n c ome . B y  c on t r a s t , da t a  i n  Ta b l e  3 . 1 7 
show that 7 4 .4% of l and l ords in agreements  between re latives  and 70 .8%  
in  leases between unre lated par t i e s  re l y  on  farmland renta l income f o r  
l es s  than 30% of their hous eho l d  inc ome . 
From these  two tab l e s , i t  can be seen that landl ords in l ea s e s  
b e tween f ami l y  memb e r s  a r e  mo r e  i nv o l v e d  i n  f a rming a c t i v i t i e s .  
Ge t t ing  t he i r  c h i l d r en s t a r t e d  i n  f�rming , and l and t ran s f � r  t o  t h e  
next  g ene ra t i o n  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  a ma j o r  r e a s on f o r  f a rm l and l ea s i ng b y  
t h e s e  respondents .  
Conclus ions 
The f a rm l and r en t a l  ma r ke t in S o u t h  Dako t a  is e s s en t i a l l y a 
s e r ie s  o f  l o c a l  ma rke t s .  P a r t i c i pa n t s  i n  t he r e n t a l ma r ke t  a r e  
predominan t l y  individua l s  and are mos t  l ike l y  t o  have  agreement s  with  
u nr e l a t e d  p e o p l e . The l and l o r d  s i de of  t h e  ma rke t is  d omi�a t e d by  
nonopera tor  l and l o rd s , one third o f  whom l i ve out of s tate.  The renter 
side of the market i s  dominated by partowner opera tors.  Par towners  are 
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inv o l ved in more l ease s , rent l arger trac t s , and are the largest  group 
of renter part icipants .  
Ana l y s i s  o f  t he ag e s  o f  ma rke t p a r t i c i pant s re v e a l s  s ome 
support  for the tenure ladder concept.  Proceeding from rent ing a l l of 
the l and farmed t o  eventua l  ful l ownershi p  is st i l l  a motivat ion for a 
p o r t i o n  o f  t he r e n ta l · marke t .  But  i t  i s  no t the  ma j o r re a s on a s  i t  
once may have been. The preeminence of par towner .operators sugge s t s  
t h a t  the  p r ima r y  r e a s on f o r  l and r e n t a l i s  e xpans ion  o f  t h e  f a rm 
enterprise . 
The preference by respondents for verba l annua l leases sugge sts  
t ha t  the  ma rke t is  f ai r l y  i n f o rma l a nd t rad i t i ona l l ea s e  t e rms a r e  
re l ied upon t o  some extent .  A s igni f i cant l y  higher proportion o f  cash 
l e a s e s  t han s ha r e  l e a s e s  are w r i t t en a g r e emen t s , e s pe c i a l l y l e a s e s  
be tween unre l ated indiv idua l s .  
Lea s i ng ag reemen t s  be t we e n  f ami l y  memb e r s  and re l a t i v e s  a r e  
more informa l than those between unre l a ted parties .  Non-price terms o f  
l e a s i n g  ag r e emen t s  be twe en re l a t i v e s  a n d  f ami l y  memb e r s  ma y b e  mo r e  
favorab l e  for tenants .  However , the cash or  share rental does not seem 
to be inf luenced to a s ignifi cant degree by r e lationships .  
Fami l y  member l and lords are o l der and more re l iant on rental  
income than unre l a ted or re l at i v e  l and l ords .  They are more l ikel y  t o  
b e  retiring or retired farmer s  pass ing o n  the land.  
Chapter 4 
RENTAL MARKET C HARAC T ER I S T I C S  AND MARKET 
PERFORMANCE UNDER VARYING CONDITIONS 
Tradition has p l ayed an inf l uential  ro le in determining farm-
l and renta l prices and practices .  For many years , economis t s  have  been 
concerned wi th the efficiency imp l i cat ion s  of tradition on renta l terms 
(Mill 1851  and Hur l burt 1 96 2 ) .  
U s e  o f  t ra d i t i ona l a g r e em e n t s  i nh i b i t s  v a r i a t i o n  o f  r e n t a l 
terms to ad just to variat ions in s o i l produc tivity  and economic envi-
r o nmen t .  I f  r e n t a l t e rms and the  a c c ompanying  r e s ou r c e  mix  d o  n o t 
respond to changing condit ions , product prices do not ref l ect  consumer 
p r e f e r e n c e s  and ine f f i c i e n t  u s e  o f  r e s ou r c e s  i s  t h e  r e su l t  ( He a d y  
1 9 52 ) .  The magni tude and extent of renta l market re sponses t o  changing 
cond i t ions are examined in Chapter 4 .  
The c ro p land i n  South Dakot a  v a r i e s  considerab ly  i n  fer t i l ity  
and amount of rainfa l l  rece i v ed (Figure 4 . 1 ) . The Southeas t  corner  o f  
t h e  s tate has �e lative l y  more ferti l e  soi l  and receives  more rainfa l l  
than other areas of  the s tate.  Crop produc tion in this area i s  predomi-
nan t l y  c o rn and s o ybeans . T h e  We s t e r n  po r t i o ns o f  the  s t a t e , i n  
c on t r a s t ,  a re a r id o r  s emi - a r i d  wi t h  l and o f  cons i d e r ab l y  l e s s  f e r -
t i l i t y .  M o s t l and i n  t h e  We s t e r n  p a r t o f  t h e  s t a t e  i s  range l an d  a n d  
wheat l and. 
In this chapte r ,  respons ivenes s  of  the farm l and renta l marke t 
in ad jus t ing to these condit ions wi l l  be ana l yzed. To accomp l ish thi s 
l e a s i n g  a g r e emen t s  wi l l  be  examine d by : 1 )  t e s t i ng f o r  s i gni f i c a n t 
Figure 4 . 1  Average annual pr ec ipitation and air t emper ature 
( F igure 4 . 1A ) , and average percentage r ating p er 
acre of unimproved land p er county ( Figur e  4 . 1B )  
in S outh 
·
Dakota ( 1 9 6 7- 1 9 7 4  sales dat a). * 
..... .. ,. 
Figure 4 . 1A 
....... _ 
1 9  
< 20 
Figure 4 . 1B 
20 - 40 
*Sourc e :  Wes t in and Malo 19 78  
- - - -· 
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d i f f e r e nc e s  in l e a s ing t e rms be twe e n  r e g i ons · o f  t he s t a t e , and 2 )  
te s t ing for s igni ficant difference s in lease terms by the type o f  crop 
grown on the l and . 
Data Source and Ana lyt i cal Variables 
D a t a  f o r  thi s ana l y s i s  a r e  f r om t he 1 9 8 6  S o u t h  Diko t a  S t a t e  
Univers i ty Farmland Renta l  Surv ey. For purpose s of regional ana l ys i s ,  
t he r e s p on s e s  t o  t he s ur v e y  a r e  d i v i d e d  i n t o e i g h t  r e g i ons  b a s e d  o n  
crop reporting districts .  The regiona l groupings are those used b y  the 
S ou t h  Dako ta C r o p  and Li v e s t oc k  Re p o r t in g  S e r v i c e .  The We s t  a nd 
S ou t hwe s t  d i s t r i c t s  ha v e  b e e n  c o n s o l i d a t e d  due t o  t he l ow numbe r o f  
respondent farmland owner s  and rente r s  in the Southwes t  Region. 
The cropping pat terns us ed in the ana lysis  were dev e l oped f rom 
respondents '  l is t s  of mo st  importan t  crops grown. Four cropping pat-
t e rn s  tha t o c c u r r e d  mo s t  f r e q u en t l y ,  f rom t he s e v e ra l  t ha t  we r e  
p o s s i b l e ,  a r e  u s ed i n  t he ana l y s i s .  The s e  f o ur  pa t t e rns  a r e  u s e d  
b e c a u s e  the y ref l e c t  the  mo s t  c ommon c r o p  r o t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  
r e g i ons  o f  t he s t a t e  and p r o v i de a s e q u en t i a l s c a l e  t h a t  s e r v e s  a s  a 
proxy for  soi l productiv ity.  
For the ensuing ana l ysi s , the cropping pat tern is labe l ed corn­
s oyb e ans if t he r e s pond ent  i nd i c a t ed t h a t  o n l y  c o rn and / o r  s o y b e a n s  
w e r e  t h e  p r inc i pa l c r o p s  g r own o n  t h e i r  ren t e d  l and . I f  c o rn , 
soybeans , and one or mo re sma l l grains were grown the cropping pa t tern 
i s  c o rn , s o ybeans , and  g r a i n .  Land t h a t  wa s u s e d  t o  p r o d uce  c o rn , 
whe a t  and o t h e r  t yp e s  o f  sma l l  g r a i n  h a s  a c r o p p in g  pa t t e rn o f  c o r n , 
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whea t ,  and gra i n .  A r e s p o nd e n t ' s  i n d i c a t i on t ha t  on l y  whe a t  and / o r  
a no t h e r  sma l l  g r a i n wa s g ro wn ,  r e c e i v e d a c r o p p ing pa t t e r n  ! ab e  1 o f  
whea t and grain. One of these four c ropping patterns are found in over  
85% of crop land l eases examined.  
Regional Dif ferences 
D i f f e renc e s  i n  cr ops grown o n  r e n t e d  l and • . T h e r e  i s  c o n s i d­
erab l e  variety in crops produced on rented l and in South Dako ta. So i l  
fert i l i ty and prec ipitat ion decrease s teadi l y  mo v ing from the Southeast  
Region of the sta te  to  the Nor thwe s t  Region. It  is  not unexpected then , 
that  t he greatest  occurrence of  soybean production occurs in the South­
ea s t  and E a s t  Ce n t r a l p o r t i o n s  o f  t h e  s ta t e .  C o r n  i s  the  c r o p  mo s t  
extens i v e l y  produced in the se areas and i s  regu l ar l y  inc l uded in the 
c r o p p in g  pa t t e rn in mo s t  a r e a s  of t h e  s t a t e  exc e p t  in t h e  We s t  and 
Northwest  Regions ( T a b l e  4 . 1 ) .  
C r o p  p r oduc t i o n  i n  t h e  C en t r a l regions inc ludes cons iderab l y  
l a r g e r  p r o p o � t i o n s  o f  sma l l g r a i n s  ( l i ke o a t s  and bar l e y ) g r own i n  
ro t a t i o n  wi t h  c o rn .  Whe a t  i s  ano t h e r  c r o p ,  b e s i d e s  c o r n , tha t i s  
p r o du c e d  i n  mo s t  a r e a s  o f  t he s ta te .  Howe v e r , i t  i s  g rown o n  a muc h  
sma l l e r  proport ion of the l and i n  regions where corn and soybeans are 
g rown. C r o p  p ro d u c t i on b e g ins  t o  s h i f t  mo r e  he a v i l y  t o  whe a t  i n  t he 
No r t hea s t Re g ion whe r e  j u s t o v e r  7 0 %  of  t h e  r e s pond e n t s ind i c a t e d  i t  
was  g r own i n  r o t a t ion  w i t h  o t he r  c r o p s .  I n  t he Cent r a l  and We s t e rn 
regions of the state , wheat  i s  regu l ar i y  grown on vi rtua l l y  a l l crop­
l and under renta l agreements .  
Tab le 4 . 1 Crop§ Gro�� Qrr_�����4 Land By Crop Report i na D i s t r i c t  i n  South Dakot a  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Number of Leas e s  W i th These Crops Grown - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Regi on 
Nor thwe s t  
We s t e rn 
South Cen t ra l 
Cent ra l 
North Cen t r a l  
North Eas t  
Eas t  Cent ra l 
Southea st 
To t a l  
'lc 
Corn / S oybeans 
No . o f  















. 8  
1 9 . 1 
13 . 3  
1 3 . 1 
Corn . Soybean s 
& Other Gra i n s  










3 3 2  
0 
0 
1 . 4 
1 . 5 
7 . 8  
2 5. 9 
3 1 . 3  
3 1 . 0  
1 9. 9  
Corn , Wheat 
& Other Gra i ns 
No . o f 
Leases Percent 
1 0  
1 0  
60 
94 
1 1 0 
1 3 1 
1 58 
1 54 
7 2 7  
1 5 . 2  
1 2. 8  
42 . 9  
7 0 . 7  
5 3 . 9  
5 3 . 0  
4 5 . 8  
34 . 2  
4 3. 7 
Wheat and / o r  
Other Gra i n s  








1 3  
7 
3 8 7  
84 . 8  
8 7 . 2  
55 . 7  




1 . 5 
2 J. 3 
N= 1 664 
2 Corre lat i on between c ropp ing pat tern and Crop Repo r t ing D i s t r i c t : X =952 . 999 P� . 000 1 · DF= 2 1  
Tot a l s  
No . o f 
Leases Pe rcent 
6 6  
7 8  
1 40 
1 3 3 
204 
2 4 7  
3 4 5  
4 5 1  
1 664 
4 . 0  
4 . 7  
8 . 4  
8 . 0  
1 2. 3  
1 4. 8 
20 . 7  
2 7 . 1  
1 00 . 0  
* Cropp i ng patte rns are comb i na t i ons of maj o r  c rops ra i sed on t he rented l and . On l y  maj or c ropp ing p a t t e r n s  are 
i nc l uded . Exp l ana t ion :  Corn/ Soybeans - corn and soybeans are the on l y  maj o r  c rops grown . 
Corn / Soybeans /Gra i n s - Corn . soybeans , and othe r  g r a i n s  ( oa t s , bar l e y , whea t , e tc . ) 
are g rown . 
Corn /Wheat / G r a i n  - Corn , wheat , and other gra i n s  are grown . No soybeans a r e  g r own . 




Wi t h i n  e a c h  r e g i o n  t h e  u s e  o f  s ha r e · o r  c a s h  a g r e eme n t  i s  
inf l uenced  b y  t he p r i nc i pa l  c r o p s  g r own o n  the  l and co v e r e d  i n  t h e  
agreement .  The higher variab l e  product ion cos t s  and increas ed risk t o  
r en t e r s '  inc ome i n  c o rn a n d  s o y b e a n  p r o d uc t i on encourag e s  the  u s e  o f  
share agreements .  Share agreement s '  risk sharing at tributes and input 
co st  sharing pro v is ions cos t s  make it a t t ract ive for these crops . 
In fi v e  o f  the se ven regions there  were statis tica l l y  s i gnif­
icant differences ( p=.05)  in the cropping pat terns grown on l and r ented 
unde r  s ha r e  and c a s h  a g r e emen t s .  O n l y  t h e  We s t e r n  and S ou t h  C en t r a l  
Regions did not reveal a pat tern o f  respond ents  shi f t ing t o  cash l ea ses  
as corn or soybeans became less  impor tant crops .  In a l l five  regi ons 
where d ifferences were significan t ,  the proportion of share l eases  is 
much higher  for wheat-grain l and than it i s  for corn-wheat-grain l and.  
In  t he S ou t he a s t  and E a s t· C en t r a l  r e g i o ns s ha r e  r en t a l  
ag reemen ts are 83-86% o f  the ren ta l  agreemen ts for corn-soybean l and . 
Re s p o nd e n t s  i n  t h e s e  two a r e a s , a s  we l l  a s  the  N o r t h e a s t  and N o r t h  
Centra l regi ons , reported a lmos t  80% o f  their  l ease s on corn-soybean­
grain l and were share agreements .  
The p r o po r t i o n  of  share  ag r e emen t s  on  c o r n-whea t - g r a i n  l and 
decreased to less than ha l f  of leases  repo r t ed in each . region. No rth 
C en t ra l  r e g i o n  re s po nd e n t s  r e p o r t e d  t he h i g he s t  p r o p o r t i o n , 4 3 % , of  
s ha r e  l e a s e s  for t h i s  t ype o f  l an d .  The l owe s t  p r o p o r t i o n  of  s h a re 
a g r e eme n t s  f o r  t h i s t y p e  o f  l and  wa s � p p r o xima t e l y  one t h i r d  in  t he 
Southeast  re g io n .  
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Whea t-grain land is l eased wi th share agreement s in over  ha l f  
o f  the c a s e s .  A l though t h i s  l a nd i s  g ene r a l l y o f  l ower  qua l i t y and  
whe a t  p r oduc t i o n r e q u i r e s  f ewe r v a r i a b l e  inp u t s , t he use  o f  s ha r e  
agreements i s  qui te high. Over three fourths o f  respondents in the Eas t 
C en t ra l r e g io n  and two t h i r d s  o f  re s pond e n t s  i n  the No r t hea s t  a n d  
Nor thwest  regions used share l eases  for  wheat-grain l and. The Nor t h  
Centra l region had the lowe s t  proportion of share agreement s f o r  wheat­
grain l and , at  55%  of the renta l agreement s .  
Differences in cash rent a l  prices .  Cash renta l prices  shou l d  
r e f l e c t  t h e  ne t v a l ue o f  t he l a nd ' s  c on t r i bu t i on t o  c r o p  p r o duc t i o n .  
C ro p l and  in t he Ea s t  Cen t ra l  and S o u t he a s t re g i ons  o f  t he s t a t e  a r e  
capab le  of produc ing grea ter yie lds  o f  higher va lued produce than l and 
in o ther areas of the state .  Land in these  regions shou l d  earn a higher 
c a s h  r e n ta l t han l and e l s ewh e r e  i n  t h e  s t a t e .  As l and  p r oduc t i v i t y 
p r o g re s s i v e l y  d e c r e a s e s  a c r o s s  t h e  s t a t e , the  r e n t a l p r i c e  s h o u l d  
decrease as we l l .  
D a t a  � n  T a b l e  4 . 2 s h o w  a v e r a g e  c a s h  r e n t a l  p r i c e s  a n d  
significant differences in cro p l and cash rents  be tween regions o f  the 
state .  The tab l e  contains the number of  cash leases for which price s 
w e r e  re p o r t e d in each  r e g i o n , and  t h e  mean c a s h  r e n t a l  p r i c e  f o r  e a c h  
r e g i on .  Le t t e r s  in  the  r i g h t  c o l umn i nd i c a t e whe t he r s i gni f i can t 
differences exist .  Regions wi th dif ferent l e t ters have signi!icant l y  
different  (p= .05)  ca shrent pr ices , whi l e  tho se wi th the same letter  do 
no t .  Testing f o r  differences was done us ing the Wal le r / Duncan mul t i p l e  
t test .  Thi s procedure te s t s  f o r  signif icant differences be tween means 
7 5 . 
Tab le 4 . 2  Regiona l D i fferences in Cash Rent Leve ls 
S i gn i f icant D i f ference 
Average Cash Ind i cated by 
Region Rental Pr i c e  N D i f ferent Letters 
S outheast 4 1 . 9 6 7 3  A 
Eas t Central 34 . 3 4 7 9  B 
Northeas t  3 2 . 3 0  6 8  B 
North Central 2 2 . 4 9 6 8  c 
Central 1 8 . 50 3 8  c D 
S outh Central 1 4 . 0 3 2 7  D E 
Wes tern 1 1 . 45 1 5  E 
Northwes t  1 0 . 94 1 8  E 
Dependent Var iable Cash Pr ice 
S ource : S um  Mean F 
R2 DF o f  Sq . � Value PR . F c . v .  --
MODEL 7 3 8 9 3 8  5 5 6 2  3 8 . 7 6 . 0 0 0 1  . 4 1 6  4 2 . 1 4 7 9  
ERROR 3 7 8  5 4 5 3 9  1 4 3  
Corrected 
Total 385 9 3 4 7 8  
R o o t  MSE Cash Pr i ce Mean 
. 1 1 . 9 8 0 2  28 . 4 2 . 
7 6 · 
of  more than two c l asses of observat ions . The test  is  accomp l ished by 
compar ing t he mean of  each cl a s s  to each of  the other c l ass  means , and 
groups them according to detec ted significant dif ferences (Kirk 1 96 8 , 
SAS  Us e r ' s  Gu ide  1 9 8 5 ) .  
As expect ed , the highe st  amount o f  cash renta l was pa id i n  the 
S ou thea s t  r e g i o n. C a s h  r e n t a l s  d e c r ea s ed s t e ad i l y  f o r  l a nd f a r th e r  
we s t  a c r o s s  S o u th Da ko t a .  T h e  a v e ra g e  p r i c e  p e r  a c r e  r e n t a l i n  t h i s 
r eg i o n  wa s a l mo s t $ 4 2 . 00 , a b o u t  2 0% hi g h e r  t han the  s e c o nd h i g he s t  
average , $ 3 4.34 , in the Ea st  Centra l region. The av erage renta l paid  
in the Northeas t region was $ 3 2 . 30 ,  essentia l ly the same as tha t  pai d  
i n  the Eas t  Centra l region. 
In  t h e  c e n t r a l  p o r t i o n  of t he s t a t e  t he Nor t h  Cen t r a l  r eg i o n  
h a d  t he h i g h e s t  a v e rage  r e n t a l ,  $ 2.2 . 4 9 .  The a v e r a ge c a s h  ren t a l i n  
the Centra l regio n ,  $ 18 . 50 , was not s igni ficant l y  di fferent from ei ther 
the No r t h C e n t r a l ' s o r  S o u th  C en t r a l ' s , $ 1 4 . 0 5 , r e g i ona l a v e ra ge s .  
Ave rage ren ta l s  in the South Centra l ,  Wes tern ,  and Northwes t  regions 
were not significan t l y  d if ferent . Renta l s  in this group ranged from 
$ 1 4  in the South Centra l region to about $ 1 1  in the Northwe s t  region.  
Cash rental prices  a l s o  vary according to the  crop product ion 
pat tern on th� rented land. Varia t i on in ca sh renta l between land wi th 
v arious cropping pat terns was expec ted for  the same reasons regiona l 
v a r i a t i o n  wa s e x p e c t e d .  The c r o p p i ng pa t t e r n s  d e v e l o p e d  f o l l ow a 
regiona l pat tern as  di scus sed ear l ier .  The dif ferences in  cash renta l s  
be tween cropping pat terns sugge s t  that crops produced have a s tronger 
Table 4 . 3  Var i at i on in Crop land Cash Rental P r i ces by 
Cropping Pattern 
Cropping Pattern 
Corn and/ o r  Soybeans
. 
Corn , Soybeans , Other .Gra in 
Corn , Wheat , or Other Gra in 
Wheat and/ or Other Gra in 
N 
4 7  
7 5  
1 50 
6 8  
Dependent Var iable Cash Pr i c e  
S ource : Sum o f  Mean 
DF Sg . � 
MODEL 3 3 3 7 8 2  1 1 2 6 0  
ERROR 3 3 6  4 9 1 1 8  1 4 6  
Corrected 
Tota l  3 3 9  8 29 0 0  
Mean Cash 
Rental P r i c e  
F 
Va lue 
7 7 . 0 3 
4 7 . 1 2 
3 7 . 5 2 
2 7 . 6 8 
1 6 . 8 0 
PR . F 
. 0 0 0 1  
Root MSE 
1 2 . 0 9 0 8  
S i gn i f i c ant 
D i fference 
Ind i cated by 









c . v .  
4 1 . 6 3 8 3  
Cash Pr i c e  Mean 
, 29 . 0 3 8  
7 7 . 
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i n f l uence  on t he r en t a l  p a i d  than  d o e s  l o c a t i on .  Re g i on o r  c r o p p i n g  
pa t t e rn v a r i a b l e s  exp l a i ned  a b o u t  4 1 % o f  v a r i a t i on i n  c a s h  r e n t a l 
prices ac ross South Dako ta. 
M e an c a s h  r e n t a l s  pa i d  in e a c h  c r o p p ing pa t t e rn ca t e g o r y  a r e  
signif icant ly di f ferent from t he o thers .  Land where corn or s oybeans 
a r e  g r own e a rns  $ 4 7 . 1 2  p e r  ac r e .  T h e  p r i c e  d e c re a s e s  t o . $ 3 7 . 5 2 p e r  
acre on land where sma l l grain i s  a l so grown and drops another  $ 10 .00 
t o  $ 2 7 . 6 8 ,  on c o rn-whe a t -g r a i n  l an d . Whe a t -g r a i n  l and e a r n s  on l y  a 
third of the cash rent recei ved on corn-soybean land ,  $ 1 6 .80 per acre.  
Di f f e r e n c e s  in g r o s s  r e n t .!£_ v a l ue r a t i o s .  T h e  r a t i o  o f  ca s h  
rent to va l ue of the l and shows the return on inves tment in l and. Rent 
to value rat ios  are ca lcul ated by div iding the cash renta l amount by  
t he ma r ke t  v a l ue of  t he l and . The r en t  t o  v a l ue ra t i o s  r e p o r t e d  i n  
this chapter are based on gross  ren ta l  prices which inc lude prope r t y  
taxes and other l andl o rd cos t s  of  ownership and maint enance. The net 
re turn to the l and l ord's  inve s tment in l and is  the ren ta l  price minus 
these costs  of ownership. Rent to  va l ue rat ios ca l cu l ated using ne t 
re turns more accurate ly  depic t the l and l o rd ' s  rate of return. Howeve r ,  
these net amounts are not avai lab l e  and the gross re turn is  used a s  a 
proxy for ne t re turn. 
Re t u rns  to land a r e  i n f l u e n c e d  by e a r n ing po t en t i a l  of o t h e r  
type s o f  inves tments  and renta l s  rise  and fa l l  with the value o f  l and . 
Ren t  t o  v a l ue ra t i o s  may f l uc t u a t-e o v e r  t ime as  e c onomic cond i t i o n s  
c hang e , but shou l d  be f a i r l y  c o n s t an t - a c r o s s  a l l  r e g i ons a t  a g i v en 
p o i n t  i n  t i me . The  r e n t  t o  v a l u e r a t i o s  u s e d  in t h i s  ana l y s i s  we r e  
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c a l cu l a t ed u s ing t he p e r  a c r e  c a s h  r e n t a l f o r  1 9 8 6  and re s p ond e nt s '  
es t ima tes  of the land ' s  value .  
The ra t i o s  in the  s amp l e  d i f f e r  b y  as  muc h  as  3 . 5 % , b u t  do  no t 
f o l l ow a pa t t er n  that  r e f l e c t s  l and f e r t i l i t y ,  l and p r i c e s  o r  c r o p s  
p r o d uc e d .  A re v iew  o f  d a t a  i n  Ta b l e  4 . 4  r e v e a l s  t ha t  s i gn i f i c a n t  
diff erences exis t be tween the Northeas t and South Centra l regions onl y. 
Crop land in the Northeas t Region earns the highes t  percentage 
r e t u rn wi th an e s t i ma t ed r e n t  to v a l ue r a t i o  of 1 0 . 6 % .  The l o we s t  
average return of rent to crop l and was reported in the South Centra l 
Region,  at  7 . 3% .  Al l other regions  of  t he s ta te have mean rent to  v a lue 
r a t i o s  t ha t  a r e  no t s t a t i s t i ca l l y  d i f f e r en t .  An ana l y s i s  o f  r e n t · t o  
value ratios by cropping pat t ern re vea l ed differences so sma l l that the 
a t t em p t  to ca l cu l a t e the t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  f a i l ed .  I t  a p p e a r s  t ha t  
cropping pat tern does not exp lain variat ion in rent t o  va l ue r�t io s .  
Regiona l variation in share renta l proportions .  Share renta l 
payment s  shou ld genera l ly ref l ec t  the v a lue of the land 's  contribution 
t o  c r o p  p r o d u c t i o n.  The me an t e na n t s '  s h a r e  o f  c r o p s  p r odu c e d  o n  
r en t e d  l and i s  sh own i n  T a b l e  4 . 5 .  I t  c an be s e en t ha t  t he l and l o r d s '  
share i s  genera l l y significant l y  higher i n  areas of more fe r t i l e  l and. 
I n  t he S o u t h e a s t  CRD , whe r e  c o r n  and  s o yb e ans a r e  mo s t  f r equen t l y  
grown , the mean tenants '  share i s  60%.  The Northwe s t  CRD , where wheat 
is  the primary cro p ,  has a mean t enan t s '  share s l ight l y over  67% .  
The a v erage  share  i n  t he We s t e rn C RD i s  the  on l y  one t h a t  
appears out of p l ace ,  a t  64%.  The reason for this re la tive ly low s hare 
Table 4 . 4  Var i at ion in Rent to V alue Rat i o  by Crop Report ing 
D i s tr ict 
S ign i f icant 
D i f ference 
Ind icated by 
Mean D i f ferent 
Region N Rent / Va lue Letters 
Northeas t  4 7  1 0 . 6  A 
East Central 6 1  1 0 . 4  A B 
C entral 2 8  9 . 2  A B 
Western 8 8 . 9  A B 
S outheast 5 1  8 . 5  A B 
Nor th Central 44 8 . 4  A B 
Northwes t  1 1  8 . 1 A B 
S outh Central 1 7  7 . 2  B 
Dependent Var iable Rent to Va lue Rat i o  
S ource : Sum Mean F 
R
2 
DF o f  Sg . � Va lue PR . F c . v .  
MODEL 7 . 0 3 0 7  . 0 0 4 4  2 . 2 8 . 0 29 . 05 7 9  4 7 . 1 4 
ERROR 259 . 49 8 5  . 0 0 1 9  
Corrected 
Total 266 . 5 2 9 2  Rent to 
Roo t  MSE Value Mean 
. 04 3 8 7  . 0 93 1 
8 0  
Table 4 . 5  Var iat i on in Share Ren t a l  Payment by Crop Report ing 
D i s t r i c t  
S ign i f i c ant 
D i f feren c e  
Mean Share Ind i cated by · 
Rental D i f f erent 
Region N P r oport ion Letters 
Northwest 24 6 7 . 9  A 
North Centra l  7 5  6 6 . 0  A B 
S outh Central 56 6 5 . 1  B c 
C entral 4 5  6 5 . 0  B c 
Northeast 98 6 5 . 0  B c 
Wes tern 3 2  6 3 . 7  c D 
East Central 1 3 0 6 1 . 7  D E 
S outheas t  1 7 0 6 0 . 8  E 
Dependent Var iable Share Rental Proport i on 
S ource : Sum Mean F 
PR . F R
2 
DF o f  Sq . � Va lue c . v .  -- --
MODEL 7 3 0 9 5  4 4 2  1 0 . 6 7 . 0 00 1 . 1 0 7 1 8  1 0 . 1 6 3 5  
ERROR 6 2 2  2 5 7 8 8  4 1  
Corre cted 
Tota l 6 2 9  2 8 8 8 4  
Root MSE Mean Share 
6 . 44 6 3 . 3 5  
8 1  
8 2  
i s  tha t a f ew r e s ponden t s  f r om t h i s  r e g i on r e p o r t ed  agr e emen t t e rm s  
t ha t  p a i d  t h e  l and l o rd o v e r  ha l f  o f  t he c ro p .  In  th i s  s i t ua t i on t h e  
land l o rd a l so paid most  of  the variab l e  input cos t s  and the tenant on l y  
provided l abor and soQe machinery. 
Share agreement s  wi th the l and l o rd receiving one third of  the 
c ro p  is t he mo s t  f re quen t l y  u s e d a r r an g eme-n t  in t he s t a t e , exc e p t  i n  
t h e  No r thwe s t  a n d  S ou t he a s t  r eg i o n s . Ag r e ement s tha t pay on l y  a 2 5 %  
share t o  the l and lord are common l y  used in the Northwes t  region. The 
Southeas t and Eas t Central Region hav e  the highe s t  incidence of renta l 
a g r eeme n t s  t ha t s ha re the  p r o d u c e  4 0 - 6 0  and  s ome in t he S ou t h e a s t  
Region use a 50-50 land l ord-tenant share arrangement . 
Although the share proportions  do vary between regions , i t  i s  
s t i l l  e v i d e n t  tha t t rad i t i o n  ha s an  i n f l ue n c e  i n  de t e rmining  wh i c h  
share i s  used. There are on l y  f our tenant-land l ord share percentages 
that are used ext ens i v e l y. The 1 / 2- 1 / 2 ,  3 / 5-2/ 5 ,  2 / 3- 1 / 3 ,  and 3 / 4- 1 / 4  
t enan t - l and l o rd s ha r e s  a r e  c h o s e n  a l mo s t  exc l us i v e l y ,  f r om a l l 
available  possibi l i ties.  Onl y  3 .4%  of  res ponden t s  wi th share l eases  
reported share proportions other than these.  
Difference s  in number of inpu t s  shared. The va lue of the share  
r en t a l  p ayme nt  c an be  ad j u s t e d  b y  v a r y ing the  numbe r o f  input  c o s t s  
shared by the land l ord and tenant .  Higher va lued crops of ten require  
greater out l ay for variab le inputs  than do  less  intensive l y cul ti vated 
crops . 
Seven inpu t cos ts are cons idered : seed , fer t i l i zer , herbicid e , 
insect ic ide , chemica l appl ication , har v e s t ing , and drying. Fert i l i ze r  
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was reported as shared mos t f requen t l y  in a l l · regions . Herbicide and 
insec t ic ide respec tive l y ,  were the next most  frequent l y  shared input , 
except  in the We st ern Region. Seed costs  were frequent ly  sha red in a l l 
CRDs , except for the wes tern regions.  Further discuss ion of s pecific  
input sharing pat terns is deferred  unti l Chapter 6 .  
Ren t a l ag reemen t s  i n  t he E a s t e r n  r e g i ons o f  t h e  s t a t e ha v e  a 
h i g h e r  a v e r a g e  numb e r  o f  i n p u t  c o s t s  s h a r e d  t han o t he r a r ea s . The 
E a s t e rn r eg i o ns h a v e ,  on  a v e r a g e , a bo u t  two and a ha l f  in p u t s  s ha r ed  
pe r agreement (Table  4 . 6 ) .  Share agreemen ts  in the central regions of  
t he s t a t e  ha v e  an  a v e ra g e  of  j u s t  un d e r  2 input  c o s t s  s ha r e d  p e r  
agreement .  Respondent s wi th share lease s  in the Wes te rn CRD report  an 
a v e ra g e  of j u s t  o v e r  one , 1 . 2 , i n p u t  c o s t s  sha r e d .  L e a s e s  in t he 
Nor t hwe s t  CRD ha v e  t he l owe s t  num b e r o f  i n pu t s  sha r ed , an a v e ra g e  o f  
l e s s  t han one ( . 7  5 )  per agreement . 
The re l at ionshi ps between the types of  crop grown , l and produc­
t i v it y ,  and the number of input s  sha red i s  even more evident in Tab l e  
4 . 7 .  The data show that  s igni ficant differences exi st i n  t he av erage 
n umbe r  of i n p u t s  s ha r ed b e t w e e n  l e a s e s  c o v e r i ng l a nd wi t h  a l l  f o u r  
c r o p p ing pa t terns . 
Share  r en t a l a g r eeme n t s  f o r  l a nd t h a t  p r oduce s c o rn a n d  
s o yb e an s , t w o  ma j o r c r o p s  g r own i n  t h e  S ou t h e a s t  a n d  Ea s t  C en t ra l 
Re g i on s , ha v e  an  a v e ra g e  o f  a l mo s t  t h r e e  inpu t s  s ha r e d .  Lea s e s  f o r  
l �nd where smal l grain i s  grown i n  t he rotat ion a verage just over two 
and a ha l f  inpu ts shared p�r agreemen t .  The average continue s t o  dro p ,  
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Tab le 4 . 6  Var iat ion in the Numbe r  o f  Input s · Shared by Crop 
Re:eort ing D i s tr i ct 1< 
Mean 
No . o f  S ign i f i cant D i ff eren c e  
Inputs Ind i cated by 
Region N Shared D i f f erent Letters 
Eas t  Cent ral 1 3 0 2 . 64 A 
Southeas t 1 7 0 2 . 54 A 
Northeast 9 8  2 . 3 6 A B 
North Central 7 5  1 . 92 B c 
S outh Central 56 1 . 8 0 B c 
Centra l 4 5  1 . 80 c 
Wes tern 3 2  1 . 1 6 D 
Northwes t  2 4  . 7 5 D 
Dependent Var iable : Number o f  Inputs Shared 
S ource : Sum Mean F 
R
2 
DF of Sg . � Va lue PR . F c .  v .  
MODEL 7 1 5 3  2 1 . 9 6 9 . 0 5 . 0 0 0 1  . 0 925 7 0 . 8 0 0 7 
ERROR 6 2 2  1 5 0 9  2 . 4 2 6  
Corrected 
Tota l 6 2 9  1 6 6 2  Mean No . 
Root MSE of Input s 
1 . 55 7 6  2 . 2  
)'( 
Inputs c ons i dered are seed , fert i l i z er , herb i c i de , insect i c i de , 
chemical app l i cat i on , harve s t ing , and grain dry ing . 
8 5  
Tabl e  4 . 7  Var iat i on in Number o f  I nputs Shared by Type o f  Crops 
Grown on Rented Land 
S i gn i f i c ant 
Mean D i f f erence 
No . o f  Ind i cated by -
Input s D i f ferent 
CreEs Grown N Shared Letters 
Corn and/ or S oybeans 1 04 2 . 9 8 A 
C o rn , S oybeans 1 6 1  2 .  5 9 . B 
& Other Grain 
Corn , Wheat , and 1 7 5 2 . 2 5 c 
Other Gra i n  
Wheat and/ or 1 2 9 1 . 2 6 D 
Other Gra in 
Dependent Var iable : Number of Input s Shared 
S ource : Sum Mean F 
R
2 
DF of Sg . fuc_ Va lue PR . F c . v .  
MODEL 3 2 0 1 6 7  2 9 . 8 1 . 0 0 0 1  . 1 3 6 2  66 . 6 4 5 0  
ERROR 5 6 5  1 2 7 3  2 . 2 6 
Corrected 
Tota l 5 6 8  1 4 7 5  Mean No . 
Root MSE of Inpu t s  
1 . 5 0 1 6  2 . 2 5 3  
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to 2 . 2 5  inputs  shared per agreement , for land where wheat is grown wi th 
corn and other sma l l gra in. Agreement s for land wi th a cropping pat­
tern of wheat and grain have the lowe s t  average number of input s  shared 
at 1 . 2 6 .  
Tab l e  4 . 7  con t a i n s  d a t a  t h a t  s ho w  t h e  numbe r  o f  i n p u t s s ha r e d  
decreases  a s  sma l l grain and wheat  become mo re ·important crop opt ions . 
Furthe r examinat ion of. Tab l e  4 . 6  revea l s  tha t  thi s  pat te rn ho l d s  as  
we l l  by r e g i o ns . The  c e n t ra l  a r e a s  o f  the s t a te ha v e  an  a v e r age  o f  
a lmos t  two · input s shared per renta l agreement .  Production of  whea t 
and sma l l  grain is  inc reas ing ly important  in the s e  areas . The l owe s t  
average number o f  inputs sha re d  i s  . 7 5  i n  the No rthwes tern Region whe r e  
c r o p  product ion i s  a lmo s t  ent ire ly  i n  the form of whea t .  
D i f f e r e n c e s  i n  n u m b e r o f  l e a s e s  � r e n t a l  m a r k e t 
par t i c i pan t .  V a r i a t i on s  i n  c r o p  e n t e r p r i s e s  b e twe e n  r e g i o n s  o f  t h e  
state  do not appear t o  affect  the number o f  l ease s that marke t partici­
p an t s  a re in v o l v ed i n .  T h e  a v e r ag e  numbe r o f  l e a s e s  l and l o r d s  a n d  
t e nan t s  r e p o r t e d  us ing  wa s 1 . 8 .  The  C en t ra l CRD had  t he h i gh e s t  
a v e ra g e  at  2 . 1 .  Tenure s t a t u s  i s  t he mo s t  i n f l ue n t ia l f a c t o r  · in  t he 
numb e r  of  l e a s e s  a re s p o nd e n t  i s  i n v o l v e d  i n .  Pa r t owner  o p e r a t o r  
l an d l o r d s  r e po r t  the  h i g he s t  a v e r a g e  numb e r  o f  l e a s e s  a t  3 . 7 .  
Nono perator land l ords report the lowe s t  average number of l ease s ,  a t  
1 . 4  ( S e e  Tab l e  3 . 1 ) .  
Differences  in numbe r  � ac res  � l ease.  Var iat ions in fer­
t i l ity and precipi tat ion a l so affect  t he number of acres  required for  a 
s u c c e s s f u l  c r o p  en t e r p r i s e .  The num b e r  o f  a c r e s  c o v e r e d  b y  a l e a s i n g  
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agreement ref l ect the acreage requiremen ts for the cond i t i ons and crops 
produced in dif ferent regions .  
Re spondent s in  the  Southeast  CRD reported the  sma l l e s t  a verage 
number  of  a c r e s per a g r e e me n t a t  1 5 0 a c r e s  ( Ta b l e  4 . 8 ) . The  a v e ra g e  
number o f  acres per agreement increases  i n  each region t o  the no rth and 
increases even more in the Cent ra l and Wes tern parts of the s tate .  The 
l a r ge s t  a v e r a g e  t ra c t  s i z e  wa s r e p o r t e d  in t h e  No r thwe s t  Reg i o n .  T h e  
average number o f  acres p e r  lease  in the Northwe s t  CRD, 1048 acres , i s  
a lmos t seven t imes the size  of rented t rac t s  i n  the Southeas t Reg ion. 
The use of land renta l for expansion and the inf l uence of c rop 
en terpri se on t ract size i s  r e inforced by comparing the average sa l e  
t ra c t s i z e  to  r en t a l t ra c t  s i z e .  W i t h t h e  e x c e p t ion o f  t he We s t e r n 
Reg i on s , t r a c t  s i z e  p a t t e r n s  f o r  l and s o l d  f o l l ows t ha t  o f  r en t e d  
trac t s  fair ly c l ose l y  ( Swinson and Jans sen 1 984) .  
Conclusi on 
The f�r t i l ity  o f  farmland in South Dako ta varies cons iderab l y  
be tween regi ons and the crops produced ref l ec t  l and fert i l i ty. Corn i s  
grown i n  mos t  o f  the s tate , wi th soybeans i n  the eas t , and sma l l grain 
in the no r t h and we s t .  Whe a t  i s  t he p r e domi nant  c r o p  in  t he We s t  and 
No r t hwe s t e r n  r e g i o n s . The r e n t a l ma rke t and r e n t a l a g r e eme nt  t e rm s  
a d j u s t  f a i r l y  we l l  t o  t he s e  v a r i a t i on s  i n  l and f e r t i l i t y a n d  c r o p  
produc tion . 
The ri sk and cos t sharing a t t r ibut es of share leases  apparent l y  
make them prefera b l e  for rent ing l and where high variab le co s t  crops , 
Table 4 . 8  Var i at i on in Number o f  Acres Per Lease Agreement 
by Crop Repo r t i ng D i s t r i c t  
S igni f i cant · 
Mean D i f ference 
No . o f  Ind i c ated by -
Acres Per D i f fe rent 
Region N Lease Letters 
Nor thwes t  7 9  1 0 4 8 . 6  A 
Wes tern 8 5  9 1 5 . 3 A 
S outh Central 1 1 7  5 7 3 . 0  B 
Central 1 2 9 3 8 4 . 1 c 
North Central 1 8 8 2 9 5 . 3  c D 
Northeast 1 9 1  2 3 7 . 2  D E 
Eas t Centr a l  2 4 1  2 0 5 . 9  D E 
S outh East 3 0 9  1 5 0 . 4  E 
Dependent Var iable : Acres Per Lea s ing Agreement 
S ource : Sum Mean F 
R
2 
DF of Sg . � Value PR . >F c . v .  
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MODEL 7 9 1 9 7 02 1 9  1 3 1 3 8 6 0 2  2 9 . 0 4 . 0 0 0 1 . 1 3 248 1 89 . 9 5 7  
ERROR 1 3 3 1 6 0 2 24 5 7 34 4 5 2 4 7 6  
Corrected 
Tot al 1 3 3 8  6 9 42 1 5 9 5 4  Mean Acres 
Root MSE Per Lea s e  
6 7 2 . 6 6 3  3 54 . 1 1 3  
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l i ke c o r n , a r e  g r own . U s e  o f  s h a r e  l ea s e s  d e c r e a s e s  a s  mo r e  sma l l 
grains are inc l uded wi th corn in the cropping pat te rn. The higher r i sk 
of crop fai lure in we stern wheat  production areas may be respons ib l e  
f o r t he h i gh p e r c e n t ag e  o f  s h a r e  l ea s e s  f o r  p r e d ominan t l y wh e a t  
producing land. 
Renta l shares paid the l and l o rd vary with the fert i l i ty o f  the 
l and and the type of crop  grown. Howe ver the a lmos t  exc lusive  use of 
four renta l shares  ref l ects  the inf l uence of trad it ion on share l ea s e s .  
T he numb e r  o f  i npu t s  s ha r e d  i s  i n f l u e n c e d  mo s t  by the  t y pe o f  c r o p  
produced on the ren ted l and . 
Cash renta l prices appear to adapt qui te we l l  to variat ions in 
regiona l and crop production c o nd i t i on s .  The ana l y s i s by c r o p p i n g  
pa t t e r n r e v e a l e d  howe v e r , t ha t v � r i a t i o n s  in ca � h  r e n t a l r a te sa r e  
a t t r i b u t a b l e  mo r e  t o  the  p r o d uc t i v i t y of  i nd i v i d u a l  t ra c t s .  R e n t  t o  
v a l ue ratios wer e  fa ir l y  cons is tent acros s regions . 
The numb e r  of  l e a s e s  d o e s  n o t  v a r y  by r e g ion  o r  c r o p p i n g  
pa ttern. The s i z e  o f  the renta l tract varies cons iderab l y  depen� ing on 
t he r e g i on and t y pe of c r o p  p ro du c e d .  Av e r a g e  t r a c t  s i z e s  in t he c o r n  
p r o duc ing  ar e a s  o f  ea s t e r n  Sou t h  Dako t a  a r e  on l y  a b o u t  o n e  f i f t h  t h e  
s i ze of  wheai  produc ing trac t s  in the we stern areas .  
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Chapter 5 
FARMLAND RENTAL MARKET RE SPONSES TO F INANCIAL STRE S S : 
CHANGES IN RENTAL AGREEMENT TERMS IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS 
The agricul tura l economy has exper ienced subs tantial  f inanci a l  
dif ficu l ty i n  recent years .  Cro p l and prices have  decreased , crop prices  
have been depressed , and intere s t  rates have  been unusual l y high. For  
many years , economis t s  thought renta l  agreement terms hav e  too of ten 
_ been det ermined by t radi tion to respond to changes in conditions in the 
a g r i cu l tu r a l e c onomy . To o b t a i n  e f f i cient combinations of re source s 
under changi ng conditions , terms of  rent a l  agreements shoul d  respond t o  
these  changes i n  the economic env i ronment .  
In this chapter , changes in the renta l market and renta l agree-
ment terms wi l l  be ana lyzed.  The fi ve  years preceding 1986  was deemed 
the appropriate t ime frame for ana l yz ing most  of the change s  in renta l 
agreement terms . This time period ( 1 981-1986 ) was chosen because  o f  
the ma jor  changes experienced b y  the farm economy dur ing this period . 
Ana l y s i s  o f- chang e s  in c a s h  r e n t a l p r i c e s  wa s l imi t ed t o  change s 
o c cur r ing b e t we en t he 1 9 8 5  and 1 9 8 6  c ro p  ye a r s . Th i s  wa s d one t o  
inc r ea s e  the  re l i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  i n f o rma t i o n  and bec aus e o f  r a p i d l y  
decreasing land prices during this t ime. 
The occurrence of  changes in renta l agreement type s and terms 
w i l l  be ana l y z e d  f o r  the inc i de n c e  of c hang e s  in the ma r ke t as a 
who l e .  In addit ion , the impac ts  of 1 )  regiona l location , 2 )  cropping 
pat tern,  3)  tenure status of respondents , and 4) re lat ionship be tween 
cont rac t ing parties  on changes  in l ease terms are ana lyzed . The l at te r  
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ana lysis  wi l l  be accomp l i shed us ing the subse t of observat ions used for  
ana lysis  of land l ord-renter r e l a t i onship and lease terms in  Chapter  3 .  
Dat a  Source 
Da t a  f o r  a na l y s e s  in t h i s c h a p t e r  a r e  f r om t he 1 9 3 6  S o u t h  
Dako ta  S t a t e F a rml and  Ren t a l  S u r v e y .  The r e g i o n , c r o p p ing p a t t e r n ,  
re l at ionship ,  and tenure categorie s  are the same as those defined and 
used in the prev ious chapters . 
Re n t a l  M a r k e t Re s po n s e s  
Change s in forma l i ty o f  renta l  agreement s .  Res ponden t s  to the 
survey repor ted l i t t l e  change in the form or  length of the ir  leas ing 
agreements during the l a s t  f i v e  years . Data in Tab l e  5 . 1  show s l ight l y  
more agreement s  changing from wri t t en t o  verba l than verba l to  wr i t ten 
a g r e emen t s .  Chang e s  i n  e i t he r  d i r e c t i on we re r e p o r t e d o c c u r r i ng by 
on l y  about 7 %  of the marke t partic i pant s  res pond ing . 
A s imi l ar p a t t e rn a p p e a r s  in the  l eng t h  o f  t ime f o r  wh i c h  
re n t a l a g r e emen t s  a r e  conc l ud e d .  Ap p r oxima t e l y  f i v e  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  
l eases  reported changing from annua l t o  mu l t i-year , and 4 .5% changed 
from mu l t i-year t o  annua l .  
Al though the differences  were not signif icant , the re was s ome 
v ariation in re sponses be tween regi ons .  The highes t  reported frequency 
o f  any  change i n  a l l  r e g i o n s  wa s 1 0- 1 2 % .  Re s p onden t s  c hang e d  f r om 
wri t ten to v erba l  l eases mos t  of ten in the East  Centra l CRD. Change s  
from verba l t o  wri tten and from annua l to mul ti-year were repor ted mos t  
of ten in the Nor thwe st CRD. 
Tab le 5 . 1  Inc i dence of Change in Form and Length o f  Ren t a l  Ag reements i n  South Dakot a  
in Last F ive Years ( 1 98 1 - 1 986) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Lease Changed F rom - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
By Reg i on :  
Northwes t  
Western 
South Cent r a l  
Centra l 
North Cen t ra l  
Nor theast 




Correlat i on between 
Reg i on and : 
By Cropp ing Pat te rn : 
Corn / Soybeans 
Corn/ Soybeans / G ra i n  
Corn / Whea t / Gra i n  
Whea t / G ra in 
Corre l a t i on between 
C ropp ing Pa t tern and : 
Wr i t ten to Verba l  Verbal to Wr i t ten Annua l to Mu l t i -yea r  Mu l t i -yea r  to Annua l 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Percent o f  Thos e  Re spond ing - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
9 . 3  
6 . 7  
6 . 7  
7 . 0  
4 . 7  
7 . 0 
9 . 8  
7 . 0 
7 . 3  
958 
Change f rom 
Wr i t ten to Verbal 
X2=3 . 5 1 4  P< . 834 
DF=7 
7 . 9 
8 . 2  
3 . 7 
9 . 7  
Change from 
W r i t ten to Verba l 
x
2=S . S84 . P< . l 34 
DF=3 
1 1 . 3  
9 . 1 
5 . 3  
5 . 1 
8 . 2  
7 . 4  
5 . 7  
5 . 1  
6 . 6  
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Change f rom 
Verba l to Wr i t ten 
X2=4 . 4 7 8  P< . 7 2 3  
DF= 7 
5 . 7  
6 . 1 
6 . 1 
8 . 1 
Change f rom 
V erba l t o  W r i t ten 
2 X = 1 . 3 P< . 7 29 
DF=3 
1 2 . 0  
4 . 8  
6 . 8  
2 . 9  
7 . 6 
3 . 7  
4 . 6  
3 . 3  
5 . 0  
8 5 4  
Change f r om 
Annua l to Mu l t i - year 
X2=9 . 7 7 6  P < . 202 
DF=7 
2 . 4  
3 . 1 
2 . 8  
9 . 8  
Change f rom 
Annua l to Mul t i - year 
X2= 1 5 . 262 P< . 002 
DF=3 
2 . 0  
0 . 0  
9 . 7  
4 . 2  
7 . 0  
4 . 5  
5 . 2  
2 . 4  
4 . 5  
8 4 1 
Change f rom 
Mu l t i - year to Annua l 
x2= 1 1 . 1 7 P< . l 3 1  
DF=7 
6 . 0  
4 . 7  
4 . 8  
5 . 3  
Change f rom 
Mu l t i - year to Annua l 




Table 5 . 1 ( cont inued ) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Lease Changed F rom - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Wr i t ten to Verba l  Verba l  to Wr i t ten Annua l to Mul t i -year Mu l t i -year to Annua l 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Percent o f  Those Res pond ing - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
By Tenure C lass : 
Tenant 2 . 6  2 . 7  0 . 0  1 . 4  
Par towner operator 7 . 4 7 . 8  7 . 3  4 . 6  
Partowner operator land lord 1 0 . 9  1 2 . 0  8 . 3  6 . 4  
Ful lowne r operator land lord 4 . 4  0 . 0  2 . 5  7 . 1  
Non - operator land lord 7 . 9  6 . 5  4 . 4  • 4 . 5  
Corre lat ion· between 
Tenure C lass and : Change f rom Change f rom Change f rom Change f rom 
Wr i t ten to Ve rba l  Ver ba l  to Wr i t ten Annua l to Mu l t i - year Mul t i - year to Annua l 
x
2
=4 . 4  P< . 354 * ,, * 
DF=4 
By Re lat ionsh i p : 
Fami l y  5 . 9  2 . 6  2 . 6  2 . 6  
Re lat ive 5 . 6  3 . 0  2 . 1  4 . 2  
Unre lated 8 . 2  6 . 5  4 . 4  4 . 2  
N= 6 3 1  5 7 7  56 1 5 5 2  
Corre lat ion between 
Re lat i ons h i p  and : Change f rom Change f rom Change from Change f rom 
Wr i t ten to Verba l Verba l to Wr i t ten Annua l to Mul t i - year Mu l t i - year to Annua l 
x2= 1 . 24 P< . 5 38 * * 2 X = . 422 P< . 8 1 
DF=2 DF=Z 
'lc 
Ce l l  frequenc ies too low to ca l cu l ate re l i a b le x 2  stat i s t i c . 
\.0 
� 
9 5  
Changes from wri t ten t o  verba l  were reported b y  8-9% o f  respon­
d en t s  wi t h  t h r e e  of t he f o ur c r o p p i ng pa t t e rns . On l y  3 . 7 %  o f  c o r n , 
wheat ,  and grain land renters made this change. None of  · the regional 
difference s we re s tatistica l l y  s i g n i f i c an t . The hi ghe s t  inc i d en c e  o f  
l ease s  changing f rom verba l t o  wri t ten , 7 . 8% , was repo rt ed on wheat­
grain land and the l owes t ,  5 .7% on corn-soybean land . 
Lea s e s  f or whe a t  and g r a i n  l and  were  r e po r t e d  t o  ha v e  t h e  
highes t incidenc e o f  change from annua l to  mul t i-year lease agreement s 
a t  9 . 8 % .  T h i s was mo re t han t h r e e  t ime s a s  h i gh a s  t h e  f r e q u en c y  f o r  
any o ther cropping pat tern. 
Ana lysi s of change s in forma l i ty of agreements  by tenure c l as­
s i ficat ion of the respondent did no t revea l any signif icant differences 
in change s be twe en c l a s s e s .  P a r t o wn e r  o pe r a t o r  l a nd l o rd s  r e p o r t e d  
change from writ ten to  verba l , v erba l t o  wri t t en ,  and annual t o  mu l t i­
year agreements mo re often ,  1 1 ,  12 and 8% respective l y ,  than any o ther 
c la s s .  Tenants reported the l eas t amount of  change ,  with f requenc ies 
r ang ing f r om  0 to  2 . 7 % ,  i n  f o r m  or l en g t h  o f  a g r e eme n t .  F u l l o wne r 
operator l and l ords  reported change f rom mu l t iyear to  annua l mos t of ten 
at 7 % .  Changes from ve rba l to wri t ten and wri tten t o  verba l a s  we l l  as 
change s from annual to  mul ti-year and v i ce versa , were fair ly  e v enly  
dist ributed across  a l l  re l a tionship categories .  
Probab l y  the mos t  significant resu l t  of the ana l ysis  o f  changes 
in f o rma l i t y of ren t a l ag r e eme n t s  is the l a ck o f  chang e s  o c c u r r i ng .  
De s p i t e  t he i n c r e a s e d  ins t a b i l i t y  and f i nanc ia l s t r e s s  i n  the f a rm 
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se ctor , change s in l ease terms that wou l d  a l l ev iate some risk d i d  no t 
o c cur  w i t h  s i gni f i c ant  f r e q u e nc y .  T e nan t s  a r e  not  ge t t ing g r e a t e r  
forma l security  o f  tenure nor are l and l ords get ting greater prote c t ion 
agains t de fau l t  on rental  payment s .  
Change s in � � agr e emen t  u s ed .  I t  w a s  hy p o t he s i z e d tha t 
financ ial difficu l ties of  farm ope rators  in recent years woul d  encour­
age a shi f t  to share leases  ( Scott  1 9 8 5 ) .  This cha·nge woul d  reduce the 
financ ial risk from unfavorab l e  weather or price changes faced by farm 
operators .  It  would , however , increas e the risk faced by the l and l o rd .  
E xami na t i on o f  the  d a t a  i n  Tab l e  5 . 2  r e v ea l s  t ha t , q u i t e  t o  t h e  
contrary , twice a s  many share agreement s  changed to cash than changed 
from cash to share .  Just s l i ght l y  more than 6% of share l ease ho lders  
re ported a change from cash  t o  sha re .  Almost  13%  of  responden t s  with 
cash l eases reported that i t  had prev ious l y  been a share le�se ( Tab l e  
5 . 2 ) . 
Ana lysis  of changes in l ease  type s  by region did no t revea l any 
signif icant di fferences in changes occurring between regions .  Howev e r ,  
the r e  wa s a s omewha t h i ghe r inc i d e n c e  o f  c hange  f r om s ha r e  t o  c a s h  
reported in  the cash grain reg ions i n  the Eas tern par t o f  the state .  
The proportion of respondent s who reported leases  changing f rom 
share to cash d id not differ s i g n i f i c an t l y  b e twe e n  c r o p p i ng pa t t e r n s  
ei ther . There i s  however , a more d is t inc t range of  variat ion be tween 
ca tego ries than was evident in the regiona l  ana l ys i s .  
The h i g he s t  p r o po r t i o n  o f  r e s p o n d en t s  report ing changes f rom 
s ha r e  t o  c a sh , a l mo s t  2 0% ,  l ea s e d c o r n- s o y bean l and . The o p p o s i t e 
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Table 5 . 2  Reported Inc idence of  Change in Type of  Rental Agreement in South 
Dakot a  in Last F i ve Years ( 1 9 8 1 - 1 98 6 )  
By Cropp ing Pattern : 
Corn/ Soybeans 
Corn / Soybeans / Grain 
Corn/Wheat / Grain 
Whea t / Grain 
Total 
Corre lat ion between 
Change f rom Share to Cash 
Number of  Percent 
Those Indi cat ing 
Responding Change 
5 1  1 9 . 6  
8 2  1 7 . 1  
1 7 2 1 6 . 3  
7 7  6 . 5  
3 82 1 4 . 9  
Cropp ing Pattern and : Change from Share t o  Cash 
P� . 1 25  DF=3 
By Tenure Class : 
Tenant 46 8 . 7  
Partowner operator 1 64 9 . 2  
Partowner operator 3 7  2 1 . 6  
land lord 
Fullowner operator 25 4 . 0  
landlord 
Non- operator 2 3 9  1 5 . 1  
l andlord 
Total  5 1 1  1 2 . 5  
Corre lat i on between 
Tenure C lass and : Change from Share to Cash 
2 X =8 . 1 8 2  P� . 0 8 5  DF=4 
By Relat i onship : 
Fami ly 35  2 8 . 6  
Re lat ive 49 1 2 . 2  
Unre lated 2 1 8  1 3 . 8  
Total 302 1 5 . 2 
Corre lat i on between 
Re lat ionship and : Change from Share to Cash 
x2=S . 5 2 7  P< . 063 DF•2 
A l l  Respondents 5 1 1  1 2 . 5  
Change from Cash t o  Share 
Number o f  Percent 
Those Ind i cat ing 
Responding Change 
93  6 . 5  
1 44 6 . 9  
. 1 7 2  5 . 8  
1 2 7  7 . 1  
5 3 6  6 . 5  
Change from Cash to  Share 
P� . 969 
55 7 . 3  
1 44 4 . 2  
3 7  2 . 7  
29 1 7 . 2 
3 3 8  6 . 2  
603 6 . 1 
Change from Cash to  Share 
X
2
=8 . 064 P� . 084 DF•4 
55 7 . 3  
64 4 . 7  
263  2 . 7  
382 3 . 7  
Change from Cash to Share 
-x
2
•2 . 9 6 7  P< . 2 2 7  DF-=2 
603  6 . 1 
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change , from cash t o  share , was repo rted only  about one thi rd a s  often 
by  6 . 5 - 7 %  o f  r e s ponden t s  r e n t i n g  c o rn- s o y b e an l and . Re s pond en t s  
g r ow ing whe a t  and g r a i n . re p o r t e d  t h e  sma l l e s t  pr o p o r t i on ,  6 . 5 % , o f  
share l eases changing to cash. Approximate l y  an equa l proport ion of  
this  group of re spondents  reported chang ing from cas h  to share.  
Fu l l owner operator l and l ords  reported l eases changing from cash 
to  s ha r e  in 1 7 % o f  the  ca s e s , m o r e  t ha n  t w i c e  as  o f t en a s  any  o t h e r  
t enure c l a s s .  On l y  2 . 7 %  o f  p ar t owner  o p e r a t o r  l and l o r d  r e s p o nd en t s  
r e p o r t e d  t h i s  c hange o c cu r r i ng , the  l owe s t  p r o po r t i on o f  any t e n u r e  
group . 
Par t owne r o p e r a t o r  l and l o r d s r e p o r t e d  c hang i ng t he i r  l ea s e s  
f rom s ha r e  t o  c a s h  mo s t  f re qu e n t l y  wi t h  2 1 . 6 %  r e p o r t ingth i s  c hang e .  
O v e r  1 5 %  o f  nono p e r a t o r  l and l o r d s . r e p o r t e d  making s imi l a r chang e s .  
Onl y  4 - 8. 7 %  of ful l owner operator  l and l ords and tenants respect i ve l y  
re ported changing f rom share t o  cash .  
Ana l ysis  of  changes in l ease type by rela t ionship be tween the 
cont rac t ing parties revea led perhaps the mos t  s urprising resu l t  · of  this  
ana l ysi s .  C l ose  t o  29% o f  re spondent s hav ing l eases  with fami l y  mem-
hers  reported changing f rom s hare to cas h  l eases . This was more than 
twi c e  t he f re qu enc y r e po r t e d  by any  o t h e r  r e l a t i on s h i p  g r o u p .  B y  
cont rast , on l y  7 %  of  respondents l easing w i t h  fami l y  members changed 
f r om c a s h  t o  s h a r e  agre emen t s .  I t  wa s e xp e c t e d  t h a t  fami l y  membe r s  
wou l d  be more l ike ly to change from cash to s hare t o  a l l ev iate risk  and 
he l p  ensure the surviv a l  of t he farm enterprise .  
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Changes in number of input costs  shared � the l and l ord in the 
last  five  years .  The renta l price o f  sha re rented l and can be ad jus ted 
by v arying the number of  inputs  shared or  the proport ion of  the input 
co st to  be shared.  If  crop pr ices and farm land v a lues are · l ow ,  renta l 
a g r eeme n t s  may be  ad j u s t e d  t o  r e f l e c t  t h i s  d e c r e a s e d  v a l ue o f  t he i r  
contribution to crop production. 
Ana lysis  of the data in Tab l e  5. 3 shows v ery l i t t l e  adjus tment. 
of this type occurring in share agreement s. Change s  in the proport ion 
o f  i n p u t s  sha r e d  we re  r e po r t e d  b y  5 . 1 %  o f  the  re s pond en t s . On l y  3 . 2 %  
o f  s h a r e  l ea s e  ho l d e r s  r e po r t e d  a c hange i n  the numb e r  o f  i n p u t s  
s ha r e d .  The d a t a  d o e s no t i n c l ud e  a n y  i n fo rma t i on o n  whe t h e r  t h e  
changes were an increase o r  a decrease i n  l and lords '  sharing o f  cos t s , 
becaus e respondents were not asked to prov ide this informat ion. 
Re g i ona l l o c a t i on of t h e  .l an d  d o e s  no t ha v e  a s i gni f i can t 
impa c t  on c hang e s  i n  input  co s t  s ha r ing . The h i g he s t  p r o po r t i o n  o f  
respondent s reporting a change i n  the l and l ords ' share of  input cos t s , 
a lmos t 13% , was reported in the Nor thwe s t  Region.  S l ight l y  more than 
6%  o f  t h e  r e s ponden t s  in the We s t e rn Re g i on i nd i c a t e d  a change in t h e  
number of  input co sts  shared by  l and l o rd s .  
Leases o n  corn , soybean and grain l and experienced the highes t  
frequency ,  7 . 4% , o f  change i n  the land l ords ' proportion o f  input c o s t s  
shared . Respondent s wi th rent a l  a g r e eme n t s  f o r  b o th c o rn- s o ybean a n d  
whe a t -g ra i n  l and r e po r t e d  a cha n g e  i n  the  l and l o r d s ' p r o p o r t i o n  i n  
about 6 .5% of the cases .  Renta l agreements f o r  corn , wheat ,  and grain 
too 
Tab le 5 . 3  Inc idenc e  o f  Change in Landlords ' Output and Input 
Shares in S outh Dakota in La st F ive Years ( 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 6 ) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - Change in Land lord ' s - - - - - - - - - - - -
Shared 
P-r op ort i on 
o f  I nput 
C o s t s  
Number Increase Dec r e a s e  
o f  i n  i n  
Shared Output Output 
I nputs Share Share 
- - - - - - - - Per c ent of Thos e  Respond ing - - - - - - - - -
A l l  Respondents 
Cropp ing Pattern : 
Corn / Soybeans 
Corn / Soybean s / Gr a in 
Corn/ Wheat / Gra in 
Wheat / Gra in 
Tota l 
Correlat i on between 
5 . 1  
N=5 7 5  
6 . 4  
7 . 4 
1 . 8 
6 . 5  
5 . 2  
N=5 3 8  
Cropp ing Pattern and : Chang e  
in Input 
Share 
Re l at i onsh ip : 
F am i l y  
Relat ive 
Unre lated 
Corre lat i on : 
x
2
=6 . 2 0 4  
P< . 1 02 
DF= 
1 . 8  
4 . 7 
6 . 7  
N= 3 8 7  
3 . 2  
N=5 6 9  
6 . 5  
4 . 2  
1 . 2  
5 . 0  
3 . 8  
N=5 2 1 
Change in 
Number of 
Input s Shared 
X
2
=5 . 3 3 8  
P < . 1 4 9 
DF= 
0 . 0  
1 . 6  
3 . 4  
3 . 3  
N=5 8 6  
3 . 2  
6 . 8  
1 . 2  
2 . 4  
3 . 4  
N=5 2 0  
0 . 0  
1 . 5  
3 . 4  
N= 3 7 8  N=3 8 9  
1 . 7  
N=5 7 7  
2 . 2  
2 . 2  
0 . 6  
1 . 7  
1 . 5 3 
N=5 2 2  
3 . 8  
1 . 6  
1 . 6 
N=3 7 5  
-;'c 
*
c e l l  frequen c i es were too low t o  c a l culate va l id x
2 
stat i s t i c . 
1 0 1  
l and we r e  r e po r te d  c hang ing the l a nd l o r d s '  sha re  of  inpu t c o s t s  t h e  
l ea s t  o f t e n , w i th 1 . 8 % . 
Ren t e d  l and w i t h  c o r n  and  s o y b ea n s  a s  p r in c i pa l c r o p s  ha d 
l ea s e s  t ha t  c h ang e d  t h e  numbe r  o f  i np u t c o s t s  s ha red b y  t h e  l and l o r d  
6 . 5 %  o f  t h e  time . On l y  1 . 2 %  o f  t he l e a s e s  f o r  c o rn- whea t -g r a i n  l and 
were repor ted to  hav e  a change i n  the numbe r  of  inputs shared.  
The frequency- o f  change i n  the l and lords '  · share of input cos t s  
a n d  the  numb e r  o f  i n pu t  c o s t s  s h a re d  d i d  no t show muc h  v a r ia t i o n 
be tween tenure c l asses .  Changes occurred in a fai r l y  uniform fashion ,  
revea l ing no percep t i b l e  pat terns . 
I t  i s  n o t  po s s i b l e  t o  de t e rm i ne whether rel a tionship be tween 
c ont ract ing par t ie s  inf luence s chang e s  in l and l ords ' cos t  sharing. The 
incidence of changes in this subse t  were too l ow to generate any s ta­
t i s t i c a l l y  re l ia b l e  f i nd i ng s .  Wha t  r e s p on s e s  t h e r e  were  r e v ea l e d a 
higher frequency of changes in l and l o rd s '  sharing of input cos t s  when 
the contract ing part ies were unre l ated.  
Change in s h a r e  r en t a l  propo r t i o n  i n  l a s t  f i v e  yea r s .  Land 
prices have  fal l en drama t i ca l l y  in recent years , and rent as payment 
f o r l a nd us e c ou l d  be exp e c t e d  to  re f l e c t  t h i s o c c u r r en c e .  Howe v e r , 
accord ing to the surv ey resu l t s ,  sha re renta l  payments hav e  no t changed 
to any s igni ficant degree in response  to  economic f luctua tions . Onl y  
3 .3% o f  res ponden ts reported a n  increase i n  the l and lords '  share and a 
mere 1 . 7%  re ported a dec rease in the l and l o rds '  share of the crop.  No 
s ig n i f i c an t  d i f f e r e nc e s  i n  sha re  r e n ta l s  c hang e s  be twe e n  any o f  t he 
ca tego ries could be identified ( Table 5 . 3 ) . 
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Ana l y s i s  o f  t h e  a d j u s t m en t s  i n  l and l o r d s ' s ha r e  by  r e g i o n  
showe d c ha ng e s  o c c ur r i ng mo s t  f r e quen t l y  i n  t h e  E a s t C e n t r a l a n d  
Nor thwe s t  Regions . Res ponden t s  i n  those  areas repo rted a land l ord �hare 
inc r ea s e  ab o u t  6% of the  time . Re s p o n d en t s  ren t i ng c o r n , s o y b e a n , a n d  
g ra i n  p r o duc i n g  l a nd r e po r t e d  a n  i n c r ea s e  in  the l and l o rd s '  s ha r e  i n  
6 .8% o f  t he ir agreement s .  Thi s  was the only  no table propor tion of  any 
c ro p p ing p a t t e rn g r oup  re p o r t i n g  c h an g e s  in  the l and l o r d s ' s ha r e  
payment .  
Almo s t  7% of fu l l owner operator  land l ords repor ted an inc rease 
in t h e i r  ou t pu t  s ha r e .  Ju s t  o v er 5 %  o f  p a r t owner  o p e r a t o r l an d l o r d s 
ind i c a t e d  t he i r  share  i nc r e a s i n g .  On l y  2 - 3% o f  r e s p onden t s  in  a l l 
t enure  ca t e g o r i e s  re p o r t e d  a d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  l and l o r d s '  s h a r e  o f  
output . 
None o f  t he r e s p o nd e n t s  who ha d l e a s e s  wi t h  f ami l y  mem be r s  
reported an increase in the l and l o rd s '  share. S l igh t l y  less than 4%  o f  
re spondent s  ha v ing leases wi th f ami l y  members reported a decreas e in 
the l and l ords '  ren tal share . The mos t  frequent incidence of an increase 
in the l and l ord s '  share was repor ted by 3 .4%  of those l easing wi t h  an 
unre l a t e d  p a r t y . There  were  v er y  f e w  re s p on s e s  in  any re l a t i o n s h i p  
group reporting a decrease i n  the l and l o rd s '  sha re .  
Changes in cash renta l prices .  Cash  rental prices for  cropl and 
were ana l yzed for changes  occurring between 1 985 and 1 986.  Of re spon­
d en t s  who r e p o r t e d  bo t h  yea r s '  c a s h  r en t a l p r i c e s , 2 1 . 5 %  re p o r t e d  a 
p r i c e  d e c r e a s e  ( T ab l e  5 . 4 ) .  On l y  2 . 2 %  r e p o r t e d  a n  inc re a s e  i n  c a s h  
rental prices , wi th the ba l ance report ing n o  change . 
Tab le 5 . 4  Change i n  Cash Rental Pr i c e s  i n  South Dakot a  F rom 1 98 5  to 1 9 86 
By Reg i on : 
Nor thwes t  
Wes tern 
South Cen t r a l  
Cent ral 




Tot a l  
Responden t s  i nd i cat i ng
a 
No 
Numbe r Dec rease Change 
- - - Pe rcent - - -
1 6  1 2 . 5  8 7 . 5  
1 1  0 . 0  1 00 . 0  
2 5  8 . 0  9 2 . 0  
36 1 9 . 4  8 0 . 6  
5 8  1 3 . 8  86 . 2  
66 30 . 3  69 . 7  
7 4  29 . 7  7 0 . 3  
6 8  2 3 . 5  7 6 . 5  
3 5 3  2 1 . 5  7 8 . 5  
Average 
Pr i ce 
Change 
- 2 . 00 
2 . 00 
- 7 . 2 5 
- 2 . 7 7 
- 1 . 3 1  
- 7 . 1 0  
- 6 . 09 
- 7 . 0 3  
- 5 . 4 3 
S i gn i f i cant 
D i f f erence 
I nd i c ated by 
D i f f e rent 










Corre lat i on between Reg i on and Dec rease i n  Cash Pr i c e : X2= 1 4 . 6  P< . 04 1  
By Cropp ing Pat tern : 
Corn / Soybeans 44 36 . 4  6 3 . 6  - 6 . 7 5 A 
Corn / Soybeans / Gr a i n  7 0  2 7 . 1  7 2 . 9  - 7 . 9 1  A 
Corn / Wheat / G r a i n  1 4 3 1 8 . 2  8 1 . 8  - 5 . 1 0  A , B  
Whea t / G ra in 56 1 2 . 5  8 7 . 5  - . 7 4  B 
Tota l 3 1 3  2 1 . 7  7 8 . 3  - 5 . 5 7 
Average 
Percen t age 
Change -
i n  Pr i ce 
- 1 6 . 5  
29 . 0  
- 4 1 . 7  
- 9 . 8  
- 3 . 4  
- 1 6 . 6  
- 1 2 . 7  
- 1 2 . 4  
- 1 1 . 5  
DF= 7 
- 1 1 . 4  
- 1 6 . 4  
- 1 4 . 6  
- 1 . 3 
- 1 1 . 9 
Corre lat i on between Cropp i ng Pa ttern and De c rease i n  Cash Pr i ce : x
2
= 1 0 . 6 1 1  P< . 0 1 4  DF=3 
S i gn i f i cant 
D i f f e rence 
I nd i c a t ed by 
D i f f e re n t  
Let t e r s  
B , C  
A 
c 
B , C  
A , B  
B , C  
B , C  





Tab l� 5 . 4  ( con t i nued ) 
S i gn i f i cant S i gn i f i cant 
D i f ference Average D i f f e rence 
Responden t s  ind i ca t ing 
a 
Ave rage Ind i c ated by Pe rcentage Ind i c ated by 
No Pr i c e  D i f ferent Change D i f fe rent 
Numbe r Dec �ease Change Change Le t t e r s  i n  Pr i ce Le t t e r s  
- - - Percent - - -
By Tenure C lass : 
Tenant 28 3 2 . 5  6 7 . 9  - 9 . 3 3 - 1·7 . 8 
Par t owner Ope rator 1 2 6 1 2 � 7  8 7 . 3  - 4 . 4 8 
c 
- 1 1 . 3  
c 
Partowner Operator 2 4  29 . 2  7 0 . 8  - 5 . 00 - 1 0 . 9  
Land lord 
Fu l lowner Operator 1 8  2 7 . 8  7 2 . 2  - 8 . 7 0 - 2 0 . 6  
Land lord 
Non - operator 1 54 2 5 . 3  7 4 . 7  - 4 . 7 5 - 9 . 5  
Land lord 
Total 354 2 1 . 8  7 8 . 3  
Corre lat i on between Tenure C l ass and Dec rease in Cash Pr i ce : X
2
= 1 0 . 1 8  P< . 0 3 7  DF=4 
By Re lat i onsh i p : 
c c 
Fam i l y  2 1  1 9 . 1 80 . 9  - 9 . 08 - 1 7 '. 5 
Relat ive 27 1 8 . 5  8 1 . 5  - 7 . 38 - 1 5 . 6  
Un re lated 1 5 5 2 2 . 6  7 7 . 4  - 4 . 2 8 - 8 . 0  
To t a l  2 0 3  2 1 . 7  7 8 . 3  - 4 . 99 - 9 . 5  
Corre lat i on between Re lat i onsh i p  and Dec rease in Cash Pr i ce : X
2
= . 3 1 9  P< . 85 3  DF=2 
aonly eight r espondents i2d i c a t ed a p r i c e  i nc r ease , only p r i c e decreases are cons ider ed here to 
a l low compu tat ion o f  a X . · 
bone r espondent i n  this region re por ted a pr ice increase . 
c
Te s t  s ta t is t i c too sma l l  for va l id t es t . t--' . 0 � 
1 0 5  
The p a t t e rn o f  p r i c e  d e c re a s e s  s h own by d a ta i n  T a b l e  5 . 4  
i nd i c a t e s  t h a t  mo s t  o f  t he c a s h  r e n t a l re duc t io n s  o c cur red  i n  t h e  
Eas t e r n  reg i on s  o f  the  s t a t e .  Re s p ond e n t s  i n  t h e  Nor t h e a s t  Re g i o n  
reported the hi ghes t inc idence , 30.3% , of  cash l ease prices decreas ing 
f rom 1 9 8 5 t o  1 9 8 6 . Cas h  l ea s e s  in the  We � t e r �  are a s  of t h e  s t a t e  h a d  
the l owes t incidence of change wi th the West ern region ha v ing n o  price 
decreases repor ted .  This pa t tern o f  changes ref l ect s ,  to some extent , 
the pattern of f l uctuat ion that has occur red in cropland market value s  
( Jans s en 1986) .  
Average cash renta l price decreases varied considerably be tween 
regions.  The nomina l changes were not s ignifi cant l y  diffe rent , but some 
of the differences in price changes  as a per centage of the 1 985  renta l 
price we re significant (Tabl e  5 . 4 ) .  Price decreases were greate s t  in 
the South Centra l region , averaging $ 7 .2 5  or 41 . 7% .  Respondents in the 
E a s t e rn r e g i ons  exp e r ienc e d  p r i c e  d e c l i ne s  a l mo s t  as h i g h  in d o l l a r  
t e rms , rang�ng  f rom $ 6 . 0 9  i n  t h e  E a s t  C e n t r a l r e g i o n  t o  $ 7 . 1 0 i n  t h e  
No rtheas t region. Pe rcentage d ec reases were much sma l l er however , onl y  
12 .4% i n  the Southeas t regi on t o  1 6 .6%  in the Nor theas t region. 
Examining  t h e  ren ta l  p r i c e  chang e s  by c ro p p ing p a t t ern s hows 
3 6 %  of  r e s p onden t s ' l ea s e s  c o v e r in g  c o r n- s oybean pioduc i n g  l and  ha d 
p r i c e  d ec r e a s e s .  T h i s  i s  t h e  h i g he s t  i nc i d e n c e  o f  p r i c e  d e c r e a s e s  
o c c ur r i ng o n  an y ca t e g o r y  o f  l and .  On l y  1 2 . 5 %  o f  t he l ea s e s  f o r  l and  
whe re whea t is  p ro duced  a s  t he p r i ma r y  c r o p , expe r i en c e d  p r i c e  
decrease s .  
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Corn-soybean-g ra in l and l eases  had the highe s t  average dec reas e 
in c a s h  r en t a l p r i ce a t  $ 7 . 9 1 , o r  a 1 6 . 4 %  d e c re a s e  f r om 1 9 8 5 .  Re s p o n ­
dents l eas ing corn-soybean l and had price decreases o f  $6 . 75 , a n  1 1 .4  % 
decrease.  Leases for wheat -grain l and had the sma l l e s t  average price 
decrease , on l y  $ . 74 .  The average percentage p�ice change on l ease s for 
t hi s  l and wa s 1 . 3 % , ind i c a t i ng t h a t  p r i c e inc r e a s e s  were  o f  g r e a t e r  
proportiona l magni tude t han price  decrease s .  
T enant r e s p o nden t s  r e p o r t e d t he h i ghe s t  inc i d e nc e  o f  p r i c e 
reduc t i ons  in cish  l ea s e s  o f  any t enu r e  c l a s s .  A l mo s t  one t h i r d  o f  
tenan t s  repor ted a decrease i n  cash r enta l s  paid .  Onl y  12 .7%  of part­
owner operat or land l ords repor ted a decrease in  their cash renta l s , t he 
o n l y  t e nu r e  c l a s s  t o  r e p o r t  a d e c r e a s e  i n  l e s s  than 2 5 %  o f  t he i r  
leases . 
T e s t s  f o r  s i gn i f i c a n t  d i f f e re nc e s  i n  c a s h  ren t a l  p r i c e  
decreases betwe en tenure groups , i n  nomina l and percentage terms , were 
inconc l us i ve. Howe v er , tenant and ful l owner operator  l and l ord respon­
d en t s  r e p o r t ed d e c rea s e s  s u b s t an t ia l l y  l a r g e r  t han o th e r  c l a s s e s .  
Tenant s repor ted the greate s t  d o l l ar dec l ine ,  $9 .33 , a 1 7 .8% decrease  
from 1 985 .  Fu l l owner operator land l ords ' cash renta l pri ces decreas ed 
$8 . 7 0 ,  or 20.6%.  Changes in t he o ther tenure c l as ses  ranged from $ 4 . 5 0  
t o  $ 5 . 0 0 , a nd f r om 9 . 5 % t o  1 1 . 3 %  o f  t he 1 9 8 5  r en t a l p r i c e .  
I t  appea r s  tha t p e r ha p s  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  chan g e s  b y  t enan t s  a n d  
f u l l owne r o p e ra tor  l and l o r d s  d i f f e r: e d  f r om tha t of  the o t h e r  t e nu r e  
g ro u ps . Thi s ma y ha v e  o c c u r r e d  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  g r e a t e r  numb e r  o f  
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younger ,  beginning farmers in the t enant c l as s  and fu l l owner operator  
l and l o rd s  rent to  tenant s  of thi s  type more o ften. 
Ana lysis  of cash renta l ad justment s  by re l a tionship be tween the 
par t ie s  to the agreement did no t revea l  any s ignificant d if ference s  in  
adjus tment s be tween groups (Tab l e  5 . 4 ) .  Three percentage point s is  a l l 
tha t s e pa r a t e s  the  h i ghe s t  f r om t h e  l owe s t  f r e q uenc y  o f  c hang e 
occurring. Unrelated par ties  were s l ight l y  more l ike l y  to change the i r  
renta l price than those who leased with  re lat ives .  
S i gn i f i c an t  d i f f e r e nc e s i n  a v e r a g e  p r i c e  d e c r e a s e s  b e t we e n  
r e l a t i ons h i p  c a t e g o r i e s  c ou l d  no t b e  d e t e rmined e i t he r .  I t  d o e s  
a ppear , however , tha t  l eases be tween fami l y  member s and re lat i v es had 
t h e  l ar g e s t  p r i c e d e c r ea s e s . C a s h  r e n t a l p r i c e s  de c re a s e d  $ 9 . 0 8  o n  
l eases be tween fami l y  members a n d  $ 7 . 3 8  on l ea s e s  b e t we e n  r e l a t i v e s .  
Thes e  are percentage dec l ines o f  1 7 . 5  and 1 5 .6%  respective l y. Leases 
be tween unre l ated part ie s  had price decrea ses of $4 .99 , or 8 % .  
Stabi l i ty of l andowner ship and t enant s .  The length of  time a 
l and l ord  o r  t enant has r en t e d  a t ra c t o f  l and g i v e s  an  i nd i ca t i o n o f  
stabi l i ty i n  l andownershi p and t enure in the farm land ren ta l market .  
Al though the a verage l ength o f  t ime par t icipants  rent a t ract of l and 
is o v e r t en yea r s  , i t i s  p o s s i b  1 e t h a t  man y  i nd i v i  d ua 1 s e x  p e r i  en c e d 
l o s s o f  tenure o r  owne r sh i p .  T he d a t a  i n  Ta b l e 5 . 5  a r e  b a s ed o n  t he 
l ength of t ime respondents indica ted rent ing the trac t of l and , and no t 
on responses to the questions tha t  asked whe ther change had occurred in 
the l as t five year s .  
Table 5 . 5  Chang e  in Landlord o r  Tenant in South Dakota in 
Last F ive Year s  ( 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 6 ) 




Numbe r  
o f  Leas es 
5 5 8  
1 0 5 2  
1 6 1 0  
Les s Than F i ve Years 
F ive Years or More 
- - - Percen t  o f  Leases Reported 
2 2 . 2  
1 9 . 9  
2 0 . 7  
7 7 . 8  
8 0 . 1  
7 9 . 3  
1 0 8  
Corre lat i on between Type o f  Lease and Change i n  Landlord or Tenant : 
By Crop Report ing 
D i s tr i ct : 
S outhea st 








Corre lat i on between 
P< . 2 6 7  DF= 1 
4 0 9  
3 1 5  
2 4 7  
2 1 5  
1 3 0 
8 1  
7 7  
8 1  
1 6 1 4  
Crop Repo r t ing 
2 1 . 0  
2 6 . 0  
2 7 . 5  
1 4 . 4  
1 3 . 1  
1 2 . 6  
2 3 . 4  
1 7 . 3  
2 0 . 8  
D i s tr i ct 
or Tenant : 
x
2
=27 . 46 P< . O O O  DF= 7 
By Cropp ing Pattern : 
Corn / Soybean 2 1 0 2 3 . 3  
Corn / Soybean/ Gra i n  3 1 2 2 6 . 9  
Corn /Wheat / Gra in 6 8 2  2 9 . 8  
Wheat / Grain 3 6 6  2 5 . 1  
Total 1 5 7 0  27 . 3  
and Chang e 
7 9 . 0  
7 3 . 0  
7 2 . 5  
8 5 . 6  
8 6 . 9  
8 6 . 4  
7 6 . 6  
82 . 7  
7 9 . 2  
in Land lord 
7 6 . 7  
7 3 . 1  
7 0 . 2  
7 4 . 9  
7 2 . 7  
Corre lat i on between Cropp ing Pattern and Change i n  Land lord o r  
Tenant : 
P< . 2 0 DF=3 
Table 5 . 5  ( c ont inued ) 
Number 
o f  Leas e s  
By Tenure : 
Tenant 1 3 4  
Par towner Operator 4 0 1 
Partowner Oper ator 9 2  
Landlord 
Ful lowner Operator 7 8  
Landlord 
Non - Operato r  9 0 9  
Landlord 
Corre lat i on between Tenure and 
x
2
=64 . 8 8 1  P < . O O O  
B y  Re lat ionsh ip : 
Fam i ly 6 5  
Re lat ive 8 4  
Unre lated 3 6 2  
T o t a l  5 1 1  
Les s  Than · F ive Year s  
F ive Years or More 
- - - Percent of Leases Reported 
3 8 . 8  6 1 . 2  
2 3 . 9  7 6 . 1  
2 5 . 0  7 5 . 0  
3 8 . 5  6 1 . 5  
1 4 . 7  8 5 . 3  
Change in Land lord or Tenant : 
DF=4 
2 7 . 7  7 2 . 3  
1 7 . 9  8 2  .. 1 
2 2 . 9  7 7 . 1  
2 2 . 7  7 7 . 3  
Corre lat i on between Re l at ions hip and Change in Landlord o r  
Tenant : -
X
2= 2 . 0 5 7  P< . 3 5 8  DF=2 
1 0 9  
1 1 0  
Da ta in Tab l e  5 . 5  s how t ha t  2 0 . 7 %  of res pondents wi t h  c a s h  and 
share l eases  for c ro p l and hav e  rented the tract of l and for l e s s  than 
f i v e  y e a r s .  C a s h  l e a s e s  show a s l i g h t l y  h i g h e r , t ho u g h  n o t s i g n i f i ­
cant l y  d i f ferent , inci dence o f  c hange i n  thi s period than wer e  repor ted 
by s ha re lease ho l ders.  When t he per iod o f  ch_ange is l engthened by one 
y e a r , howe v e r , to l e s s  t h a n  s ix y e a r s , t he d i s c r e pa ncy b e c om e s muc h  
grea ter.  Over 37%  of  l and l o r d s  o r  t enan t s  wi th cash leases changed i n  
l e s s  than six years , whi l e  s h a r e  l e a s e  ho l ders repor ted change in on l y  
2 8 . 5 %  o f  t h e  c a s e s .  
Re s p on d e n t s  i n  t he No r t h e a s t  C RD re p o r t e d  t he h i g he s t  f r e ­
q u e nc y ,  2 7 . 5 % ,  o f  p a r t i c i p a n t s  wh o ha v e  l ea s ed a t r a c t  f o r  l e s s  t h a n  
fi v e  years .  Genera l l y ,  respondent s i n  the Eas tern areas of the s ta t e  
w e r e  mo r e  l i ke l y  t o  ha v e  l e a s e d  t h e i r  mo s t  i m p o r t a n t  t r a c t  f o r  l e s s  
than f i v e  year s .  Over 20% o f  res pondent s i n  the three eas t ern reg i ons 
i nd i c a t e d  they had l ea s ed the l an d  f o r  l e s s  t han f i v � y e a r s .  T h e  
W e s t e r n  Re g i o n  a l s o ha d a h i g h  inc i d e n c e  o f  r e s p ond e n t s r en t i ng t h e  
l and f o r  l es s  than f i v e  years  at  2 3 . 4% .  The three cen t ra l  regi ons had 
the l owes t incidence of res ponden t s , 1 3  - 1 4% , l eas ing a t ra c t  for l es s  
than f i ve year s .  
Cropping pat tern h a s  no s i gnif ican t  e f fect  on . the propo r t ion o f  
respondent s renting l and for l es s  t han f i v e years .  Almo s t  30%  o f  the 
renters  of corn , wheat , and grain l and hav e  l eased the t ract for l e s s  
t han f i v e y e a r s .  On l y  2 3 % o f  r e s po nd e n t s  l e a s i ng c o rn- s o yb e an l a nd 
re ported leas ing the l and f o r  l e s s  t han fi v e  years.  
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Almos t 4 0% of  ful l owner o perator  l and l ords and tenan t s  l ea s e d  
t h e  l and f o r  l e s s t h an f i v e  ye a r s ,  mo r e  t h an any o t he r  t e nu r e  c l a s s .  
Partowne r operator l and l ords , 2 5 %  o f  whom had l eased the l and f o r  l es s  
than f i v e  year s , we re in . t he midd l e  o f  the frequency rang e .  Almo s t  1 5 %  
o f  nonopera tor l and l ords be l ong t o  the l e s s  than f i v e  year g roup , the 
l owes t fre quency o f  any tenure g roup. 
Tenu re or ownershi p  of t he l and for l es s  ' than f i v e  years doe s . 
n o t  v a r y  s i gn i f i c a n t l y wi t h  d i f f e r e n t t y p e s  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t we e n 
contra c t ing · par t i e s .  Almo s t  28% of re spondent s hav ing a l ease agree­
ment wi th a fami ly member had l ea se d  for l e s s  than f i v e  years whi l e  1 8 %  
of t ho s e  having agreements wi t h  re l at i v e s  fe l l  into thi s  c at egory.  
Conclusion s  
T h e  mo s t  s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u + t  o f  t h e  abo v e  ana l y s i s  i s  t h a t 
d e s p i t e  ma j or f l u c t u a t i ons i n  t he e c o n om i c  e n v i r o nme n t  f ew c ha ng e s  
oc curred in renta l ag reemen t s .  Of a l l the renta l terms examined , on l y  
cash r ental pri ce s ad justed  wi t h  any subs tant ia l d egree o f  f requ ency. 
Some of t he change s  that occurred , such as change from· wr i t ten 
t o  v e rba l agreement s  and s hare t o  cash r en ta l l eases , were contrary to  
wha t h a d  bee n e x p e c t e d .  The l a t t e r  r e s u l t  c o u l d  be a t t r i bu t a b l e  t o  a 
c a r r y o v e r  e f f e c t  o f  r i s i ng l a n d  p r i c e s d u r i n g  t h e  ! ·a t e  1 9 7 0 ' s .  T h e  
reduct ions i n  c ash renta l s  and t he ir re l at ion shi p  to land p roduc t i v i t y  
a nd c r o p p i n g  p a t t e r n s  we r e  a s  e x p e c t e d .  T h e  r e l a t i on s h i p b e t we e n  
� o n t r a c t ing par t i e s  a p p a r e n t l y  d i d  no t i n f l u e n c e  l e a s e a d j u s t me n t s  
exce p t  for changes  f rom share t o  c a sh l e ases .  
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A l t h o u gh no t s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i gn i f i c a n t ,  t h e  pa t t e r n  o f  
ad j u s tme n t  i n  c a s h ren ta l p r i c e s  and l en g t h  o f  t ime a r e s p o nd e n t  h a d  
rent ed t h e  land seemed t o  indica te a re l a t ionship be tween ad jus tment s 
b e i n g  m a d e  b y  f u l l own e r  o p e r a t o r s  a nd t e nan t s . The p a t t e r n  o f  f ew 
changes to ca sh agreement s  and re l at i v e l y  high incidence o f  change t o  
s ha r e  l e a s e s  b y  th e s e  t \vo t e n u r e  c a t e g o r i e s s u p p o r t s t h i s  a s s e r t i o n .  
What can b e  inferred- f rom t hi s  i s  somewha t conf ounded howe v er , by t he 
re l at i v e l y  high frequency of l e a s e s  b e t w e e n  fa m i l y  membe r s  c h a n g i n g  
from share t o  ca sh. 
I t  is p o s s i b l e  tha t l e a s e s  r e p o r t e d  by f u l l o wne r  o p e r a t o r  
l and l ords ref l ect terms to a s s i s t  a new farme r g e t  s tarted.  Land l o rd s  
i n  t h i s c a t e g o r y  m a y  be f ami l y  m e mb e r s  n o t  ye t r e a d y  t o  r e t i r e b u t  
r e d uc i ng the s i z e o f  the i r  o p e r a t i on .  T h e  c hange t o  ca s h  _ l e a s e s  
re po r t ed by fami l y  members may re f l e c t  tax and s oc ia l  secur �ty conce rns 
o f  re t i red or  r e t i ring farm o pe ra t o r s  with more es tabl i shed o f f s pring.  
Cash r e n ta l a g r e eme n t s  a p p e a r , i n  g e n e r a l ,  t o  be mu c h  mo r e  
r e s pon s i v e  than share ag reements t o  changes  i n  economi c cond i t i ons o v e r  
a re l at i v e l y  short period o f  t ime . 
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Cha pt e r  6 
PRESENCE OF CONDIT IONS FOR EFFIC IENT PRODUCTION 
AND D I STRIBUT I ON OF RETURNS 
The marg ina l incent i v e s  f or use  of non-o pt imum combina t ions of  
r e s o u r c e s  c r e a t e d  b y  r en t a l a g r e emen t s  s Qg g e s t e d b i  t h e  p a r t i a l  
equi l i brium theor ies rema in va l id.  E qua l effic i ency theories  requi red 
the inf luence o f  exogenous f ac t o r s  to o f f se t t he s e  margina l i nf l uenc e s . 
T h e  l e a s e mo d i f i c a t i on s  p r o po s e d b y  H e a d y  ( 1 9 5 2 )  and Hur l b u r t  ( 1 9 5 4 )  
remo v e  the incent i v es for inef f i c i en t  product ion prac tice s .  Four ba s i c  
incen t i v e  cond i t i ons mus t b e  pres en t  i n  a l easing agreemen t  to remo v e  a 
f a r m l and t e nan t ' s  i n c e n t i v e t o  a p p l y  i ne f f i c i e n t c om b i n a t i o n s  o f  
inputs . 
The incentive condi t i ons are : 
1 .  T h e  s ha r e  o f  v a r i a b l e  i np u t  c o s t s  s ha r e d  mu s t  e qua l t h e  
share o f  output rec e i v ed .  
2 .  The s hare r en ta l for a l l  p r oduc t s  mus t  be t h e  same . 
3 .  E a c h  r e s ou r c e  own e r  mu s t  r e c e i v e t he f u l l s h a r e  o f  t h e 
produc t earned by each uni t o f  r e s ou r c e  cont r i buted.  
4 .  E a c h  r e s o u r c e  owne r  m u s t  h a v e  the o p p o r t un i t y t o  r e c e i v e  
t h e  r e t u r n on i n v e s tmen t s  mad e  i n  o n e  p r o d uc t i on
. 
p e r i o d ,  b u t n o t 
avai l a b l e  unt i l  a subsequent period.  
Hur l bur t ( 19 62 )  l at e r  out l ined a proces s for extens ion agent s 
a nd c o n t r a c t i ng p a r t i e s  t o  u s e  t o  c o n c l ud e  a l e a s e  f r e e  o f  i m p e r -
fec t ions . 
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I n  t h i s c h a p t e r ,  l e a s e  t e r m s  r e p o r t e d  i n  t h e  s u r v e y  a r e  
examined for the presence o f  thes e  incent i v e  condit ions. Cos t shar ing 
pro v i s i ons of s hare l eases  wi l l  be examined in grea ter de tai l  becau s e  
i t  i s  t h e  mo s t  impor tant � ond i t ion f o r  seasona l  produc t i on dec i s ions . 
I f  co s t  s h a r ing p r o v i s i o n s  a r e  no t g en e r a l l y  t e rms o f  s ha r e  
l e a s e s  r e p o r t e d , t h en e x i s t i n g  t e r m s  wi l l  b e  exami ned f o r  t h e  p r o ­
p o r t i o n o f  p r o du c t i o n co s t s  e a c h  p a r t y  c o ntr ibutes.  Thi s propo r t ion 
w i l l  t h en be c o m p a red t o  the  s h a r e  o f  o u t pu t  each p a r t y  r e c e i v e s  to  
d e t e rm i n e  i f  t h e  s ha r e  o f  c o s t s  a p p r o x ima t e  t h e  s h a r e  o f  o u t pu t  
recei ved. The do l l ar v a l ue o f  returns t o  both par t i e s  to t he l ease wi l l  
be e s t ima ted f o r  crops s o l d  in t he marke t and for par t ic i pant s in the 
1986 Federal Farm Prog ram. 
Dat a  Source 
Data f o r  the ana l y s i s  in t h i s  c ha p t e r  is f r om t h e  1 9 8 6  S D S U  
F a rm l and Re n ta l S u r v e y .  T h e  i n p u t  c o s t  c omb i na t i o n s  u s e d  f o r  t h e  
a na l y s i s o f  c o s t  s h a r i ng we r e  t h e m o s t  t y p i c a l c o s t  s ha r i ng t e r m s  i n  
the sha re lease s reported.  Thi s  p r ocedure resu l ted in the de l e t ion o f  
2 8  o u t  o f  o v e r 6 0 0  o b s e r v a t i on s  and i m p r o v e d  t h e  c l a r i t y  o f  t h �  
ana l y s i s  whi l e  p r e s e r v i n g  t h e  e s s en t i a l c om p o n en t s .  T h e  c r o p p i ng 
p a t t e rn v a r i a b l e  u s e d  i n  t h i s  c ha p t e r  i s  t h e  s ame a s  t h a t u s e d  i n  
p r e c e ding chapter s .  
C r o p  e n t e r p r i s e  b u d g e t s  u s e d  f o r  t h e ana l y s i s  i n  t h e l a t t e r  
p a r t  o f  t h e  c ha p t er we r e  d e v e l o p e d - u s i ng t he S D S U  f a rm e n t e r p r i s e  
budget genera t o r .  The budget gene ra t o r  program i s  used t o  deve l o p  per 
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acre en terprise c o s t  pro ject ions f or l and of  v arying produc t i ve capa­
bi l i t i e s  in specific areas of the s ta t e .  
The regions us ed t o  ca l cu l a t e  t he budget s corre s pond t o  South 
Dako ta farm · management regi ons ( F igure 6 . 1 ) , which are geogra phica l l y 
sma l l e r  and mo re homogeneous t han Cro p  Reporting Di s tric t s. Addi t i ona l 
informa t ion on the 1 9 8 6  fede ra l farm program and 1 9 8 6  crop p r i c e s  was 
obtained f rom the Cooperat i v e Ext ens i on S e r v ice a t  SDSU. 
Pre s ence of Incent ive Cond i t i ons 
Inc e n t i v e  c o nd i t i o n t wo is p r e s e n t  in mo r e  of the re p o r t e d  
l eases  i n  the survey than any o ther l ease  " perfect ion" . On l y  9 re s p on­
den t s  ( 2% of res pondent s  wi th share l e as e s )  reported dif fering sha r e s  
f o r  different c r o p s  under t h e  same l ea s e .  
Mee t ing incen t i v e  cond i t ion t hree require s f i r s t  that inc en t i v e  
c ond i t i o n  o ne , t he s ha r e  o f  v a r i a b l e  i n pu t s  i s  p ro p o r t i o na l t o  t h e  
ou tput share , b e  met .  I f  this cond i t ion is sat i s f ied , t he pres ence o f  
i nc e n t i v e  c o nd i t i o n  t h r e e  i s  d e t e rm i n e d  b y  t he f re q u e n c y  o f  c a s h  
payments in add i t ion t o  share renta l ( Hur l burt 1 9 54 ) .  On l y  1 5 %  o f  the 
re s pondent s made cash payment s  in add i t ion t o  their share renta l .  Two 
thirds o f  t hose who made ext ra cash payment s , ind i ca ted that i t  wa s f o r  
h a y  a nd / o r  p a s t u r e  l a nd i n  t he r e n t a l  t r a c t .  A b o u t  o n e  f i f t h  ( 1 8 % )  
indi ca ted the paymen t was for u s e  o f  bui l ding s pro v ided under the share 
lease . 
Unf o r t un a t e  1 y ,  t h e  c o n s t ru e  t i o n o f  t h e  su r v e y  make s i t  
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inc l ud e d  in s ha r e  l e a s e s .  C o n s e q ue n t l y  the.r e  i s  no wa y t o  d e t e rm i n e  
how of ten bui l d ings or othe r improvement s are imp l ici t l y  reimbursed.  
T he r e l u c t an c e  o f  a t e n a n t t o  a p p l y  i n pu t s  f r om whi c h  a l l 
return s  are no t avai lab l e  i n  the curr en t year i s  t he source o f  ine f f i -
c ie n c y t h e  f o u r t h  i n c e n t i v e  a t t em p t s  t o  r e mo v e .  One me t h o d  f o r  
a l l e v i a t in g  t h i s s o u r c e  o f  un c e r t a i n t y  i s  t o  c onc l ud e  a l e a s e  t h a t  
l a s t s  f o r  m o r e  t han one p r o du c t i o n  s e a s o n .  Howe v e r , a s  di s cu s s e d i n  
Cha p t e r  3 ,  mo s t  l eases , 64% , we re repor ted a s  annua l .  An annua l l ease  
mus t  contain provis ions f o r  reimbur sement of the  t enant for  unexpi red 
bene f i t s  o f  l ong term inv e stment s .  
Informat ion re l at i ve t o  pro v i s ion s  for a tenant ' s  reimbu r s emen t 
u p on p r ema t u re t e rm i na t i on o f  t h e l e a s e  i s  no t a v a i l a b l e  f r om t h e  
survey. Pro v is ions of this na ture wou ld probab l y  be pre sent on l y  i n  
wri t ten l eases , bu t on l y  3 9 %  o f  t he · l eases  were reported to  be wri t t en. 
I t  wou ld ap pear tha t incen t i v e  c ond i t ion 4 is met to some degree on l y  
i n  the mu l t i-year l eas e s .  Al t hough , i f  the l and has been l eas ed b y  the 
same par t y  for a l ong t ime , there may be an imp l i c i t  unders tanding t o  
extend the l ease inde f ini te l y. 
Shar ing of  variab l e  input s  in the same proportion a s  ou tput i s  
s ha re d  i s  p r o ba b l y  t h e  mo s t  i mp o r t a n t  o f  t he i n c en t i v e  c ond i t i on s .  
This cond i t ion has mo re inf l uence on a producer ' s  decis ions dur ing the 
produc t ion per iod. Al though s ome input co s t s  are s hared in many l ea s e  
agreemen ts , sharing o f  al l variab l e  inpu t s  i s  very rare . Les s  than 6 %  
o f  share agreemen t s  were repor ted t o  s hare a l l  variab l e  cos t s ,  whi c h  
mo s t  f requent l y  occur s in 50-50 s hare a rrangement s .  On l y  4 .3%  o f  a l l 
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s h a r e  l e a s e s  r e p o r t e d  s h a re d  i n p u t  c o s t s  i n  p r o po r t i o n s  o t h e r  t h a n  
re ported output share s.  
Fe rti l i ze r  expenses were shared more frequent l y  t han any � t he r  
i n pu t .  F e r t i l i z e r c o s t s  w e r e  s ha r e d  i n  7 5 . 4% o f  t h e  s h a r e  l e a s e s , 2 0  
p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s  h i g h e r  t h an a n y  o th e r  e x p e n s e  wa s r e po r t e d  t o  b e  
s ha r e d  ( T a b l e  6 . 1 ) . H e r b i c i d e  was s ha red in 5 5 %  o f  s h a r e  l e a s e s  a nd 
i n s e c t i c i d e  wa s sha r e d  a l mo s t  a s  o f t en ,  i n  4 6 %  o f  s ha r e  l e a s e s .  
C hem i c a l a p p l i c a t i on and g r a i n  d r y i n g we r e  s h a r e d  i n  a b o u t  e q ua l 
numbers , 2 7 %  and 3 1% res pect i v e l y ,  of the sha re l eases reported.  Seed 
c o s t s  were s ha r e d  on l y  1 2 . 4 %  of  t he t im e  a nd ha r v e s t ing c o s t s  we r e  
shared in 6 %  o f  share l eas e s .  Some of  the s e  inputs ,  l ike grain d rying , 
are no t shared a s  of ten becaus e they a r e  no t requi red for produc t ion o f  
a l l  crops.  
The in p u t  c o s t  s ha r i n g p a t t e r n s  s e l e c t e d  f o r the f o l l ow i n g  
ana l y s i s  inc lude the c ombina t i ons repo r t ed i n  a l l  but 2 8  s hare l ea s e s .  
These inputs ha ve the mos t s i gn i f i c an t  impac t  on yie ld making them mos t 
r e l e v ant t o  t he i s s ue o f  r e d u c ed o u t pu t  l e v e l s  due t o  r e du c e d  i n p u t  
applicat ion . 
Ana l y s i s  o f  t h e  da t a  i rt Ta b l e  6 . 2  r e v ea l s  a c l e a r  pa t t e rn o f  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tween i n p u t . s h a r i n g  a n d  o u t p u t  sha re r e c e i v e d  by t h e  
l a nd l o r d .  S l i g h t l y  o v e r  7 7 %  o f  r e s p on d e n t s '  1 / 4 -3 / 4  land l o rd-tenan t 
share agreements conta in no pro v i s i on s  f or sharing of any inpu t c o s t s .  
Almos t 1 6 % o f  t he 1 / 4-3 / 4  sha re l e a s e s  shared ferti l izer cos t s  on l y. 
Re spondent s wi th 1 / 3-2 / 3  share l e ases  repor ted the mo s t  d i verse  
pa t tern of  input s shared. The mo st  f re quen t l y reported arrangemen t ,  by 
Tab le 6 . 1 Frequency o f  Land lords Shar ing Ind ividua l Input Cos t s  
i n  South Dakota 
Number of Per cent o f  
Input Lea s e s  Leases 
S eed 7 8  1 2 . 4  
F ert i l i z er 4 7 5  7 5 . 4  
Her b i c i d e  3 4 6  54 . 9  
Insect i c ide 2 8 8  45 . 7  
App l i cat ion 1 7 3  2 7 . 5  
Harvest ing 3 9  6 . 3  
Dry ing 1 94 3 0 . 7  
To tal 6 3 0  1 0 0 . 0  
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Tab le 6 . 2  Input Cost Shar ing Patterns in S outh Dakota by Output Share of Land lord and Tenant 
Two of Three : Fert i l i z er , 
Fer t i l i zer , Fert i l i zer , Her b i c i de ,  
Tenant ' s  Number Herb i c ide , Her b i c i de ,  Insec t i c i de ,  
Output of None Fert i l i zer Insect i c i de Insec t i c ide & AEEl i cat i on Total 
Share Leases - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Percent of Share Leases Reported - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5 0  6 0  1 0 . 0 3 . 3  1 1 . 7  3 8 . 3  3 6 . 7  1 0 . 0  
6 0  1 5 2 1 1 . 8  1 3 . 8  1 5 . 1  34 . 9 2 4 . 3 2 5 . 3  
6 7  3 6 8  29 . 6  2 3 . 4  1 5 . 8  1 4 . 95 1 6 . 3  6 1 . 1  
7 5  2 2  7 7 . 3  1 6 . 4  0 . 0  0 . 0  9 . 1 3 . 6  
Total 602 24 . 9  1 8 . 6  1 4 . 6  2 1 . 7 6 2 0 . 1  1 0 0 . 0  
Corre lat ion between Output Share and Input Cos t Shar ing : X
2
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2 9 . 6 %  o f  re s p o nd e n t s , h a d  n o  p r o v i s i on s  f o r  s h a r i n g  v a r i a b l e  i np u t  
co s t s  wi t h  t h e  l a nd l o r d .  A l mo s t  a s  man y , 2 3 . 4 % , s ha r e d  f e r t i l i z e r  
c o s t s  on l y . The rema i nd e r  o f  t h e l ea s e s  wi t h  t h i s  o u t p u t  �ha r e  
ar rangemen t were fair l y  e v en l y  d i s t r i bu ted ac ro s s  t he o ther t hree c o s t 
sharing pat te rns in the ta b l e. A lmos t 1 6% shared two of  three inpu t s ;  
fert i l i ze r ,  herbi cide , and / o r insec t ic ide , whi l e  the re s t  shared a l l  
three , or a l l three p l u s  chemi ca l app l icat ion co s ts .  
Leas e ho l d ers t h a t  share o u t p u t  5 0-50 a r e  mos t l ike l y  t o  s hare 
input co s t s . Almost  37%  share a l l four of  the inputs in the tab l e  and 
ano t he r  38% sha re a l l excep t  chemi ca l app l icat ion. Jus t 3% of the 50-
50 l ea s e s  contain terms tha t  share f e rt i l i ze r  onl y ,  and the l and l ord 
pays none of the inpu t co s t s  in 1 0% of these  l ea se s .  
Land l o rd s wi th 40-60  share agreement s  share fert i l i z e r ,  herbic ide , 
and in s e c t i c i d e  c o s t s  mo s t  o f t e n .  O v e r  a t h i rd , 3 5 % ,  o f  r e s p o n d e n t s  
wi th the se l ea s e s  used thi s c o s t share pa t tern. A lmos t 25%  share these 
t h r e e  e x p en s e s  p l u s the c o s t  of  a p p l i c a t i on .  The rema i n i ng 4 0 - 6 0  
l e a s e s  we re d i s t r i b u t e d  a c r o s s  t h e o t he r t h r e e  s h a r i ng p a t t e rn s , 
decreasing in f requency as t he numbe r of  c os t s  s hared decreased.  
Ana l y s i s  o f  c o s t  s ha r i ng b y  c r o p p i ng p a t t e rn r e v ea l s  a 
re l at ionshi p be tween crop produce d , l and l ords '  share of the out pu t , and 
i nput shar ing prac tices  ( Tab l e  6 . 3 ) .  Leases for more fert i l e  l and and 
crops wi th highe r produc tion c o s t s  a re more l ike l y  to inc l ude l and l ord 
sharing of variab l e  co s t s .  
Le a s e s  f o r c o r n- s o yb e a n  a n d  c o r n- s o y b e a n- g ra i n  l and we r e  
reported t o  contain var iab l e  c o s t  s ha r i ng prov i s i ons mo re fr equent l y  
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t h a n  l e a s e s  f o r  l and wi t h  o t h e r  c r o p p i n g  p � t t e r n s . Le a s e s f o r  c o r n ­
soybean l and had the hi ghes t p ro po r t ion ,  39 .2% , o f  repo r ted sha r ing o f  
the three prima ry chemi cal inputs ( f e r t i l i zer , herbicide , and ins ec ti­
cide ) .  Leases for corn , so ybean ,  and grain l and were mo s t  frequent l y ,  
2 6 % , re p o r t e d  t o  c o n t a i n  t e rm s  f o r  s h a r i n g  a l l  f ou r  e xp e n s e s  i n  t h e  
table . 
Land upon which whea t  i s  one o f  the mos t  importan t  crops grown 
i s  t y p i ca l l y  c o v e r e d  by l ea s e s  w i t h  no c o s t  s ha r i n g . R e s p o nd e n t s  
rent ing corn , whea t ,  and grain l and we re d i s t ributed acros s a l l  f i v e  
inpu t sharing categories . Abou t the same numbe r ,  20% , repor ted shar ing 
no input c o s t s  as re ported sha ri ng a l l four of the inpu t s .  Jus t  o v e r  
one fourt h  ( 2 7%)  reported sharing f e r t i l i z e r  co s t s  onl y. The ma j or i t y ,  
53 % ,  o f  land l o rd s  wi th l eas es f o r  whea t-grain land were n o t  required t o  
share any v ar iab le expense s .  
Ana l yzing i nput c o s t  sharing by c ropping pa t tern and land l ord ' s  
s ha r e  f u r t h e r s ub s t an t i a t e s  t h e i r  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p .  L e a s e s  w i t h  
hi gher l and l o rd shares were repo rted t o  share more input cos t s  i n  a l l 
cropp ing pat tern categorie s .  One hund red percent of 50-50 corn- s oybean 
l ea se s  were repo r ted to share at l ea s t  t he three chemical inpu t s , whi l e  
9 2 %  o f  25- 7 5  wheat-g rain l ea � e s  s ha re d  no input co s t s .  
I t  ap pears from the a b o v e  ana l ys i s  that input sha ri ng p a t t e rns 
a r e v a r i ed t o  a d j u s t  the v a l ue of t h e  r en t a l  p a i d .  La n d  of h i gh e r  
fert i l i ty genera l l y ha s a l eas e tha t pays the land l o rd a h ighe r  share 
of t he c r o p .  S h a r e s  of v a r ia b l e  c o s t s  are v a r i e d  i n  a n  a t t em p t t o  
b r i n g  the l a nd l o r d ' s  c o n t r i b u t i on i n  l i n e  wi th t h e  ren t a l r e c e i v e d .  
Tab l e  6 . 4  Land lord Input Cost Shar ing Pa t t erns i n  South Dako ta Share Leases by Cropp ing Pa t tern 
and Output Share of Land l o rd and Tenant 
Two or three : Fe r t i l i ze r , 
Fert i l i ze r , Fert i l i zer , H e r b i c i de ,  
F e r t i l i ze r  Herb i c i de , He r b i c i de ,  & I ns ec t i c i de 
Number o f None On ly Insec t i c i de Insect i c i de & A��l i c a t i on Tot a l  
Cropp ing Pa t tern Leases - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Percent o f Share Leases Repo r t ed - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Tenants Out put Share 
Corn / Soybeans 
so 2 1  0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  66 . 7  3 3 . 3  2 0 . 6  
60 62 9 . 7  1 9 . 4  1 7 . 7  30 . 7  2 2 . 6  60 . 8  
6 7  29 26 . 3  1 S . 8  1 5 . 8  36 . 8  S . 3  1 8 . 6  
To ta l 1 02 1 0 . 8  1 4 . 7  1 3 . 7  39 . 2  2 1 . 6  1 00 . 0  
Corn / Soybean s / Gr a i n  
s o  1 5  0 . 0  0 . 0  20 . 0  4 6 . 7  3 3 . 3  9 . S  
60 7 2  9 . 7  1 2 . S  1 1 . 1  3 7 . S  29 . 2  4 S . 9  
6 7  6 9  1 7 . 4  29 . 0  1 8 . 8  1 4 . 5  2 0 . 3  44 . 0  
7 S  1 0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  1 00 . 0  0 . 6  
Tot a l  1 5 7 1 2 . 1 1 8 . S 1 S . 3  28 . 0  26 . 1  1 00 . 0  
Corn/Whe a t / Gra i n  
s o  1 1  9 . 1 1 8 . 2  2 7 . 3  1 8 . 2  2 7 . 3  6 . 6  
60 1 2. 3 3 . 3  0 . 0  2 S . O  3 3 . 3  8 . 3  7 . 2  
6 7  1 4 1  1 7 . 7  30 . S  1 2 . 1  1 9 . 9  1 9 . 9  84 . 4  
7 5  3 1 00 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  1 . 8  
Tot a l  1 6 7 1 9 . 7  2 7 . 0  1 3 . 8  20 . 4  1 9 . 2  1 00 . 0  
Whe a t / G r a i n  
s o  8 3 7 . 5  0 . 0  1 2 . 5  0 . 0  so . o  6 . 8  
6 7  9 8  50 . 0  . 1 7 . 4  1 6 . 3  5 . 1 1 1 . 2  8 3 . 0  
7 5  1 2  . 9 1 . 7 0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  8 . 3  1 0 . 2  





T he i n s t i t u t i ona l i z a t i on o f  s h a r e  r e n t a l s  a t  e s s e n t i a l l y f o ur ( 1 / 2 ,  
2 / 5 ,  1 / 3 ,  and 1 / 4 ) l e v e l s  ma k e  t h i s  a v e r y  imp o r t a n t  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  
l ease  ag reemen t .  
C o mp a r i s o n  o f  e s t i m a t e d  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  � � 
product ion expense s  t o  share o f  produc t received.  
It ha s been s hown abo v e  t ha t  cost shar ing provi s i ons of share 
l ea s e s  genera l ly are not cons i s t ent wi th theore t ica l l ea s e  p e r f e c tions.  
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  tha t in p r a c t i c e t h e r e l a t i v e c on t r i bu t i o n s  of e a c h  
p a r t y  a pp r o xi ma te s t h e i r  c r o p  s h a r e . I f  t h e  c on t r i bu t i on s  o f  e a c h  
p a r t y  a r e  e q ua l t o  t h e  o u t p u t  s ha r e  a n d  t he share o f  r e t u r n s , i t  ma y 
e l imina t e  s ome o f  the ine f fic i e n c y  i nc e n t i v e s .  T o  d e t e rm i n e  wh e t h e r  
this d o e s  oc cur i n  pra c t ice , c r o p  enterprise cos t  budget s and re turns 
were e s t ima t e d .  
C o s t  bud g e t s  we r e  e s t ima t e d  u s i n g  a ba s i c  s e t  d e v e l o pe d  
p r ima r i l y  b y  D r .  H e r b  A l l en ,  a nd t h e E c onomi c s  D e p a r tm e n t  a t  S D S U . 
T he s e  bud g e t s  we r e  u pd a t e d  f o r  1 9 8 6 c o s t  c o nd i t i o n s  b y  E x t e n s i o n  
S p e c ia l is t  Bur ton Pf l ueger. Fur t he r  modi fications were made t o  incor-
pora te chemica l app l icat ion recommend at ions o f  the SDSU P l an t  Sc ience 
D e p t .  by D r .  L a r r y  J a n s s en i n  t h e  a u t umn of 1 9 8 6 .  A s e t - a s i d e  b u d g e t  
wa s a l s o  de v e l o p e d  f o r  f a r� p r o g ra m  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  .in 1 9 8 6 ( J o hn s on ,  
J an s s en ,  Lund e e n , and A i k e n  1 9 8 7 ) .  S i x  s p e c i f i c  c ro p  e n t e r p r i s e  
budget s were se l ec ted for use , t o  demons trate dis t ri but ion o f  co s t s  and 
returns for program and non-prog ram part ic i pa t i on. 
The co s t s  es t ima ted in t he b udgets  were shared according t o  the 
mo s t  c ommon ag re emen t repor ted f o r  t ha t  crop , output share , and regi on. 
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Shared co s t s  we re shared in the s ame propor tion as output i s  sha r ed i n  
a l l  b udg e t s .  I f  more t h a n  o n e  l e v e l o f  s h a r e  r e n t  was c ommon i n  one 
re gion , budge t s  for  each t yp e  o f  agreement were e s t ima ted. 
Per acre re v enue s f or t he crop en terp r i s e  were ca l cu l ated two 
. wa y s : 1 )  u s i n g  e s t ima t e d  y i e l d s  fo r t h a t a r e a  a nd Oc t 6 be r  1 9 8 6  c r o p  
p r i c e s ,  and 2 )  t h e  b e n e f i t s  f o r  F e d e ra l F a rm P r o g r am p a r t i c i p an t s  
inc l uding se t aside requirement s  ( 20 %  for corn , bar l ey ,  and o at s ,  2 5 %  
a n d  3 5% f o r  win t e r  wh e a t ) . I t  wa s a s s umed t h a t a c t u a l y i e l d  a n d  A S C S  
yie l d o n  the trac t were e qua l .  
T h e  c o m p a r i s o n o f  c o s t s  w i t h  r e t u r n s  w a s c o n d u c t e d  b y  
d e t e rmining the share o f  t o ta l p roduc t ion co s t s  for bo th the l and l ord 
and t h e  t en an t .  Ea c h  p a r t y ' s  p r o po r t i o n a t e  s ha r e  wa s c ompa r e d  t o  t h e  
p ro p o r t i on o f  t he c r o p  t h a t e a c h  w <;> u l d  r e c e i v e .  The l and l o r d ' s  a n d  
t e na n t ' s  c o s t s  we r e  d e du c t e d  f r om t h e i r  s ha r e  o f  t h e  r e v e n u e  t o  
d e t e rmine the residual each wou l d  recei v e .  How much profi t e a c h  par t y  
re ce i v ed va!ied cons iderab l y  be twee n  re v enue o p t ions. Al l non-program 
ent er p ri s e s  except soybeans l o s t  money. 
Budgets  were ca l cu l at ed for 1 / 2- 1 / 2 ,  2 / 5 -3 / 5 , and 1 / 3- 2 / 3  c orn 
s hare l ease s ;  and 1 / 2- 1 /2 and 2 / 5 - 3 / 5  s oybean share l eases for t he Eas t  
Southe a s t  Region. For the Nor theas t  Region , net returns were e s t ima ted 
for  2 / 5-3 / 5  and 1 / 3-2 / 3  corn share l ea s e s , 1 / 3-2 / 3  bar l ey and 1 / 3- 2 / 3  
o a t sha r e  l e a s e s .  A b u d g e t  f o r  1 / 3 - 2 / 3  win t e r  wh e a t  s ha r e  l e a s e s  i n  
the Sou thwe s t  Region was a l s o es t ima ted (Ta b l e  6 . 5 ) .  
Tab l e  6 . 5  Est imated Costs per Acre for Se lected Crop Enterprises in South Dakota 
East East 
Southeast ' Southeast Northeast Northeast Northeast Southwes t  Al l 
Region Region Region Region Region Region Regions 
Soybeans Corn Corn Barley Oats W inter Wheat Set 
I tem 35 bu/acre 95 bu/acre 80 bu/acre 70 bu/acre 65 bu/acre 35 bu/acre As ide 
F ixed Costs : 
a $51 . 00 $51 . 00 $31 . 20 $31 . 20 $31 . 20 $24 . 00 ( b )  Land Charge 
Deprec iation/ Insurance 16 . 64 18 . 7 5  2 1 . 50 18 . 60 18 . 60 17 . 7 5  $1 . 7 5  
Interest Operating Cap ital 1 . 57 2 . 32 2 . 16 . 70 1 .  7 5  2 . 55 
Interest on Tractor 2 . 48 2 . 36 3 . 27 1 . 31 1 . 3 1 -;'( )'( 
Interest on Equipment 7 . 7 5  9 . 06 9 . 93 9 . 78 9 . 78 1 3 . oo�·� 1 .  as�·c 
Labor 9 . 00 9 . 35 11 . 65 6 . 80 6 . 80 8 . 50 2 . 17 
Crop Overhead 4 . 50 4 .  70 4 . 50 4 . 50 4 . 50 4 . 50 2 . 50 
Management Contribution 10 . 50 9 . 50 8 . 00 7 . 00 5 . 20 5 . 25 
Cash Costs : 
Repairs 11 . 61 11 . 98 14 . 56 8 . 24 8 . 24 9 . 10 1 . 00 
Fert i l i zer 5 . 00 20 . 50 15 . 00 16 . 80 16 . 80 7 . 50 
Seed 12 . 60 1 1 . 70 9 .  74 5 . 30 7 . 50 5 . 15 
Fue l and lubricants 6 . 05 5 . 90 7 . 16 4 .  7 3  4 .  7 3  8 . 50 1 . 12 
Herbic ide 10 . 94 15 . 75 15 . 7 5 . 61 . 90 6 . 50 4 . 15 
Insectic ide 10 . 17 10 . 17 1 . 20 
Grain Drying 15 . 20 12 . 80 
b 
Total 149 . 64 198 . 24 177 . 42 115 . 57 116 . 31 113 . 50 14 . 53 
<:i)  Eight percent of estimated land value . 
b )  Varies with the value of land set as ide . 
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Soyb ean Leas es 
S o yb e an s  w e r e  t h e o n l y  c r o p i n  t h e  an a l y s i s  t ha t  wa s n o t 
co vered by the 1 9 86 Federa l Farm Program. For this reason,  r e v enue s and 
co s t s  we re e s t ima ted on ly a fo r  ful l produc t ion and sa l e  of  the commod i t y  
a t  marke t p r i ce .  T h e  e s t i ma t e d  b ud g e t  f o r  a 5 0 - 5 0  l e a s e  o n  l a n d  
produc ing s oybeans as sume s f er t i l i ze r ,  seed , and he rbicide co s t s  are 
shared.  Yie l d  on this l and is set at 3 5  bushe l s . per acre (Tab l e  6 .6 ) .  
Us ing the se assump t ions , t he l and l o rd make s a l l o f  t h e  p ro f i t  
und e r  a 5 0 - 5 0  l e a s e .  Wi t h  a 4 0 - 6 0  l e a s e  h o we v e r , b o t h  pay a s ha r e  o f  
c o s t s  c l ose t o  the i r  out put s hare , and the t enant r ec e i v es some o f  the 
re sidual . 
The l an d l o rd pa i d  4 5 . 7 %  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s  ( $ 6 8 . 3 8  o f  a 
t o ta l  $ 1 4 9 . 64)  wi th a 5 0- 5 0  l ea s e  and the tenant paid 54 .3% .  Using a 
p r i c e  o f  $ 4 . 6 0 p e r  bu s h e l t o t a l  r e v e n u e  f o r  a n  a c r e  o f  t h i s  l a nd w a s 
$ 1 6 1 .  To ta l p ro f i t  af ter a l l co s t s  ha v e  been paid , inc lud ing return to  
l a nd , l a bo� , and mana g eme n t ,  is  $ 1 1 . 3 6  per a c r e . The  l an d 1 o rd a n d  
-
t enant e a c h  r e c e i v e  $ 8 0 . 5 0  i n  r e v e n u e , p r o v i d i n g  t h e  l and l o r d  wi t h  
p r o f i t  o f  $ 1 2 . 1 2 , and t h e  t en a n t  wi t h  a l o s s  o f  $ . 7 6 .  
A 4 0 - 6 0  l e a s e  a g r e e m e n t  f o r  a s i m i l a r a c r e  o f  s o y b e a n  
p ro d u c t i on p r o d u c e s d r a m a t i. c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s .  I n  t h i s  bud g e t 
on l y  fert i l iz e r  expense i s  s ha red.  The l and l ord pays 4 1 .3%  ( $ 6 1 .80 ) of 
the product ion co st , c l oser to t he s ha re o f  output rec ei v ed t han unde r  
t he 5 0- 5 0  1 e a s e .  D i v i s i o n  o f  r e t u rn s  am ong t he two p a r t i e s  p r o v i d e s  
the l and l o rd wi th a per acre pro f i t  o f  $ 2 . 60 ( 2 3% o f  tota l pro f i t ) , and 
t he t e nant $ 8 . 7 6 .  
Tab l e  6 . 6  Est imated Costs and Returns t o  Share Tenants and Land lords 
Per In Tota l Land l ord ' s  Tenant ' s  Land l o rd ' s  Tenant ' s  
Acre Output Farm Produc t ion Share o f  Cost** Share of Cost Share of Prof i t  Share o f  Pro f i t  
Region Crol! Y i e l d  Share f!:2g CostLAcre* � Percent Allount Percent � Percent Allowtt Percent 
ESE Soybeans 3 5  1 / 2 - 1 / 2  N $ 1 49 . 64 $68 • .'�8 45 . 7  $8 1 . 26 54 . 3  1 2 . 1 2  10 . 7  - • 7 6  - 7 . 0  
Soybeans 35 2 / S - 3 / S  N 1 49 . 64 6 1 . 80 4 1 . 3  8 7 . 84 58 . 7  2 . 60 2 2 . 9  8 . 7 6 7 7 . 1  
Corn 9 5  1 / 2 - 1 / 2  N 1 98 . 24 90 . 7 0 4 5 . 8  107 . 54 54 . 2  - 1 2 . 3 3 29 . 7  - 29 . 1 6  70 . 3  
Corn 95 1 / 2 - 1 / 2  y 1 7 1 . 70 8 3 . 1 7 48 . 4  88 . 5 3 5 1 . 6  2 9 . 74 54 . 9  24 . 44 4 5 . 1  
Corn 9 5  2 / 5 - 3 / 5  N 198 . 24 7 8 . 66 39 . 7  1 19 . 58 60 . 3  - 1 5 . 96 38 . 5  - 2 5 . 5 3 6 1 . 5  
Corn 9 5  2 / 5- 3 / 5  y 1 7 1 . 70 7 3 . 46 42 . 8  98 . 24 5 7 . 2  ' 1 6 . 9 1  3 5 . 0  3 7 . 3 2 6 5 . 0  
Corn 9 5  1 / 3 - 2 / 3  N 1 98 . 24 69 . 48 3 5 . 0  1 28 . 7 6 65 . 0  - 1 7 . 2 3 4 1 . 5  - 24 . 26 58 . 5  
Corn 9 5  1 / 3 - 2 / 3  y 1 7 1 . 70 66 . 06 38 . 5  1 05 . 64 6 1 . 5  9 . 2 5 1 7 . 0 44 . 98 8 3 . 0  
NE Corn 80 2 / 5 - 3 / 5  N 1 7 7 . 42 5 5 . 5 7 3 1 . 3  1 2 1 . 85 68 . 7  - 2 .  7 7  6 . 1 -42 . 65 9 3 . 9  
Corn 80 2 / 5 - 3 / 5  y 1 5 1 . 09 5 1 . 0 3 3 3 . 8  1 00 . 06 66 . 2  2 5 . 07 64 . 0  14 . 10 36 . 0  
Corn 80 1 / 3 - 2 / 3  N 1 7 7 . 4 2  4 7 . 7 2 2 6 . 9  1 29 . 7 0 7 3 . 1 - 3 . 7 2 8 . 2  - 4 1 . 7 0 9 1 . 8  
Corn 80 1 / 2 - 2 / 3  y 1 5 1 . 09 44 . 70 29 . 6  106 . 39 7 0 . 4  1 8 . 7 2 4 7 . 8  2 0 . 4 5 52 . 2  
Bar l ey 70 1 / 3 - 2 / 3  N 1 1 5 . 5 7 38 . 8 5  3 3 . 6  7 6 . 7 2  66 . 4  - 7 . 3 5 34 . 8  - 1 3 . 7 2  6 5 . 2  
Bar ley 70 1 / 3 - 2 / 3  y 1 0 1 . 61 3 7 . 60 3 7 . 0  64 . 0 1 63 . 0  9 . 59 3 5 . 0  30 . 36 65 . 0  
Oats 65 1 / 3 - 2 / 3  N 1 16 . 3 1  38 . 52 3 3 . 1  7 7 . 7 9 66 . 9  - 1 3 . 60 3 3 . 0  - 2 7 . 96 6 7  . o  
Oats 65 1 / 3 - 2 / 3  y 102 . ?.0 3 7 . 34 36 . 5  64 . 86 63 . 5  - 9 . 4 1  5 1 . 1  - 9 . 00  48 . 9  
SW W inter Wheat ( 2 5\SA ) 3 5  1 / 3 - 2 / 3  y 9 1 . 7 7 2 3 . 99 2 6 . 2  6 7 . 7 8 7 3 . 9  2 1 . 69 6 1 . 1  1 3 . 8 1 38 . 9  
W inter Wheat ( 35\SA) 35 1 / 3 - 2 / 3  y 8 3 . 0 7  2 2 . 39 2 6 . 7  60 . 68 7 3 . 3  24 . 02 56 . 5  18 . 48 4 3 . 5  
*Costs est Un8ted f rom a set o f  budgets used for farm aanagement in the Economics Dept . at S . D . S . U .  These budgets were deve l oped and updated 
by Drs . A l len , Janssen , and Pf l ueger , 1986 . 
**In the 1 / 2 - 1 / Z  
I n  the 2 / 5 - 3 / 5  
I n  the 1 / 2 - 1 / 2  
I n  the 2 / 5 - 3 / 5  
I n  the 1 / 3 - 2 / 3  
soybean share le�se the land lord shares fert i l i zer , seed , and herbic ide costs . 
soybean share lease the l and l ord shares fert i l izer costs on l y .  
corn share lease the l and lord shares fert i l i zer , seed , herbic ide , insec t i c ide , and d rying costs . 
corn share lease the land lord shares fert i l i zer , herbic ide , insec t ic ide , and d rying costs . 
corn share lease the land lord shares fert i l i zer , herbic ide , and insec t i c ide costs . 
In the l / 3 - 2 / 3
.
bar ley lease the land l ord shares fert i l i zer and insectic ide costs . 
In the 1 / 3 - 2 / 3  oats lease the land l ord shares fert i l i zer and insectic ide costs . 
In the 1 / 3 - 2 / 3  winter wheat lease the land lord shares fert i l izer costs on l y .  
I n  the Set As ide budget the land lord shares the input costs that are shared f o r  the c rop produced . 
1--' w 
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Corn Leases  
Corn budgets e s t ima ted in the Eas t Southeas t Region we re based 
on a pe r acre yie ld of 9 5  bushe l s  per acre.  Wi th the 50-50 s ha re lease  
l and lord and tena t  were as sumed t o  s hare fert i l i zer , seed , herb i c ide , 
insec ticide , and d rying c os t s  equa l l y. 
T o t a l p r o d u c t i on co s t s f o r  c o r n  we r e  e s t ima t e d  t o  b e  $ 1 9 8 . 2 4 .  
The l and l or d ' s  share - of $ 9 0 . 7 0 , o r  4 S . 8% , i s  be l ow the share o f  out pu t  
r e c e i v e d .  A c o r n  p r i ce o f  $ 1 . 6 5  p e r bu s he l  e a rns t h i s e n t e r p r i s e  
r e v enue o f  $ 1 S 6 . 7 S  when t h e  p ro du c t i s  s o l d  o n  the marke t a n d  a n e t  
l o s s  o f  $ 4 1 . 4 9 .  I n  t h i s  s i t ua t i on t h e l and l o r d  su f f e r s  a l o s s  o f  
$ 1 2 .33 , 2 9% of the to ta l l o s s  and t he tenant l oses  $ 2 9 . 1 6 .  
I f  t he p r o d u c e r s we r e  e n r o l l e d  i n  t he f a rm p r o g r am ,  t o t a l  
produc t ion co s t s  per acre dec rease t o  $ 1 7 1 . 7 0  becaus e of the s e t  a s ide.  
T he l and l o r d ' s  p r o p o r t i on of c o s t s  i n c r e a s e s  t o  4 8 . 4 % ; ( $ 8 3 . 1 7 ) ,  
b e ca u s e  t he l a r g e s t  c o s t  o f  s e t  a s i d e  i s  t h e  c h a r g e  t o  l an d . T h e  
tenant ' s  share o f  cos ts d rops  to $ 88 . 5 3 ,  S 1 .6% of the tota l .  · Per acre 
-
r e v e nu e  und e r  t he f a rm p ro g r am r o s e  t o  $ 2 2 5 . 9 3 p e r  a c re , p r o v i d i ng a 
p r o f i t  o f  $ S 4 . 2 3 .  The  l an d l o r d  i n  t h i s  ar r ang emen t t h e n  e a r n s  a n e t 
p ro f i t o f  $ 2 9 . 7 9 ,  S 4 . 9 % o f  t h e  t o t a l ,  a nd t h e  t enant  r e c e i v e s  $ 2 4 . 4 4 , 
o r  4 S . 1 % .  
A 4 0 - 60 l e a s e , u s i ng t he s ame a s s um p t i o n s  u s e d f o r  t h e  S O - S O  
l ease  exce pt tha t  on l y  fer t i l i z er , herbicide , insec t ic ide , and dry ing 
co st s are cons idered t o  be s ha red.  Aga in t he t o t a l  produc t ion c o s t  pe r 
a c r e  w a s  $ 1 9 8 . 2 4 .  Howe v e r , t h e  l a n d l o r d ' s  c o n t r i bu t i on d r o p s  t o  
$ 7 8 . 6 6 , o r  3 9 . 7 % ,  v e r y  c l o s e  t o  t he s h a r e  o f  o u p u t  r e c e i v e d .  T h e  
1 3 2  
t e nant p a y s $ 1 1 9 . 5 8 ,  o r  6 0 . 3 % .  B o t h  p a r t i e s  wo u l d  s u f f e r a l o s s  w i t h  
$ 1 5 6 . 7 5  i n  re v e nue . O f  t h e  t o t a l l o s s  o f  $ 4 1 . 4 9 , 3 8 . 5 %  ( $ 1 5 . 9 6 )  i s  
suf fered by the l and l ord and 6 1 . 5 %  ( $ 25 . 53 )  by the t enant . . 
Wi th enro l lment in t he f arm p rogram the dis tribu t ion o f  co s t s  
does not change much and the tenant receives a lmo s t  two thirds o f  the 
re s i du a l .  To t a l co s.t s  p e r  a c r e  a r e  a g a i n  $ 1 7 1 . 7 0 ,  of wh i c h t h e  l a n d ­
l ord bears $ 7 3 . 46 , o r  4 2 . 8 % , and t h e  t enant pays $ 9 8 . 24 , 5 7 .2% .  Prog ram 
b en e f i t s  p r o v i d e  a r e t ur n  o f  $ 2 2 5 . 9 3  and t o t a l p r o f i t  of $ 5 4 . 2 3 ,  t h e  
s ame a s  f o r  t h e  5 0 - 5 0  l e a s e .  T h e  l and l o r d ' s  s h a r e  o f  t h e  p r o f i t  i s  
$ 1 6 . 9 1 , 35%  of t he to t a l , and the t enan t recei v e s  $ 37 . 3 2 , or 6 4 . 9 % .  
The budge t  for the 1 / 3-2 / 3  c o r n  budge t  for a simi l ar acre u s e s  
the same assumptions a s  abo v e  excep t  that on l y  f e rt i l i ze r , he rbicide , 
a n d  i n s e c t i c i d e  c o s t s  a r e  s h a r e d .  W i t h  t hi s  ag r e eme n t , t h e  l and l o r d  
c o n t r i bu t e s  $ 6 9 . 4 8  i n  p r o du c t i o n c o s t s , 3 5 %  o f  the to t a l .  T h e  t e n a n t  
c on t r i bu t e s  $ 1 2 8 . 7 6 ,  o r  6 5 % , v e r y  c l o s e  t o  th e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  o u t p u t  
p ro p o r t i on s �  T h e  l and l o r d  b e a r s a l a r g e r  p r o po r t i o n  o f  t h e  l o s s , 
4 1 . 5 % , $ 1 7 . 2 3 ,  o f  t h e  t o t a l  l o s s , a nd t h e  t en a n t ' s  r e d u c e s  t o  5 8 . 5 %  
( $ 24 . 2 6 ) . 
When enro l l ed in the f arm program , t he l and l o rd pays a s l ight l y  
h i gh e r  p r o p o r t i on o f  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t s , 3 8 . 5 % , the t e n an t ' s  s ha r e 
d r o p p in g  t o  6 1 . 5 % .  D i s t r i b u t i o n o f  t h e  $ 5 4 . 2 3  p r o f i t  e a r n e d  i n  t h e  
prog ram prov ides the tenant wi t h  the l arge s t proport ion,  8 2 . 9 %  ( $ 44 . 9 8 )  
and t he l and l ord w i t h  1 7 . 1 % , or $ 9 . 2 5 ;  
Lan d in t h e  No r t h e a s t  R e g i o n i s  n o t a s  p r o d u c t i v e  as  t h a t i n  
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t he E a s t  S ou t h e a s t  Re g i on , p ro d u c i n g  an e s t i ma t e d  8 0  bu s h e  1 s o f  c o r n 
per acre . The e s t imated budge t  f o r  a 4 0- 6 0  lease f or c orn l and in t hi s  
region inc l ude s s haring fer t i l i z er ,  herb i c ide , ins ecti cide , and drying .  
T o t a l p r o d u c t i o n co s t s f o r  c o r n  p r o du c t i on a r e  $ 1 7 7 . 4 2 .  T h e  
l and l ord ' s  contribut ion to p r o d u c t i on c o s t s  i s  3 1 . 3 % ,  $ 5 5 . 5 7 ,  c o n s i d­
e r a b l y  l e s s  t han t he r e n ta l s h a r e .  T h e  t e na n t  c on t r i bu t e s  $ 1 2 1 . 8 5 ,  
6 8 . 7 % , t o  the e n t e r p r i s e .  S a l e  o f  t he c o r n  o n  t h e  ma r k e t p r o v i d e s  
_ $ 1 32 . 00 in re venue , and a l o s s  of $ 4 5 . 4 2 .  The t en an t  bears mo s t  o f  t he 
l o s s  9 3 . 9 % , $ 4 2 . 6 5 , whi l e  t h e  l an d l o r d ' s  s h a r e  o f  the  l o s s  i s  6 . 1 % ,  
o n l y  $ 2 . 7 7 .  
C o r n  p r o du c t i o n o n  t h i s  l an d , w h e n  e n r o l l e d  i n  t he p r o g r am , 
w ou l d  c o s t  a n  e s t i ma t e d  $ 1 5 1 . 0 9 , a n d  e a rn r e v e nue o f  $ 1 9 0 . 2 6 .  T h e  
l and l o r d ' s  s h a r e  o f  t he c o s t  r i s e s  m a r g ina l l y t o  3 3 . 8 %  ( $ 5 1 . 0 3 ) , b u t 
t h e s ha r e  of  p r o f i t  r e c e i v ed i s  6 4 %  $ 2 5 . 0 7 .  The t en a n t  o n  t h e  o t h e r  
hand p a y s  6 6 . 2 % o f  t h e  c o s t s , r e d u c i ng t h e  s ha r e  o f  t he p r o f i t  t o  
$ 1 4 . 1 0 ,  36%  o f  the total pro f i t  avai l ab l e .  
T h e  budg e t  f o r  a 1 / 3 - 2 / 3  l e a s e  i n  t h i s  r e g i o n  h a s  a l l t h e  
a s s um p t i o n s  o f  the 2 / 5 - 3 / 5  l e a s e , e x c e p t  g r a in d r y i ng c o s t s  a r e n o t 
s ha r e d .  A l a nd l o r d  w i t h  t h i s l e a s e  p a y s  $ 4 7 . 7 2  i n  p r oduc t i o n  c o s t s , 
2 6 . 9 % , and  t h e t e nant c o n t r i bu t e s 7 3 . 1 % .  B o th w o u l d  a g a i n  l o s e  m o n e y 
by se l l ing the corn on the marke t  whe r e  i t  wou l d  re turn on l y  $ 1 3 2 .  Of 
t h e $ 4 5 . 4 2  l o s s , t h e l a n d l o r d  w o u l d  b e a r  $ 3 . 7 2 , 8 . 2 % , and the t e nan t 
wou ld l o se $ 4 1 . 7 0 , 9 1 . 8% o f  the t o t a l .  
Whe n  t he l a nd i s  in t h e  f a rm p r o g ra m , t o t a l  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s  
a r e $ 1 5 1 . 0 9 .  The l a nd l o r d ' s  c o n t r i b u t i on i n c r ea s e s t o  2 9 . 6 % ( $ 4 4 . 7 0 ) 
1 34 
and t h e  t e nan t ' s  d r o p s t o  7 0 . 4 %  ( $ 1 0 6 . 3 9 )  P r o g ram be n e f i t s  wou l d  p a y  
$ 1 90 . 2 6 ,  providing a p ro f i t  o f  $ 1 8 . 7 2 ,  4 7 . 8% of the tota l profi t t o  the 
l and l o rd ,  and 52 .2% or $20 .45 to the t enan t .  
Sma l l  Grain Leases 
B a r l e y  p r o d u c t i on in t he No r t h ea s t  Re g i on is an . e s t ima t e d  7 0  
b u s he l s  p e r  a c r e  a n� g r own und e r  a 1 / 3 - 2 / 3  l e a s e .  W i t h  a 1 / 3 - 2 / 3  
l e a s e , on l y  f e r t i l i z e r  and h e r b i c i d e  c o s t s  a r e  s ha r e d .  T o t a l p r o ­
d uc t i o n  c o s t s a r e  e s t ima t e d  t o  b e  $ 1 1 5 . 5 7  p e r  a c r e .  A l and l o r d  wi t h  
t h i s  l ea s e con t r i b u t e s 3 3 . 6 % , $ 3 8 . 8 5 , t owar d  p ro d u c t i on c o s t s ,  v e r y  
c l o s e  to the share rent a l  p roport ion. The tenant wou l d  pay $ 7 6 . 7 2 ,  o r  
66 .4%.  Bo th par t ie s  wou l d  suff e r  a l o s s  by s e l l ing on the marke t with 
a pri ce of  $ 1 .35  per bushe l return ing o n l y  $ 9 4 .50  per  acre in re v enue .  
The l and l ord wou l d  l ose $ 7 . 3 5  ( 3 5% ) , and the tenant $ 1 3 . 7 2  ( 6 5 % ) .  
Enro l lment i n  the farm program wou l d  reduce per acre co s t s  t o  
$ 1 01 . 6 1 .  The l and l ord ' s  share o f  co s t s  wou l d  increase t o  36% ( $ 3 7 . 60) , 
a n d  t h e  t e n?nt wo u l d  c o n t r i bu t e  $ 6 4 . 0 1  ( 6 4 % ) .  Re v e nu e  f r o m  p r o g r a m  
bene fi ts  wou ld provide $ 1 4 1 . 5 6  in re v enue , l eav ing a prof i t  of $ 39 . 9 5  
pe r a c re af te r co s t s .  A l and l o r d  i n  thi s s i t ua t ion wou l d  make a p ro f i t  
of $ 9 . 5 9  ( 2 4 %  o f  t he tota l )  whi l e  the tenant wou l d  recei v e  a pro f i t  o f  
$ 3 0 . 3 6  ( 7 6 % ) . 
Oa ts production in the Nor thea s t  region usua l l y  occur s unde r a 
1 / 3 - 2 / 3  l e a s e  w i t h  f e r t i l i z e r a n d  h e r b i c i d e  c o s t s  s ha r e d .  Oa t s  
p r o d u c t i on i s  t h e o n l y  e n t e r p r i s e  t h a t  e a r n e d  a l o s s  und e r  t h e  f a r m 
prog ram. To tal per acre produc t ion co s t s  f o r  6 5  bushe l s  o f  oa t s  were 
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e s t i ma t e d  to b e  $ 1 1 6 . 3 1 .  T he s ha r e  o f  to t a l · p r o du c t i on c o s t s  p a i d  b y  
e a c h  par t y  mat che s their out pu t  s hare , the l and l ord paying $ 3 8. 52 , o r  
3 3 % , a n d  t h e  t e n an t $ 7 7 . 7 9 ,  o r  6 7 % .  A ma r k e t p r i c e f o r  o a t s  o f  $ 1 . 1 5  
per bushel re turns on l y  $ 7 4 . 7 5 ,  l ea v ing a ne t l o s s  of  $ 4 1 . 5 6 .  The l os s  
i s  s h a re d b y  e a c h  p a r t y  e xa c t l y a s  o u t p u t  i s  s ha r e d , 1 / 3  b y  t h e  
l and l o rd ,  2 / 3  b y  t he tenan t .  
Enro l lment in the farm p rogram d o e s  n o t  make oa ts product ion a 
prof i tab l e  enterprise but i t  does decrease the s ize o f  the l o s s .  Cos t  
p e r  a c r e  o f  o a t s  p r o d u c t i o n  d e c r ea s e s  t o  a t o t a l  o f  $ 1 0 2 . 2 0  und e r  t h e  
program. The l and lord ' s  share increa s e s  t o  3 7 % ( $ 37 . 3 4 )  and t he t enant 
p a y s  6 3 %  ( $ 6 4 . 8 6 ) .  P r o g r am r e v e nu e  t o t a l s  on l y  $ 8 3 . 7 9 , re s u l t i n g  in a 
l o s s o f  $ 1 8 . 4 1 .  B o t h p a r t i e s  l o s e  l e s s  p e r  a c r e , b u t  t h e  l an d l o r d ' s  
s h a r e  i nc r e a s e s t o  5 1 % ,  $ 9 . 4 1  wh i l e  t he t e n an t ' s  s ha r e  o f  t he l o s s  
d r o p s  t o  4 9 % ,  o r  $ 9 . 0 0 .  
Winte r  Whea t  Lease 
Win ter wheat produce r s  in t he Southwe s t  Region typica l l y l ea v e  
ha l f  of  thei r crop l and f a l l ow each year to maintain soi l moi s ture and 
f e r t i l i t y .  F o r  t h i s  r e a s on ,  en r o l l m e n t  in the f a rm p r o g r am o n l y  
increase s  re venue , be cause  t he s e t  as ide requiremen t does no t reduce 
p r o d u c t i on v o l ume or  c o s t .  Two w i n t e r whe a t  b u dg e t s. were e s t i ma t e d , 
a s s um i n g  en r o l l me n t  i n  t h e  f a rm p r o g ram ,  w i t h  a 2 5 %  and a 3 5 %  s e t  
a s i d e , 3 5  b u s he l s  p e r  a c r e  a n d  a 1 / 3 - 2 / 3  s h a r e  l e a s e .  F e r t i l i z e r  i s  
the on l y  variab le cos t shared by t he l and l ord.  
T o t a l  per  a c re w i n t e r  whe a t p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s  f o r  t h i s r e g i on 
we r e  e s t i ma t e d  t o  b e  $ 1 1 3 . 5 0 .  T e n a n t s  b e a r  a p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t he c o s t  
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wi th this agreement , 7 5 %  ( $ 8 5 . 52 ) , much l arg�r t han the i r  share of the 
ou tput . Land l o rd s con t r i bu t e  on l y  25% , $ 2 7 . 9 8 .  
Wi th a 25%  s e t  as ide , t o ta l  rev enue i s  $ 14 9 .00 , which p r o v i d e s  
t he l an d l ord w i t h  mo s t , · 6 1 %  ( $ 2 1 . 6 9 )  o f  t h e  p r o f i t .  The t e n a n t  e a r n s 
o n l y  $ 1 3 . 8 1 ,  3 9 %  of  t he t o t a l .  P r o g r a m  b ene f i t s  wi t h  a 3 5 %  s e t  a s i d e  
are $ 1 5 6 .00. The d i s tr i bu t ion of  prof i t s  betwe en tenant and l and l ord 
i s  equa l i zed s l ight l y , a l though the l and l ord st i l l recei v e s  mo s t , 57%  
( $2 4 . 02 )  of the  profi t .  The tenant rece i v e s  on l y  43% ( $ 1 8 . 4 8 ) .  
Conclusions 
The r e s p o n s e s  t o  the S ou t h Dako t a  F a r m l and Re n t a l s u r v e y  
s ug g e s t  t h a t  s ome o f  t h e  s ug g e s t i o n s  f o r l ea s e  imp r o v em e n t s  m a d e  b y  
Heady and Hur l bur t have been accepted.  Lease terms t ha t  share out pu t  
o f  a l l  p r o d uc t s  i n  t h e s ame p ro p o r t i on h a v e  b e e n  wi d e l y  a d o p t e d .  
Howe v er , annua l l ease s are s t i l l  the mo s t  popu l ar , and very few share 
l ea s e s  prov ide cash payment s in addi t io n  to the s hare renta l .  
A l  t i]. o u g h  a ma j o r i t y  o f  l e a s e s  d o  c o n t a i n  p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  some 
shar ing of inpu t cos t s , very f ew l and l o rd s  share a l l  of  the variab l e  
co s t s .  Sharing o f  a l l  variab l e  inpu t co s t s  i s  mos t  frequent i n  a S O-SO 
s ha r e  l e a s e .  T h e  i n pu t s  t h a t  a r e  mo s t  l i k e l y  t o  b e  s h a r e d , a r e  t h e 
one s t h a t ha v e  t h e mo s t  in t r a - p e r i o d  i n f l uenc e o n  ou t p u t  l e v e l s . 
Sharing of  fer t i l izer  cos t s  was repor ted mos t  of ten, wi t h  he rbic id e and 
inse c t icide a l s o  s hared by a s i gn i f i c an t  number of land l ord s .  
S ha r i ng o f  i n p u t  c o s t s  i s  a �e t h od f o r  ad j u s t i n g  t h e  s ha r e 
r e n t a l t o  an a p p r o p r i a t e  l e v e l f o r an i nd i v i d u a l t r a c t .  I t  i s  a l s o  
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used t o  reduce the tenan t s '  out l ay and r i s k  when producing crops  with 
hi gher variab l e  co s t s .  
Ana l ysis  o f  the e s t imat ed c ro p  budge t s  r e v ea l ed t ha t  the co s t s  
o f  p r o d u c t i o n  a r e  r a re l y  i n  p ro p o r t i o n  wi t h  t he s h a r e  o f  o u t pu t  
r e c e i v e d  b y  e a c h  par t y .  I n  a d d i t i o n t o  p r o v i d in g  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  
enro l lment in the farm program mov e d  the cost  di stribu t i ons t oward the 
a p p r o p r i a t e  p r o p o r t i o n s  i n  m o s t  c a s e s .  The d i s t r i bu t i on o f  t h e  
r e s i dua l p r o f i t s  v a r i e d  c on s i d e r a b l y d e p e nd i ng o n  t h e  t yp e  o f  l e a s e  
u s e d .  T h e  1 / 3 - 2 / 3  b a r l e y l ea s e  wa s t h e  o n l y  ag r e eme n t  whe r e  bo t h  
c o s t s  and pro f i t s  we re shared i n  appr oxima t e l y  the same proport ion as  
ou tput is shared. 
Use of  a 1 / 3- 2 / 3  lease for winter whea t produc tion cau s e s  the 
w i d e s t  d e v ia t i o n in sha re of c o s t s  a n d  r e t u rn s  f r om the s p e c i f i e d  
ou tput share.  Regar d l e s s of s e t  as ide l e v e l ,  the tenant paid 75%  o f  
p ro du c t i on c o s t s  but  the l a nd l o r d  r e c e i v e d a p p r ox i ma t e l y  6 0% o f  t h e  
prof i t . 
The par t i e s  t o  t he s o yb e an l e a s e s  e xam i n e d  s ha r e d  c o s t s  i n  
c l o s e  a p p r o x i ma t i on t o  t h e  ou t pu t  s ha r e , b u t  u s e  o f  a 6 0 - 4 0  l e a s e  
pro v i de s  the tenant wi th mo s t  o f  the prof i t .  Al l three corn l e a s e s  in 
the Ea st Southeas t reg ion ha� e t e rms tha t  d i s t ri bu t e  co s t s  wi thin 5 %  of 
ou tput share s .  On l y  40-60 corn l ea se s , a l l ow land l o rds and tenan t s  to 
s ha r e p r o f i t  in the same p r o p o r t i o n  a s  ou t p u t  i s  s h a r e d . T h e  t e nan t 
pa id a higher proport ion of  the c o s t s  and recei v e d  l e ss o f  the p r o f i t 
under bo th corn l ease s in the Nor thea s t  region of South Dako ta . 
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Chapt er 7 
SUMMARY , CONCLUS IONS , AND IMPL ICAT IONS 
The o v era l l o b j ec t i v e  of t hi s  research pro ject was t o  d i scover 
t he ma j o r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  f arm l a nd r e n t a l ma rke t s  and r en t a l 
ag reemen ts in S.D. Spec i f ic o b j ec t i v e s  were t o :  
1 .  Exam i n e  _t h e  s t ru c t u r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  f a rm l and 
r e n t a l marke t i n  South D a k o t a , i n c l ud i ng the  cha r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  
l and l ord s and tenants .  
2 .  Examine t h e  r e l a t i o n sh i p  o f  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  f a rm l and 
ren t a l  marke t participant s t o  ren t a l  agreement t erms . 
3 .  Tes t  for s i gnif ican t  d if f e rences in l ease t e rms by r e g io n  
and by cropping pat tern i n  S o u t h  Dakot a .  
4 .  Exam i ne t h e  a b i l i t y o f  t h e  f a rm l and r e n t a l ma r k e t t o  
respond t o  shor t  term chang e s  i n  unc e rtainty and f inancial condi t i ons 
and the t ypes  of adjus tmen t s  t ha t  are occurring. 
5 .  Examine t e rm s  o f  r en t a l  a g r eemen t s  f o r :  a )  p r e s en c e o f  
c o nd i t i o n s  f o r  e f f i c ie n t  u s e o f  r e s o u r c e s ,  a nd b )  t o  d e t e rm i n e  i f  
ren ta l  agreement s  dis tribu t e  cos t s  and returns approximate l y  a s  out put 
is s hared. 
D a t a  f o r  t h i s e f f o r t  are f r om t he 1 9 8 6  S D SU F a rm l an d  Re n t a l 
Survey,  comp l e ted by 1 1 5 5  l es s o r s  and l es s e e s  o f  South Dakot a  f arml a nd.  
De scri pt ive s ta t i s t ic s ,  c ro s s  tabu l a t i on , chi square tests  and ana l ys i s  
o f  variance were used t o  ana l yz e  the sur v e y  respon s e s .  
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Summary 
The f a rm l an d  ren t a l ma r ke t  in So u t h Dako t a  i s  p r e d om i na n t l y  
. 
l ocal in nature . Most res pond ent s l i v ed in t he same count y o r  a coun t y  
ad j o ining the l ocat ion o f  t h e  rented l and . Howe v er , a lmo s t  one third 
o f  nonoperat or l and l o rd responden t s  l i ved in ano ther s ta te .  
The r e  are  f i v e i d en t i f i a b l e  t e nu r e  c l a s s e s : 1 )  n o no p e r a t o r  
l and l o rd s ( 56% of respondent s ) , 2 )  fu l l owne r operator l and l ords ( 5 % ) , 
3 )  p a r t owne r o p e ra t o r  l a n d l o r d s  ( 5 % ) , 4 ) par towner opera t o r s  ( 2 6%) , 5 )  
t enan t s  ( 8 % ) .  Nono p e r a t o r  l an d l o r d s  r e n t e d  sma l l e r t ra c t s  a n d  we r e  
inv o l v e d  i n  fewer l ease s t han res pondent s  i n  othe r  tenure categori e s .  
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  b e ing the l a r g e s t  g r o u p  o f  re s p ond e n t s r en t i ng i n  
fa rm l and , par towner operators wer e  inv o l v ed in more l ease s , co v ering 
more ac res than other respondent s .  
Fu l l t e nan t r e s p o n d e n t s  h a d  t h e yo unge s t  age di s t r i bu t ion o f  
a l l  t enure c l as se s ,  sugge s t ing t ha t  many are re l a t ive l y  new farme r s .  
Nono p e r a t o r  l and l o r d  r e s p o nden t s  h a d  t h e  o l d e s t  age d i s t r i bu t i o n , 
i nd i c a t i ng a s i g n i f i c ant p r o p o r t i o n  w e r e  p r o b a b l y  re t i r e d , p o s s i b l y  
re t i re d  f a rmer s .  The va s t  ma j o r i t y  ( 7 5 % )  o f  re s p ond en t s  we r e  m e n .  O f  
women re sponden t s , o v e r  ha l f  were 6 5  year s o f  age o r  o l der.  
T he i n c i d e n c e  of i n v o l v e men t in t h e re n t a l ma r ke t  by b a n k s , 
g o v e r nm en t s , p a r t n er s h i p s , o r  c o r p o r a t i o n s  wa s l ow ,  l e s s  t h an 8 %  o f  
re sponden t s .  Howe ver , t rac t s  l eased b y  go vernment s  were mos t l y  pas ture 
a n d  w e r e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  l a r g e r  t han t ra c t s  r e n t ed by o t h e r  l a nd l o r d s .  
Over thre e f if ths of res pond en t s  had a t  l ea s t  o ne lease wi th unr e l a te d  
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ind i vi dua l s .  Re sponden ts l ea s e d  w i t h  r e l a t i v e s  w er e  l e s s  o f t en t ha n  
wi th unre l at ed part ie s ,  but rented l a rger trac t s .  Those who l ea s ed t o  
or  f rom unre l ated ind i v idua l s  wer e  mo s t  l ike l y  t o  hav e  mul t i p l e  l ea s e s .  
R e l a t i on s h i p  b e t we e n  l e a s i ng p a r t i e s  ha s m o r e  i mp a c t o n  t h e  
form o f  agreement than o n  the l and ren t a l  price.  Leases be tween fami l y  
member s and r e l ati ves we re o v e rwhe l ming l y  verba l , annua l agreement s .  
On l y  cash l eases  be tween unr e l a te d  par t ies we re wri tten more than ha l f  
the time. The l e v e l o f  sha re o r  cash renta l paid was not d i s ce rnib l y  
affec ted by re l a t i onship.  
Leas es between fami l y  membe rs and r e l a t i v es a re more l ike l y  to 
p r� v i d e  n o n- p r i c e  c on c e s s i o n s  to r e n t e r s .  The c a s h  r e n t a l p a ym e n t  
s c h e d u l e  wa sa nnu a l mo r e  o f t en i n  l e a s e s  b e twe e n  f ami l y  memb e r s  a nd 
r e l a t i v e s  t han i n  l ea s e s  b e tw e e n  u n r e l a t e d  p a r t i e s .  S ha r e . l e a s e s  
b e t w e e n  r e l a t i v e s  we r e  mo r e  l i ke l y  t o  p r o v i d e f o r a g e  u s e  o f  c r o p  
re sidue than were l ea s e s  wi t h  unr e l a te d  part ies.  
Re spondent l and l o rd s  leas ing to fami l y  membe rs were o lder and 
more re l i ant on income from the rented l and than l and l ords l ea s i ng t o  
re l a t i v e s  or unre l at ed persons . 
Regi ona l variat ion. In comp l e t ing the third ob jecti v e ,  renta l 
a g r e eme n t  t e rms w e r e  t e s t e d  t o  i d e n t i f y  s i g n i f i c an t  d i f f e r e nc e s  i n  
rent a l marke t s  be t ween regions i n  South Dako ta.  S oi l f er t i l i ty and the 
t ype o f  crop grown ,  from corn and s o ybeans in the Southeas t to  whea t in 
the We st , var ie s cons iderab l y  ac ro s s  the s ta te .  
Share l eases were mor e  l ike l y t o  be f ound on corn- soybean l and 
and wheat-grain l and t han o th e r  c ro p l and . 
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Cash ren ta l payment s were highe s t  i n  the predominan t l y  c orn and 
soybean reg ions . Cropping pa t tern on the rented l and a l so had a ma j o r  
inf l uence on rental  price.  Togethe r  they exp lain a l arge prop o r t i on o f  
t h e  v a r i a t i o n  in c a s h  r e n t a l p r i c e s .  Re n t  t o  v a l u e  r a t i o s  d i d n o t 
r e v ea l  many s i g n i f i c an t  d i f f e r e nc e s  b e tw�en r e g i o n s  o r  c r o p p i n g  
pa t t ern . 
S h a r e  l e a s e s  a r e  in s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  a t  f o ur l and l o r d - t e n a n t 
s hare percentages  ( 1 / 2- 1 / 2 ,  2 / 5- 3 / 5 ,  1 / 3- 2 / 3 ,  1 / 4- 3 / 4 ) .  Renta l  s hare s  
v a r y  b y  r e g i o n  and cr o p p i n g  p a t t e rn .  T h e  h i ghe s t  l a nd l o r d  r e n t a l 
s ha r e s  a r e  p a i d i n  t he E a s t e r n  c o rn g r o w i n g  r e g i on s  and d e c r e a s e a s  
sma l l  gra in and wheat produc t i on be come more prominent .  Howe v e r , the 
1 / 3- 2 / 3  land l ord- tenant share l ea s e  i s  used extens i v e l y  in a l l  areas of  
the s t a t e .  
percen tage s . 
S ha r e  l e a s e s  g en e r a l l y u s e  . on l y  f o u r  r e n t a l s h a r e  
Re s p on d e n t s  r e p o r t i ng h i g h e r  r e n t a l share s  and produc t ion o f  
c ro p s  w i th l: i g h e r p e r a c re c o s t  s ha r e d  m o r e  i np u t  c o s t s t han r e s p o n ­
den t s  wi th sma l l er renta l sha re s  or l ower c r o p  product ion c o s ts . 
The s i z e  o f  the rental t rac t v ar ie s  considerab l y  by the reg ion 
o f  t h e s t a t e  and cro p p r o du c e d . The a v e r a g e  si z e  of  r e n t e d  tr a c t s  in 
t h e wh e a t  p r o duc ing N o r t hwe s t  r e g i o n i s  a l mo s t  s e � e n  t i me s t h a t o f  
rented t ra c t s  i n  t he p redominant l y  corn and s oybean produc ing Southeas t 
region . 
Change s in rental agreement s . · Cash renta l price s changed more 
o f t e n , in a sh o r t e r  t i me s p an ( 1 9 8 5 - 1 9 8 6  c om p a red to 1 9 8 1  t o  1 9 8 6  f o r 
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o t he r  l ease t erms ) ,  than a n y  o t he r l ease term examined .  The g r ea t e s t 
inc idenc e and magni tude o f  change i n  cash rental prices occurred i n  the 
e a s t e r n  r e g i o n s  of the s t a t e , a nd o n  l an d  whe r e  c o rn and s o y b e a n s  a r e  
the mo st  impo r tant crops . 
Very few change s  i n  s ha re l ea se terms were reported.  Change s 
f rom annua l to mu l t i-year , and v e rba l  t o  wr i t ten agreement s we re o ff s e t  
by nea r l y  equa l amounts o f  chang e s  i n  t he other dire c t ion. 
Re spondent s changed f rom share t o  cash l eases  mo re of ten t han 
the reverse , the o ppos i te direc t i on of change an ticipated.  Fu l l owner 
operator l and l ords were the on l y  category of res pondent s  wi th s igni f i­
cant change f r om cash to sha re l ea s es . Respondents leas ing wi th fami l y  
members and nonoperat or l and l o rd s  changed from s hare t o  cash with t he 
g r e a t e s t  f re quency. 
E f f i c i e ncy c o nd i t i o n s  a n d  s ha r i n g  .£.!_ c o s t s  a nd r e t u r n s .  
E xami na t i o n  o f  r en t a l  a g r e em e n t s  r e v e a l e d t h a t  f ew c o n t a i ned a l l o f  
H ea d y ' s o r  Hur l b ur t ' s  c ond i t i o n s  n e c e s sa ry for an eff ic ient ( pe r f ec t )  
1 e a s e .  A l mo s t  a l l  r e n t a l s h a r e  a g r e emen t s  sha r e  t h e  o u t p u t  o f  
dif feren t  crops in the s ame propo r t i on.  However , few agreemen t s  prov ide 
a c a s h  pa ymen t in a dd i t i on to t h e  r e n t a l s h a r e , and mo s t  l e a s e s  a r e 
annua l .  Shar ing of variab l e . c o s t s  o cc ur s  to some degree i n  many s hare 
l ea se s , but  on l y  50-50  share l ea s e s  share a l l  var iab l e  co s t s  wi th any 
frequenc y . 
Input cos t sharing p ro v i s i ons are inf luenced mos t  by the s iz e  
o f  t h e  o u t p u t  s h a r e  and t h e  t y p e  o f  c ro p  g rown.  The g r ea t e r  t h e 
l a nd l o r d ' s  r e n t a l s h a r e  and t h e  h i g he r  t he v a r i a b l e  co s t  o f  c r o p  
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produc t i on ,  t h e  more l ike l y  i t  i s  t h a t  variab l e  cos t s  wi l l  be shared . 
The c o s t s  that are shared a re the ones that inf l uence seasona l outpu t  
l e v e l s  mos t  s i gnif i cant l y  ( f er t i l i z er , herbicide , and insec t i c i d e ) .  
O f  t h e  1 1  t y p e s  o f  s ha r e  l e a s e s  examin e d , on l y  t h e  1 / 3 - 2 / 3  
share l ea s e s  f o r  bar l e y  and oa t s  d i s t r i but e cost s and returns in c l o s e  
approxima t ion to  outpu t  share.  Cos t s  a re s hared propor t ionat e l y  i n  on l y  
t wo o f  the  o t h e r  n i n e  l e a s e s  e x am i ne d .  None o f  t h e  o t h e r  l e a s e s  
d i s t r i b u t e  r e t ur n s  a s  we l l ,  h o we v e r , p ro v i d i ng w i d e l y  d i v e r g e n t  
d i s t ribution s  o f  cos t s  and return s .  S ix o f  the l eases  examined prov ide 
l and l o r d s  w i t h  a s ha r e  of t h e  r e t ur n  l a r g e r  t h an t h e i r  r e n t a l c r o p  
share and a share o f  p roduc t ion c o s t s  sma l l e r  than the i r  out pu t  s hare .  
Conc lus ions 
Farm l and ren ta l in S ou th Dakot a  is a v er y  impo r tant component 
of re source contro l in the agri c u l tura l economy cover ing abou t  3 8% o f  
t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l l a nd . E x c e p t  f o r  t h e  l a r g e  p ro p o r t i on ( 3 3 % )  o f  
-
nono pe rator l and l o rd s  who l iv e  out-o f- s tate , the market i s  e s sent ia l l y  
a s e r i e s  o f  l ocal  ma rke t s  where l eases  are be tween ne ighbors , f r i end s , 
or re l a t i ves . 
Rent a l  agreement s ,  e s pec ia l l y s hare agreements , are gene ra l l y 
informa l annua l le as es , terms o f  whi ch are inf l uenced by trad i t ion and 
cus t omary pract ice.  Ren ta l agreement terms do vary with variat ions in 
c r o p  p roduc t ion c ond i t i ons , but mo s t  l ease t erms do no t vary wi t h  f l ue-
tuat ions in input and output pric e s .  Cash agreements , e spec ia l l y  cash 
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r en t a l p r i c e s ,  c ha nge mo r e  f re q u e n t l y  t han· s h a r e  l e a s e s , b u t  d o  n o t  
c ha n g e  a s  r a p i d l y  o r  a s  d r ama t i c a l l y  a s  t h e  e c on om i c  e n v i r o n me n t  
change s .  
Ana l ys i s  of charac ter i s t i cs o f  tenure c l a s s e s  sugges t s  tha t the 
t e nure l a dd e r  c on c e p t  is s t i l l  a pp l i ca b l e  to a m i n o r i t y  o f  ma r k e t 
par t ic ipants . Howe v er , the c ha ra c t e r i s t i c s  of par towner operat o r s  and 
the i r  dominance of the marke t sugge s t s  tha t mos t  l e s sees rent l and t o  
expand their farming ope ra t i on. 
The - wi d e s p r e a d  i n c i d e n c e  of mul t i p l e leas ing adds c omp l exi t y  
tha t  may strain the informal proces s es o f  t h e  farml and rental marke t i n  
t h e  fu ture . 
Incen t i v e s  for e ff ic ient us e o f  resou rc e s  have not been wide l y  
adop ted in mos t renta l agreement s .  In p rac t ice , i t  appear s that exc e p t  
f o r  1 / 3-2 / 3  sma l l grain l ea s e s  i n - Sout h  Dakota renta l sha re and i n pu t  
co s t  sharing pro v i s ions shou l d  be ad j us t ed t o  provide a more e qui t a b l e  
d i v i s ion o f  c o s t s  and re turn s .  
Impli ca t i ons 
T h i s  r e s e a rch e f f o r t  p r o v i d e s  a f a i r l y  c l ea r  p i c t u r e  of t h e 
s t ruc ture of the farml and r enta l marke t and terms of renta l agreement s 
used in South Dako ta. I t  a l s o  revea l s  some of the impac t s  of fac t o r s  
such a s  region , crop produced , t enure c l a s s i f i ca t ion ,  and re l at ions h i p  
be tween l ea s ing part ie s o n  the r en t a l  marke t and renta l agreemen t s .  
Producer s ,  land owne rs , and l end ers can u s e  t hi s  inf orma t ion t o  
guide them when cons ider ing t e rms o f  l and ren ta l  i n  the i r  area. Future 
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d e c r e a s e  i n  c omp e t i t i o n  f o r  r en t a l l a nd , l o we r i ng r e n t l e v e l s . T h e  
t r e n d  toward f ewe r a nd l a r g e r  p r o d u c i n g  f a rms c o u l d  p r o mo t e  f u r t h e r  
c on c e n t ra t i o n  i n  t h i s a re a .  A s h o r t a g e  o f  f a rm o p e r a t o r s  t o  r e n t  t h e  
l and may c ause a n  increa se i n  t he u s e  o f  c us t om hire.  
The ef fects of the lack o f  incen t �v e  c9nd i tions iri share l ea s e s  
i s  s t i l l  unknown. Case s tudi e s  cou l d  re vea l whether inpu t s  are app l ie d  
i n  equa l int ens i t i e s  acro s s  t enure t ypes.  Resul t s  o f  the ana l ys i s  o f  
ind i v idua l share l eases sugg e s t s  tha t  fur ther inv es t iga t i on into the 
i n come t ra n s f e r e f f e c t s  o f  s h a r e  l e a s e s  c o u l d  b e  b e n e f i c i a l .  
Exp l o ra tion of  po tent ia l modi f i ca t i on s  of share l ease t e rms shou l d  b e  
pursued . 
Expanded use of f l exib l e  ca sh agreemen ts cou l d  pro v ide the r i s k  
s ha r i ng ad v an ta g e s  o f  s h a r e  a g r e em e n t s , w i t h o u t  t h e  i ne q u i t i e s  t h a t  
a p p ea r  t o  b e  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  s h a r e  l e a s e s  exam i n e d .  T h e  g r e a t e r  
f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  f i x e d  c a s h  l ea s e s  t o  a d j u s t  t o  chang i ng e c o n om i c 
cond i t ions , i s  an advantage that c anno t be o v e r l ooked.  The bene f i t s  o f  
thi s f l exibi l i ty i n  cash l ea s e s  may outweigh the inc rease i n  risk f rom 
us ing them ins t ead of s hare lea s e s .  
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llllint priCticla widlin their lociMty 1M tlll 1t111. h � thia quationnlirt, you will Ill hllpint ta com,ill mat mlrktt infannltion for 1 988. 
This uwey il blinl 11M to 1 r1lldllll .... !If llotll 11111 IIMI IIIICiardl. Some QUIItiona may not .....,, ta YIIU but pteae reapand • comptetlty u 
pouillll. Your lfiiWtrl wil Ill klllt eonfidlmill lftd Ulld anty in COifttlilint tatll lftd mr�t� rnpon•. 
GENliiAL INFORMATION 
1 .  A rt  you 1 f 1m1  or rind! oper1tor in · Sou1ft D1hta in 1 988? 
o Ya 
e NG  
2. Art you 1 lando._ ltlline fln'lilnd to othtn ill 1 9867 
c 'fa 
e NG  
3. How llllftY leta of f1nntlftd, if any, do you: 
e. own? ICitl 
b. ltae tl ott.a? acrtl 
c. 11 .. tn. othtn? acra 
d. ftrm yourlllf? ICtll 
4. In wftlt county or countia is your llllld lind locltld? 
I. 
b. 
5. The number llld tatlt acra of ell your 111111 by IYPI ft: 
Number A era 
•· crop .n .. 
b. c11t1 r111t (CfOtl or l'llyl 
c. calli rent tpllturt onlyl 
�. livtltKII snn 
1. attw 
8. How mlfty of your ,,... 1rt: 
I. writtlft 
b. 01'111 
7. How many of YfNI '- �r�: 
I. llltUII? ----
b. mutti·yt•? -----
8. Ovtr tht pat five ye.,, hM any of your '- ....-. 
If "Yn," 
1. from writt111 to verb��? 
b. front Ydli to writt111? 
c. from ......., to multi-yttr? 
d. from lllllti-v- to lftiiUII? 
CROP SHARE LEASE SECTION 
_!!__._ � ,.,.... 
( 1 ) 0 (21 0 
( 1 ) 0  121 0 
1 1 1 0 (2) 0 
1 1 1 0  (2) 0 
9. Art �ou 1 tlnMt or landlord in any ClOP SNAil ,._ for erapllad 
or hay!IM? 
o 1 1 1  Y• If "Y-." go to a-tilt 1 0. 
o 121 No tf "No," go to Oullriln 2 1 .  
1 0. WMt .. your: 
1. n....., Gf cratt ....,. "-'1 
b. totll cr._, ICrll lll .. llllld? 
c. totll � lUll IMn lnud? 
d. tatll !rritiiiii iCl'a ••• llllld? 





Ewtn though you may hM mort tlrln one I III. pltau lfllwtr Oueltionl 1 1  
to 20 for jUit ane crot1 111 .. ltlll llflll'lllnt - lither your MOlT IMPOII· 
TAIT 011 MOlT nPtCAL crop 111 .. 11 ... 
t 1 .  Haw many 1er11 .,, undlr this ltMI .....,..,? ----
1 2. How many Y11f1 haft you leased me. ecra? ----
1 3. For thil ....,.n, (chick ant for udl qutltionl 
a. you n? 1 1 1 t- o 
b. tht ... il? ( 1 )  ... 0 
c. tht ... il? , , ,  .... 0 
( 21 llftdlord 0 
t 2) written 0 
t2l  rnufti·y•• o 
1 4. Tht ttniM'I shlrl of tilt output is? ICGftiCIIItt II that -� 






d. tlml hay (bromll 
1. nltift ltly 
1 5. Is th .. 1 Cllll ptynat in lddition to this shft rent? 
o t t l  Ya If "Ya." oa to Ouaticll 1 5a. 
8 121 No tt "No," oa to Ountiln 1 8  .
.. Haw mudl is that ..... rtnt? 
_____ totll 
or 
---- per ICII 
1 8. The ...., income-producing crQtltsl grawn IHI th• ICI'II il(nl? 
(dltdl .. tlllt tpplyl 
o 1. com 
0 b. 10.,-.s 
0 c. sargfUI 
O d. wftllt 
0 1. oats 
0 f. blrily 
0 a. othtr t.,.afyl 
1 7. For this 11111, daiS me tenlftt hiVI for�ge uu I grazing on stocb ar 
h.vtstint hlyl aftw the grlin is hlrVIItld? 
:: ( 1 1  Yn If "Y-." go to a.tilft 1 7L 
CJ 121 No If "No," go to llulll• 1 8. 
C I 1 1 Yn 
c 121 No 
22. Whet 111 your:. 
1. n...- of elltl '-1 
b. totlt era, ICI'II Cilia llllld? 
c. totlt ,..,..... ... Clltl llald? 
d. tot It .,._. ..... calfl luald?. 
L totii .,.... ICI'II caalt luald? 





Ev• thougll yeu lillY hM marl than OM IIIII. ptiiM lnl- Questions 23 
to 30 for just one C11t1 1.- ....,.,t - tither your MOST IMPORT AIT 
1 8. Of any CIIOP IIPUT costa th1t 1re sftlrld. wt11t n the ttnlm'a end 01 MOlT TYPICAl Cllh 11-. 





e. applicltion of chemicals 
f. irriQ1tion .,.,gy 
g. hematint 
h. drvint 
i. other (specify) 
T lnlllt'a l.andlord'a 
(Shn of Total 
1 9. Of 1ny MAY PIIOOUCnOI IIPUT coats that 1re sh1rltl, what Ire thl 





•� other ISC*ifyl 
T.,n·a lancllonra 
( S h i n  of T o u l l  
20. Ourine the 1111 five ye111 l or  t he  time y ou  have llllld this trect. if 
shonlr), hll: 
Ya No 
1. lend own•lhip chlflgld? ( 1 1 0 121 0 
b. thn bien 1 diffwlnt t.,ent? 1 1 1 0 121 0 
c. tM shn of inputs changed? 1 1 1 0 121 0 
d. tht number of annd inputs chlngld? ( 1 1  0 12) 0 
•· the ._ c:ftllllld from call to 
... rent? ( 1 1  0 12) 0 
f. the lendlord'a era, lhn incrl.-17 ( 1 )  0 121 0 
g. the landlord's crota lhn dlcreald? ( 1 ) 0 121 0 
CASH lEASE SECTION 
2 1 .  Are you 1 t1n1nt or landord in eny CAlli 11111 .....,..nta· for 
croPand ar haytancl? 
o 1 1 l Yn If "Y-." go to QUIItion 22. 
o 121 No If "No," go to au.ation 3 1 .  
23. How many acra "'* thil lllll ....,t? ----
24. How many ye.a hne you llllld thlll ecrn? ----
25. For this ...-..  (check. one for tldl question) 
1. you n? 
b. the II• is? 
c. the IIIII il? 
( 1 )  tMIIIt 0 (21 1encllonl C 
( 1 )  orll o 121 writtlft ::: 
( 1 1 emull 0 121 multi·ylar -
28. Wtlat wn/111 the 1 985 end 1 988 per Kre castl rent and your 
tatimltl of tM 1 988 per Krl merktt vllue of this ,__. l111d? 
Cull Rlnt Estimated 
Crop Type 1 985 1 988 M1rk1t Value 
I. irrioltld CtiPII 
grlina 
b. dryland crGIIII 
grlina 
c. llfllfl 
d. • .... hey lbnlmll 
1. nltivt hay 
$ __ $ __ 
2 7. Thi !Hjer income·producing cropCal grown on tltnl ecm islnl? 
lcl1lclc Ill that ICIP'YI 
o 1. com 
o b. soybe• 
c c. sorghum 
0 d. wheat 
0 I. Oltl 
0 f. blrlty 
o g. other (specifyl 
28. P1y!t*tf1 on this clstl lllll Ire midi? (check one) 
0 I 11 annualy 
o 121 twica yeerty 
0 ( 31 querttrfy 
0 (41 other 
29. Are thlrl ,._ promiona th1t very tht amount of clltl rant due to 
changn in y_,. or prieta? 
0 I l l  Y• If "Y•.'' go to Out�tion 291. 
o 12) No If "No," go to Que at ion 30. 
1. Ia rent ldiultld for ch�nt�� in: lchack anti 
0 ( 1 )  yilldl? 
0 12) prica? 
0 (3) botft? 
30. Ourint thl lut fivt y11n lor tht time you hlvt ltllld this triC1. if 
sltorttrl. hu: . 
YM No 
•· land owntrsttip cn.,.ct? 1 1 1 0 121  G 
b. thft blln I �fftrlftt tlftlllt? I l l  0 121 0 
e. tilt IIUI dlangtd from llllrt to 
eai rtnt? 1 1 1 0 121 0 
PASTURE/RANGE LEAS£ S£CTION 
3 1 . Art you 1 ttnlftt or landlatd in any lt1SIS for per1111N11t PASTURE tr 
ROGV 
. 
� 1 1 1  Yes If "Yes." go to Question 32. 
c 121 No If "No," go to Question 43. 
32. Whit trt your tot•: 
a. numblr of puturtlrange ltues? 
b. acrn pastw:tlrange ltlsed? __ acrtl 
Even thaugfl you may htvt mort than one ltlst. please answers Questions 
33 to 42 for just ont plsturtirange lease IQrttmtnt - eithtr yout MOST 
IMPORTAIT OR MOST TYPfCAL puturtlrtntt lust. 
33. How m111y acres under this aQrHmant? ----
34. How many yellS have you leutd these acrn? ----
3 5. For this agrlll'lllftt. (check one for etCh questianl 
a. you 1r1? 1 1 1  ttntnt G ( 21 1tndtotd :J 
b. thl •• is? ( 1) oret � 
e. tht llue is? I l l  annual :J 
1 21 written a 
( 21 multi·YIII 0 
36. The rent1l price for this tract in 1 98 5  and 1 986 w1slis: 
1 9 85 1 986 
a. per ICI'I 
or 
$· __ $ __ 
b. per animtl unit month 
37. Whit is tht 1 988 stockinQ rate? ___ acm per lllim .. unit 
38. Wh1t is the usu1l gruing sauon ltntth in months? ----
39. You .,, ltllint this ptsturtlrantt from or to: (chick anti 
0 I 1 1  individull. plrtMflfrip, or corporation 
c 121 government egency 
C1 13 1  tritlal gavtmmtnt 
o 141 other (.,..cifyl 
40. Which ptrty is rtiiiO"Iillll far: (chick tl thlt ... 1 
1. chlcking IMstodl 
b. sttt ancl minlrlll 
c. ftneinl ---
d. flftCinl lllllr 
t. IMIIOCk dlmlgt 
liMility inlurlnCI 
f. ftrtMU. Clll 
g. othtr (specify) 
T entnt l.lndlord -- ---
( 1 1  0 121 0 
I l l  o 121 0 
I l l  o 121  o 
1 1 1 0 121 0 
1 1 1 0 










4 1 .  The water sowcltsl is llrtl: (ctltci al thtt • vi 
::::; 1. str•• 
� b. pond 
0 c. well 
o d. rur• wettr systlftl 
0 1. other 11.,._1 · 
1 5 5  
42. Durint tht lilt fiYt ye .. or tht timt y ou  hl.vt ltllld this tract if 
shafttr. hu: 
a. l111d ownerstlip ctllftOid? 
b. thtrl bMn I difftrlftt ttnlllt7 
Yes 
1 1 1  CJ 
( 1 1 G 
No 
1 2) = 
12l � 
GENERAL RENTAL MARKET AND RESPONDENT INFORMATION 
This Jut section c011tlinl !tnt stts of questions. pltlll answer only 
thOII thlt apply to you. 
IF YOU LUll FROM OTHERS, answer lluntions 43 thrOUQh 49. If not. 
� to Question 50. 
43. Pltese indic1t1 thl numblr and totll acrn you ltesa from eeeh of the 
fotlowinQ landlords. 
1. P•.,ts or in·llws 
b. Otlw rllltM 
c. Unrlllttd incliwidu .. 
d. Financill institution 
•. Stltl gGVtrnllllr'lt 
f . Tribll gcmmmtnt 
g. Ftdlrll govtmm.,t 
h. Other 
Acres 
44. How did you typiclity first 111111 your leuld lllld wa evlillbll to rent? 
(chiCk ontl 
0 ( 11 From lllldawner dirtctty. 
:J 12 1  From 1 rtlltivt. 
c 13 1  From ntigtiOar or othlr individult. 
G (41 From 111W111...., or oth• medii ad. 
o 151 Othlr lupllinl ____________ _ 
45. At the time of yOUt oriein• agrt�mtntlal. w.-1 you ewn of camptti· 
tion from othlrs? 
Cl 1 1 1  Yes 
0 121 No 
48. When you rtniW leua. Itt you usualy in COmtMtition with othtn? 
0 1 1 1  YM 
0 121 No 
47. How would you l'lliultl tht opportunity for continuing to 11111 your 
mast importlftt triCt for the next five yttrs? lcirclt anti 
1 2 3 
v.., Unctrtlin Reuanlbfy 
Unctrtlil Ctrtlil 
48. Do you ...,._ yaw ftnn busintla a: ldlldl anti 
0 ( 11 .. iftchidull proprilt .. 1 
0 12) 1 �7 




49. Your 1nnuaf gross rtctiots from farmint IVIt'IQt? (chick OM) 
: 1 1  l Ltss than $ 39.999 
= 121  $40.000 to $99.999 
: 131 S l OO.OOO to S249.999 
: 141 $ 2 50.000 IX mort 
IF YOU LEASE TO OTHERS, answers Ouationl 50 thraugll 52. If not. go 
to Question 53. 
50. Pltue indicate tht numbtr and total acra you luu to liCit of me 
following tenlntl. 
I. Son, daught•. IX in·laWI 
b. Oth• rtfativt 
c. UnrtfattG d¥idual 
d. Non·famlv ptrtntrship 
t. Non·family corporation 
f. Othtf 
Numlltr Acrn 










4 .  
v.,.., 
Euy 
52. Who hlndla tht man.-n of your lttltl? (chick one or morel 
0 I. Mystff 
CJ b. Rtf1tivt 
::: c. Estate txtcutor 
� d. Proftllional farm m11119tr 
c t. Othtr ISCitcifvl -------------
Qutstions 53 throutt� 58 art for AU RESPOIDEITS. 
53. From tht standpoint of faimm. how would you classify your ltllint 
a"angamtntls)? (circle anti 
1 2 3 4 5 
Poor Fair Adtquatt Good EJctlltnt 
1 5 6  
54. O n  avtragt. _. ·income from era, and livntock procluction at farmland 
rental contributes what percent191 of yow totll houslllcMd incamt? 
lc:Mdl onel 
CJ 1 1 1  L111 diM 30� 
0 121 30� to 49� . 
0 131 50� 10 80� 
0 141 Mort thM 80� 
55. Your 111 is? !chtdc OMI 
o I 11 L111 than 25 ytltl 
o 121 25 to 34 ytltl 
o 131 35 to 44 ytltl 
c 141 45 to 54 ytltl 
a 151 55 to 84 Yllfl 
0 (6) 65 Ot mort , ... 
56. YOUI Ill is? 
� 1 1 1 M. 
a 121 Ftmalt 





58. Wt thri you for � this QUIItionnairt. If you hav• �ny addi· 
tional comments. ._ prov* thMI below. 
